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Field
Trial End Date
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Before
December 31, 2023
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After
June 30, 2024
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Field
Last Published
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Before
June 23, 2023 05:13 PM
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After
February 18, 2024 10:53 AM
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Field
Intervention (Public)
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Before
The aim of the laboratory experiment is to study the causal relationship between heterogeneity in life expectancy due to economic inequality and the amount of intragenerational redistribution in a stylized social security system. In the experiment, subjects are assigned the role of an involved social planner. In the framework of a hypothetical social security system, the social planner is asked to redistribute benefits among a group of persons who differ in their contribution-based entitlements. Depending on the treatment, the group members may also differ in their 'mortality risk', which is implemented in the experiment as the probability of default in terms of receiving a zero payoff instead of the benefit. The decision of the social planner is made from behind the veil of ignorance (VOI), that is, she learns her position in the group in terms of her own entitlement, mortality risk, and (expected) benefit only after having made her choice about the level of redistribution.
As a new feature compared to a former version of this experiment, positions in the group are still randomly assigned, but the social planner knows prior to her choice that she has to earn the entilement associated with her position ex-post. In the experiment, entitlements will be associated with a waiting time, whereby a higher waiting time is attached to a higher entitlement (as this results from a higher effort). Subjects are fully-informed and have to fulfill the waiting time of their position at the end of the experiment.
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After
The aim of the laboratory experiment is to study the causal relationship between heterogeneity in life expectancy due to economic inequality and the amount of intragenerational redistribution in a stylized social security system. In the experiment, subjects are assigned the role of an involved social planner. In the framework of a hypothetical social security system, the social planner is asked to redistribute benefits among a group of persons who differ in their contribution-based entitlements. Depending on the treatment, the group members may also differ in their 'mortality risk', which is implemented in the experiment as the probability of default in terms of receiving a zero payoff instead of the benefit. The decision of the social planner is made from behind the veil of ignorance (VOI), that is, she learns her position in the group in terms of her own entitlement, mortality risk, and (expected) benefit only after having made her choice about the level of redistribution.
As a new feature compared to a former version of this experiment, positions in the group are still randomly assigned, but the social planner knows prior to her choice that she has to earn the entilement associated with her position ex-post. In the experiment, entitlements will be associated with a waiting time, whereby a higher waiting time is attached to a higher entitlement (as this results from a higher effort). Subjects are fully-informed and have to fulfill the waiting time of their position at the end of the experiment.
In a new version, entitlements will be associated with a real-effort task instead of a waiting time. Subjects have to position a certain number of sliders at the end of the experiment. The number of sliders corresponds to the entitlement of their position. Still, subjects are fully-informed that they have to complete the slider-task at the end of the experiment.
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Field
Intervention End Date
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Before
December 31, 2023
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After
June 30, 2024
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Field
Experimental Design (Public)
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Before
The redistribution task, which is repeated 4 times with a different parametrization, is to choose the preferred degree of redistribution of the initial social security contributions from among the five positions of a group. The five positions vary with respect to their contribution-based entitlements and associated waiting time. Depending on the treatment, the group members may also differ in their 'mortality risk', which is implemented in the experiment as the probability of default in terms of receiving a zero payoff instead of the benefit.
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After
The redistribution task, which is repeated 4 times with a different parametrization, is to choose the preferred degree of redistribution of the initial social security contributions from among the five positions of a group. The five positions vary with respect to their contribution-based entitlements and associated waiting time. In the new version, waiting time will be replaced by a slider-taks. Depending on the treatment, the group members may also differ in their 'mortality risk', which is implemented in the experiment as the probability of default in terms of receiving a zero payoff instead of the benefit.
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Field
Planned Number of Observations
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Before
4 treatments between-subjects
2 sessions per treatment
30 participants per session
4 observations per participant
= 240 observations per treatment
= 960 observations in total
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After
4 treatments between-subjects
2 sessions per treatment
30 participants per session
4 observations per participant
= 240 observations per treatment
= 960 observations in total
New survey:
4 treatments between-subjects,
2 sessions per treatment,
25 participants per session,
4 observations per participant
= 200 observations per treatment
= 800 observations in total
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Field
Sample size (or number of clusters) by treatment arms
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Before
30 participants per session * 2 sessions per treatment = 60 participants per treatment
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After
30 participants per session * 2 sessions per treatment = 60 participants per treatment
New survey:
25 participants per session * 2 sessions per treatment = 50 participants per treatment
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