Costly Information in Experimental Assets Markets

Last registered on May 25, 2023

Pre-Trial

Trial Information

General Information

Title
Costly Information in Experimental Assets Markets
RCT ID
AEARCTR-0011425
Initial registration date
May 15, 2023

Initial registration date is when the trial was registered.

It corresponds to when the registration was submitted to the Registry to be reviewed for publication.

First published
May 17, 2023, 2:53 PM EDT

First published corresponds to when the trial was first made public on the Registry after being reviewed.

Last updated
May 25, 2023, 2:47 PM EDT

Last updated is the most recent time when changes to the trial's registration were published.

Locations

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Primary Investigator

Affiliation
UCI

Other Primary Investigator(s)

PI Affiliation
UCI

Additional Trial Information

Status
On going
Start date
2023-03-16
End date
2023-12-31
Secondary IDs
Prior work
This trial does not extend or rely on any prior RCTs.
Abstract
In this study we add to the long tradition of assets market experiments going back to the seminal work of Plott and Sunder in the late 80’s and early 90’ by closely looking at the interaction between costly information acquisition and trading purpose. We conduct a laboratory assets market experiment wit an Overlapping Generations framework where there are speculating investors (who do not collect dividends and trade only for capital gains since they won't be "alive" when dividends realize) and dividend-collecting investors (who will be "alive" when state-contingent dividends are paid).
External Link(s)

Registration Citation

Citation
Klapp, Francisco and Radhika Lunawat. 2023. "Costly Information in Experimental Assets Markets." AEA RCT Registry. May 25. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.11425-1.1
Experimental Details

Interventions

Intervention(s)
Intervention Start Date
2023-04-14
Intervention End Date
2023-12-31

Primary Outcomes

Primary Outcomes (end points)
- Information dissemination -but NOT information aggregation- for both investor types under both information structures, as measured by deviations from fundamental asset price.
- Likelihood of information acquisition (% of predicted requesters by type) and whose information is more likely to be incorporated into prices?
- Price informativeness (about the state of the world) and efficiency (deviations from fundamental price) of the interaction b/w trading purpose and information acquisition?
- Trading intensity (trading volume) and its interaction with trading purpose and information acquisition?
Primary Outcomes (explanation)

Secondary Outcomes

Secondary Outcomes (end points)
Secondary Outcomes (explanation)

Experimental Design

Experimental Design
The experimental implementation consists of randomly assigning participants to different generations or cohorts in each of the eight 3-period sequences that make up a session. Members of each cohort face different trading motivations (speculation or dividend collection) in each period's double auction asset market given by the overlapping generations structure and state contingent dividend design.

In terms of the treatments we use both a between and within design. In half of the sessions information about the "state of the world" that determines dividend payments is freely given to half the market participants, in the other half this information is costly and can be acquire by up to half the participants. In each session, regardless of the information structure, all participants will eventually encounter both trading motivations depending on on the cohort for the sequence they been assigned to.

In terms of the actual interface, we use Otree and run sessions online with members of the UCI ESSL subject pool. Instructions, a comprehension test and 2 practice sequence are directed by a researcher trough Zoom and then participants are left for the remaining 8 sequence on their own.
Experimental Design Details
Not available
Randomization Method
Recruitment of volunteers using SONA software: Students enroll in one of the offered dates using our website and they are paired with 23 other students who decided to enroll in the same date. If more than 24 volunteers enroll for a single date we randomly select (using a random number generator) which students will participate. Those who are not selected to participate can enroll again for an upcoming session.
Randomization Unit
Group (session) randomization for cost information availability treatment, and individual
Was the treatment clustered?
Yes

Experiment Characteristics

Sample size: planned number of clusters
8 sessions of 24 students each
Sample size: planned number of observations
192 students
Sample size (or number of clusters) by treatment arms
4 sessions for public information control and 4 sessions for costly information
Minimum detectable effect size for main outcomes (accounting for sample design and clustering)
IRB

Institutional Review Boards (IRBs)

IRB Name
University of California, Irvine Institutional Review Board
IRB Approval Date
2022-05-25
IRB Approval Number
2011 - 8378