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Field
Trial Status
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Before
completed
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After
on_going
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Field
Trial End Date
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Before
August 31, 2023
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After
May 01, 2025
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Last Published
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Before
March 07, 2025 10:50 AM
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After
March 07, 2025 11:26 AM
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Field
Intervention (Public)
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Before
In the main experiment, participants read news articles (Part 1 of the experiment) and are subsequently matched to four groups with different compositions of members of majority and minority. We define minority as those individuals with a name most ethnic Germans would identify belonging to Muslims, namely but not exclusively, Turkish, Arabic, Persian or some names originating from the Balkans. We define majority as individuals with an ethnic German name. The four groups vary in their composition comprising 0, 1, 4, or 9 minority members out of 10 group members. The group members will have their first name displayed during the main experiment. See below for the construction of the reference sample.
Participants in the main experiment will distribute money between themselves and each of these groups separately (Part 2 of the experiment). They will subsequently state their preference for decision-making rules that determine the distribution of money (Part 3 of the experiment).
Our main treatment variation is the type of news articles participants read before they make distribution decisions. They will either read 10 neutral news items without person identifiers or 10 articles that constitute a power threat. News articles that depict success stories of minority members constitute our power threat treatment. Each of these articles provide information about one minority group member living in Germany who either set up a successful firm or made important societal contributions. Articles are balanced with respect to gender with 5 female success stories and 5 male success stories. Neutral news articles are constructed on the basis of power threat articles. Here, individuals’ information is replaced with sectoral information or a focus on the innovation itself (if relevant).
Participants receive a fixed payoff for their participation. Their allocation decisions are incentivized as follows: At the end of the experiment, one participant and one allocation part is chosen per treatment for additional payment. Part 2 is chosen with 90 percent probability and Part 3 with 10 percent probability. With Part 2 being chosen, one of the groups is further with equal probability randomly chosen, and the participant’s allocation decision when facing that group determines his own additional payoff as well as the additional payoff of that group’s members. If Part 3 is chosen, the participant’s choices determine the decision-making rule that decides on the allocation of payoffs across the four groups. The participant here is making a decision behind the veil of ignorance, and thus, his or her payoff is equal to one randomly selected person out of the four groups.
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After
In the main experiment, participants read news articles (Part 1 of the experiment) and are subsequently matched to four groups with different compositions of members of majority and minority. We define minority as those individuals with a name most ethnic Germans would identify belonging to Muslims, namely but not exclusively, Turkish, Arabic, Persian or some names originating from the Balkans. We define majority as individuals with an ethnic German name. The four groups vary in their composition comprising 0, 1, 4, or 9 minority members out of 10 group members. The group members will have their first name displayed during the main experiment. See below for the construction of the reference sample.
Participants in the main experiment will distribute money between themselves and each of these groups separately (Part 2 of the experiment). They will subsequently state their preference for decision-making rules that determine the distribution of money (Part 3 of the experiment).
Our main treatment variation is the type of news articles participants read before they make distribution decisions. They will either read 10 neutral news items without person identifiers or 10 articles that constitute a power threat. Our main power threat treatment comprises news articles of success stories of minority members. Each of these articles provide information about one minority group member living in Germany who either set up a successful firm or made important societal contributions. In a second power threat treatment, we introduce ethnic German success stories. Articles are balanced with respect to gender with 5 female success stories and 5 male success stories. Neutral news articles are constructed on the basis of power threat articles. Here, individuals’ information is replaced with sectoral information or a focus on the innovation itself (if relevant).
Participants receive a fixed payoff for their participation. Their allocation decisions are incentivized as follows: At the end of the experiment, one participant and one allocation part is chosen per treatment for additional payment. Part 2 is chosen with 90 percent probability and Part 3 with 10 percent probability. With Part 2 being chosen, one of the groups is further with equal probability randomly chosen, and the participant’s allocation decision when facing that group determines his own additional payoff as well as the additional payoff of that group’s members. If Part 3 is chosen, the participant’s choices determine the decision-making rule that decides on the allocation of payoffs across the four groups. The participant here is making a decision behind the veil of ignorance, and thus, his or her payoff is equal to one randomly selected person out of the four groups.
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Field
Intervention End Date
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Before
August 30, 2023
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After
April 30, 2025
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Field
Planned Number of Clusters
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Before
First data collection: 400
Second data collection: 200 participants
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After
First data collection: 400
Second data collection: 200 participants
Third data collection: 990 participants
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Field
Planned Number of Observations
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Before
600
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After
1590
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Field
Sample size (or number of clusters) by treatment arms
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Before
300 control, 300 power threat, of which 400 comes from a representative German sample and an additional 200 from East German states.
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After
600 control (about 300 in West and East Germany each), 600 power threat-minority (about 300 in West and East Germany), and 390 power threat-majority from East Germany.
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Field
Power calculation: Minimum Detectable Effect Size for Main Outcomes
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Before
Based on GPower 3.1, in a linear regression with three predictors and a sample size of 400, with α=0.05, and power at 0.80, the minimum detectable effect size f2 is 0.019.
Amendment for second data collection: Based on Stata 16, with a t-test comparing two means in the main predictors with α=0.05 and power=0.80, 200 new observations from East Germany allows us to detect the observed treatment difference in the main sample for points allocated to the dictator rule and combined points allocated to groups with 0 and 1 person with a migration background in the one-group rule.
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After
Based on GPower 3.1, in a linear regression with three predictors and a sample size of 400, with α=0.05, and power at 0.80, the minimum detectable effect size f2 is 0.019.
Amendment for second data collection: Based on Stata 16, with a t-test comparing two means in the main predictors with α=0.05 and power=0.80, 200 new observations from East Germany allows us to detect the observed treatment difference in the main sample for points allocated to the dictator rule and combined points allocated to groups with 0 and 1 person with a migration background in the one-group rule.
Amendment for third data collection: We have previously collected in control, 190, and 148 participants in West and East Germany, and in power threat-minority, 192, and 146, respectively. Based on the realised effect sizes in this data, increasing the sample size gives us at least 80 percent power with α=0.05 to detect the following difference-in-differences according to G*Power 3.1: 1) the change in the percentage of participants who support an authoritarian rule in power threat-minority in West and East Germany, 2) the change in the amount of money allocated to participants controlling for minority status in power threat-minority in West and East Germany, 3) the change in the amount of points allocated to participants in the dictator rule controlling for minority status in power threat-minority in West and East Germany.
In a similar vein, the power threat-majority has at least 80 percent power to detect effects similar to power threat-minority. Alternatively, if it has no effect as we hypothesize, the difference between power threat-minority and power threat-majority within East Germany can be detected with 80 percent power.
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Field
Intervention (Hidden)
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Before
After collecting data for our main experiment as listed in its original pre-registration, we observed a differential treatment effect in West and East Germany. Since our sample was aimed to be representative with respect to German state residency, we have relatively few observations from East Germany (formerly German Democratic Republic). We therefore collect more data from these to test whether indeed the treatment effect is only present in Easy Germany.
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After
After collecting data for our main experiment as listed in its original pre-registration, we observed a differential treatment effect in West and East Germany. Since our sample was aimed to be representative with respect to German state residency, we have relatively few observations from East Germany (formerly German Democratic Republic). We therefore collect more data from these to test whether indeed the treatment effect is only present in East Germany.
Once the East German data collection has been completed, we observed meaningful treatment effects based on location, but some of these effects were marginally significant. We therefore collect further data both in West and East Germany, so that per treatment, there are about 300 participants. This gives us 80 percent power to detect the effect size derived from the prior collected data at 5 percent significance level.
Finally, we will introduce a second power threat treatment, where ethnic German success stories are depicted. We will run this study only in East Germany to see whether the effect we observe in the data is due to success stories in general triggering discrimination of minorities, or this only happens with migrant success stories.
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Field
Secondary Outcomes (End Points)
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Before
Emotions, attitudes towards migration and the measure of power threat we employ. We will aggregate the answers to these measures and conduct separate analyses on them.
Exploratory analysis: Prior authoritarianism measures and social dominance orientation.
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After
Emotions, authoritarianism measures, attitudes towards migration and the measure of power threat we employ. We will aggregate the answers to these measures and conduct separate analyses on them.
Exploratory analysis: Prior authoritarianism measures and social dominance orientation.
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