Delegation in the household : Theory and Experimental Evidence

Last registered on May 17, 2023
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Pre-Trial

Trial Information

General Information

Title
Delegation in the household : Theory and Experimental Evidence
RCT ID
AEARCTR-0011353
Initial registration date
May 15, 2023

Initial registration date is when the trial was registered.

It corresponds to when the registration was submitted to the Registry to be reviewed for publication.

First published
May 17, 2023, 2:54 PM EDT

First published corresponds to when the trial was first made public on the Registry after being reviewed.

Locations

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Primary Investigator

Name
Marie Boltz
Affiliation
University of Strasbourg, BETA
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Other Primary Investigator(s)

PI Name
Catherine Guirkinger
PI Affiliation
University of Namur
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PI Name
Roberta Ziparo
PI Affiliation
Aix Marseille University
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PI Name
Anna Jolivet
PI Affiliation
University of Namur / F.N.R.S.
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PI Name
Jean-Marie Baland
PI Affiliation
University of Namur
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Additional Trial Information

Status
In development
Start date
2023-05-10
End date
2024-06-30
Keywords
Behavior, Gender
Additional Keywords
intra-household decision model, delegation model ; couples ; consumption decisions
JEL code(s)
D13, O12
Secondary IDs
Prior work
This trial does not extend or rely on any prior RCTs.
Abstract
Bargaining power within the couple is often proxied in surveys by measures of who has a say in the decision -- with the idea that the more a couple discusses about choices to make, the more balanced is the bargaining power within the couple. However, arguing and discussing over a choice could also reflect non-aligned preferences among partners: with perfectly aligned preferences, who decides is not so important and delegation of the decision power becomes an efficient outcome.

We explore this pattern in a theoretical framework looking at the equilibrium decision structure in the household, analyzing how the degree of preference alignment and the differences in the opportunity costs of time determine when delegation or negociation is preferable. We consider a non-cooperative framework for intra-household decisions drawing from models of delegation of authority in firms developed by Dessein (2002) and Aghion and Tirole (1997). We test the predictions of the model in an online experiment conducted among couples.

External Link(s)

Registration Citation

Citation
Baland, Jean-Marie et al. 2023. "Delegation in the household : Theory and Experimental Evidence." AEA RCT Registry. May 17. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.11353-1.0
Sponsors & Partners

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Experimental Details

Interventions

Intervention(s)
We will conduct an online experiment with couples living in the region of Namur. Participants will be contacted by mails. If they are interested to take part in the survey and if they satisfy our eligibility criteria -- being above 18, living in couple for more than 2 years --, both partners could register into the survey platform and start to answer the survey. In the experiment, we elicit the willingness to pay for different goods for both partners. We will randomly vary across games and partners the cost to acquire information about the goods. We will thus test whether, given a certain cost and the degree of expected preference (non) alignment for the good within the couple, the individual will want to pay to acquire information about the good and/or choose to delegate rather to participate in the decision.
We will further correlate these decisions with survey measures such as task sharing within the household, and decisions in vignette situations from the post-experiment questionnaire.
Intervention Start Date
2023-05-10
Intervention End Date
2023-10-31

Primary Outcomes

Primary Outcomes (end points)
Our key outcomes will be the decisions to pay to acquire more information within the experiment or not and the decision to delegate or to participate in the decision across games. We will also analyze the degree of preference (non) alignment.
Primary Outcomes (explanation)
We will construct the degree of preference (non) alignment by comparing the difference between one's own willingness to pay (WTP) for a good and the partner's WTP for the same good. We will also compute it by looking at the difference between one's own WTP for a good and what he/she thinks is the partner's WTP for the good.

Secondary Outcomes

Secondary Outcomes (end points)
We will further exploit questions from the survey about decision making within the couples (like vignettes or survey questions about task sharing within the households).
Secondary Outcomes (explanation)

Experimental Design

Experimental Design
Participants will be contacted by mails. If they are interested to take part in the survey and if they satisfy our eligibility criteria -- being above 18, living in couple for more than 2 years --, both partners could register into the survey platform and start to answer the survey. Partners will have to connect at the same time.

(1) In the experiment we first elicit the willingness to pay for different goods for both partners.

(2) We will randomly partition the set of goods between partners - so that they make the following decisions on different goods to avoid incentives to communicate.
We will vary across games and partners the cost to acquire information about the goods.
We will thus test whether, given a certain cost and the degree of expected preference (non) alignment for the good within the couple, the individual will want to pay to acquire information about the good and/or choose to delegate rather to participate in the decision.

Experimental Design Details
Not available
Randomization Method
The randomization is done in office by a computer.
Randomization Unit
Within couple, individual randomization - multiple games. We observe both partners.
Was the treatment clustered?
No

Experiment Characteristics

Sample size: planned number of clusters
0
Sample size: planned number of observations
TBD - it depends on the take up after sending the email invitations.
Sample size (or number of clusters) by treatment arms
Within individual treatment arms.
Minimum detectable effect size for main outcomes (accounting for sample design and clustering)
Supporting Documents and Materials
IRB

Institutional Review Boards (IRBs)

IRB Name
Comité d'Ethique en Sciences Humaines de l'UNamur
IRB Approval Date
2021-09-28
IRB Approval Number
2021/2
Analysis Plan