Willingness-to-Pay for Attributes of High-Profile Jobs

Last registered on October 30, 2023

Pre-Trial

Trial Information

General Information

Title
Willingness-to-Pay for Attributes of High-Profile Jobs
RCT ID
AEARCTR-0011352
Initial registration date
May 02, 2023

Initial registration date is when the trial was registered.

It corresponds to when the registration was submitted to the Registry to be reviewed for publication.

First published
May 03, 2023, 4:39 PM EDT

First published corresponds to when the trial was first made public on the Registry after being reviewed.

Last updated
October 30, 2023, 11:38 AM EDT

Last updated is the most recent time when changes to the trial's registration were published.

Locations

Region

Primary Investigator

Affiliation
University of Erlangen-Nuremberg

Other Primary Investigator(s)

PI Affiliation
University of Erlangen-Nuremberg
PI Affiliation
University of Erlangen-Nuremberg
PI Affiliation
University of Erlangen-Nuremberg

Additional Trial Information

Status
On going
Start date
2023-05-11
End date
2024-05-31
Secondary IDs
Prior work
This trial does not extend or rely on any prior RCTs.
Abstract
In this pre-analysis plan, we describe a choice experiment that induces exogenous variation in the attributes of high-profile jobs. We focus on a specific type of high-profile job, namely tenured professorships, and aim at identifying the willingness to pay for certain job attributes among highly educated workers who actually hold this type of job, or will likely negotiate about a tenured professorship in the near future. The key features of the experimental design follow Maestas et al. (2018). The job attributes we study include performance-related pay, the option to negotiate about further pay increases, and mobility requirements. Special attention will be given to gender differences in the willingness-to-pay for (avoiding) these attributes.

UPDATE:
The original choice experiment induces exogenous variation in the attributes of high-profile jobs. We conducted the experiment and, in accordance with the pre-analysis plan, devoted special attention to gender differences in the WTP for job attributes. Importantly, we did not find any such differences across the attributes we study, with the exception of a higher WTP among women for gender diversity among high-profile co-workers. We now plan to extend the experimental design to shed light on the reasons for the absence of gender differences where previous literature suggests such differences should occur. Our main focus will be on selection into high-profile jobs based on preferences (risk preferences, willingness to compete, family-related preferences). For that purpose, we will run similar choice experiments as the one described in the original registration in a sample of Ph.D. students and a sample of university students (i.e., of highly educated individuals before selection into high-profile jobs has taken place). Data collection for the extension will start on October 30, 2023.
External Link(s)

Registration Citation

Citation
Högn, Celina et al. 2023. "Willingness-to-Pay for Attributes of High-Profile Jobs." AEA RCT Registry. October 30. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.11352-2.0
Sponsors & Partners

There is information in this trial unavailable to the public. Use the button below to request access.

Request Information
Experimental Details

Interventions

Intervention(s)
This pre-analysis plan refers to an online choice experiment that allows us to elicit workers' preferences over jobs under exogenous variation in job attributes. Our main contribution relative to previous studies using similar approaches is that we focus on high-profile job offers. A key feature of our design is that we sample workers who actually hold this type of job, or will likely negotiate about a high-profile job offer in the near future. In order to do so, we focus on an important segment of the market of high-profile jobs, namely the market for tenured professorships. In collaboration with the association of professors in Germany (Deutscher Hochschulverband, DHV), we plan to collect data in a sample of high-profile workers. The population of workers to be invited to the survey consists of active associate and full professors (most of them tenured) and (non-tenured) assistant professors, many of whom will likely negotiate about a job offer for a tenured professorship in the near future. The experimental design aims at identifying the willingness-to-pay (WTP) for certain job attributes. The job attributes we study include performance-related pay, the option to negotiate about further pay increases, and mobility requirements (plus other job attributes discussed in the following). Special attention will be given to gender differences in the willingness-to-pay for (avoiding) these attributes.

In many aspects, our experimental design follows Maestas et al. (2018), who use a survey experiment to estimate the WTP of workers for alternative work arrangements and various non-wage characteristics of job offers. The approach is based on the idea of inducing random variation in fictitious job profiles and observing the choices individuals make when facing the tradeoff between these hypothetical job offers with different wage and non-wage characteristics. The resulting data allow us to identify the workers' average willingness to pay for the presence of certain job characteristics.

UPDATE: see PAP
Intervention Start Date
2023-05-11
Intervention End Date
2024-02-29

Primary Outcomes

Primary Outcomes (end points)
Binary variable indicating the subjects' choice between two hypothetical job offers
Primary Outcomes (explanation)

Secondary Outcomes

Secondary Outcomes (end points)
Secondary Outcomes (explanation)

Experimental Design

Experimental Design
Before participating in the experiments, each respondent answers a survey about demographics and current job characteristics. We elicit the following:
- current position (Post-Doc, Assistant Professor (W1, no tenure track), Assistant Professor (W1, tenure track), Associate Professor (W2, non-tenured), Associate Professor (W2, tenured), Full Professor (W3, non-tenured), Full Professor (W3, tenured)
- age (if tenured: <40, 40-49, 50-60, >60; if non-tenured: <35, 35-39, 40-44, >44)
- gender
- children of primary school age, or younger, who need some form of care during workdays (yes/no)
- taking into account private and family situation: flexibility in choosing a place of residence (Likert scale from 1 (very unflexible) to 7 (very flexible))
- current workplace in daily commuting distance from main place of residence (yes/no)
- federal state (current position)
- discipline (social sciences, law, natural sciences, engineering, economics and business, medicine)
- if non-tenured: how well informed about negotiations for a professorship and the topics typically raised in such negotiations (Likert scale from 1 (very poorly) to 7 (very well))
- if non-tenured: with how many people in touch regularly regarding academic career, negotiations, and other related topics (nobody, one person, two people, ..., 5 people, more than 5 people)
- if tenured: performance-related bonus in current position (yes/no)
- if tenured: number of past negotiations for a professorship (1, 2, 3, more than 3)

After the survey, we administer a series of ten stated-preference experiments to each survey respondent. In each of these experiments, survey respondents are asked to select between two job offers, each defined by a partially varying set of non-wage job characteristics and the job's monetary compensation. To minimize the risk of differential perceptions regarding unspecified job characteristics, we instruct respondents to assume that any job attributes not mentioned are identical across offers.

The job offers' monetary compensations comprise two components. The first component is a fixed base pay that is given by the regulations regarding the compensation of tenured professors in the respective federal state. For a given participant, this base pay in the experiment does not vary between job offers and is the same across all 10 experiments. The second component is the bonus. We leverage this bonus to induce random variation in monetary compensations. Using a discipline-specific mean bonus, m, the random variation in the bonus is achieved by setting the bonuses of Offer A and Offer B as c_A*m and c_B*m, respectively, where c_A and c_B follow a N(1, 0.075) distribution. We truncate both weights to lie between 0.5 and 1.5 and round the bonus values to full Euro amounts.

The offers' non-wage characteristics vary freely. We consider the following characteristics:
- Mobility requirements, measured by whether or not the job's location is within commuting distance of the preferred place of residence for the respondent and her family
- Academic reputation, measured by whether or not the university offering the job has the status of an "Exzellenz-Universität" in the German system of higher education
- Child care options, measured by whether or not the university offers guaranteed placement in a child care facility
- Share of women among professors at the university department offering the job (10%, 25%, or 40%)
- Performance-related pay, measured by whether or not the job features a bonus that is contingent on the job holder reaching certain pre-defined goals
- Option to negotiate further pay increases, measured by whether or not there is an option to negotiate about a further bonus after three years

When creating hypothetical Offers A and B, we randomly select two of these non-wage attributes to vary across the two offers (in addition to the monetary compensation, which always varies between offers). Within each of the two randomly selected attributes, we choose corresponding attribute values at random sequentially for both offers without replacement. This makes sure that Offer A and Offer B actually vary in the selected attributes. We adapt the strategy used by Maestas et al. (2018) to limit the number of job pairs in which one of the jobs dominates the other on all varying dimensions.

In addition to the 10 choice experiments, we include one further survey question that serves as an attention check. When facing this question, which appears randomly between the fourth and the last choice experiment, respondents are instructed to respond in a specific way (mark two specific options from a choice menu), irrespective of what they believe is the true answer to the respective question. The attention check question allows us to estimate the share of inattentive participants and test the robustness of our findings with respect to excluding inattentive respondents.

In terms of implementation, in each experiment we display the hypothetical job offers with all characteristics side by side. We instruct respondents to either select ``Prefer Offer A,'' or ``Prefer Offer B.'' Each respondent makes the binary decision between Offer A and Offer B in 10 distinct sequential experiments.

UPDATE: see PAP
Experimental Design Details
Not available
Randomization Method
Randomization by a computer
Randomization Unit
Individual choice between two hypothetical job offers
Was the treatment clustered?
No

Experiment Characteristics

Sample size: planned number of clusters
We will invite about 23.800 subjects to participate in the survey experiment. We hope to be able to collect data from at least 2400 subjects. Each subject will make 10 choices between pairs of fictitious job offers.

UPDATE: see PAP
Sample size: planned number of observations
We will invite about 23.800 subjects to participate in the survey experiment. We hope to be able to collect data from at least 2400 subjects. Each subject will make 10 choices between pairs of fictitious job offers. UPDATE: see PAP
Sample size (or number of clusters) by treatment arms
There are no treatment arms in our design, but the job offers' characteristics vary randomly in each individual choice experiment.
Minimum detectable effect size for main outcomes (accounting for sample design and clustering)
We do not have any baseline data and thus cannot provide minimum detectable effect sizes. However, assuming that our key variables are distributed similarly as the key variables in Maestas et al. (2018), we are confident that we will be able to detect relatively small effects. For instance, Maestas et al. (2018) estimate that a switch from a fast-paced to a relaxed job (holding all other job characteristics constant) is equivalent to a 4.4 percent wage increase. Similarly, they estimate that the option to telecommute (without a differentiation on how intensely this option may be used by the worker) is equivalent to a 4.1 percent wage increase. These estimates are based on a sample of 1,815 survey respondents and significant at the one percent level. Assuming that we will be able to collect data from at least 2,400 respondents, we expect to be able to identify wage premia for our key attributes (performance-dependent pay, option to negotiate further pay increase, and mobility requirements) of less than 4 percent. UPDATE: see PAP
IRB

Institutional Review Boards (IRBs)

IRB Name
Ethics Committee at the Department of Business, Economics, and Society of the University of Erlangen-Nuremberg
IRB Approval Date
2023-03-24
IRB Approval Number
N/A. Extension was approved by the the same IRB on 2023-07-27
Analysis Plan

There is information in this trial unavailable to the public. Use the button below to request access.

Request Information