Intervention(s)
Study 1 (originally pre-registration): This experimental investigation aims to compare the labor supply responses to taxation to the labor supply responses to other forms of redistribution. In the context of a real-effort task, participants' payments will be subjected to a 25% withholding, the beneficiary of which varies across five treatment groups. There will be 2 control groups, one where the piece-rate is the same as the pre-withholding piece-rate in the treatments and one where the piece-rate is the same as the post-withholding piece-rate in the treatments.
Study 2 (update to pre-registration on 28 October 2023):
In study 1, we found negative labor supply responses among all treatment groups, compared to the control group with the same net wage. In study 2, we will further explore the labor supply responses to working for others by exploring the impact of perceived autonomy on labor supply. Study 2 is very similar to study 1, however, we remove the control (high) group, the ACLU group, and the Heritage Foundation group from study 1. We then add 2 new treatments. We call these treatments "restricted choice" and "unrestricted choice." In "restricted choice," participants are informed about the task and are asked which political party they would like to earn points for (in addition to earning points for themselves.) In "unrestricted choice," participants are given these same choices, but are also given the option to only earn points for themselves, without earning points for a political party. The only other change in the procedures is the addition of a comment section at the end of the survey and the removal of information that relates to the treatments we removed.
Study 3 (update to pre-registration on 15 May 2024):
In study 2, we found that adding "autonomy" (in the form of a choice about which organization to work for) only mitigated the negative labor supply response to working for others when participants were offered the choice to work only for themselves (net wage to participants remained constant, regardless of their choice). We again found negative labor supply responses to working for both the Republican and Democrat parties (when no choice is involved), and this negative effect persists after controlling for political affiliation. In Study 3, we want to further explore the relationship between opinions about the organizations, choice about which organization to work for, and labor supply. Specifically, we will run a preliminary study where participants will give us their opinions of a list of about 12 charities. Then, we will select the top 5 most trusted charities from this study, and will use these as the potential organizations in the main study. In the main study (for study 3), we will have 4 treatments: control (low), rank_nochoice (where participants will be given information about the 5 potential charities and asked to rank them in terms of how much they trust the charities, then we will assign participants to work for their most trusted charity), rank_thenchoice (where participants will be given information about the 5 potential charities and asked to rank them in terms of how much they trust the charities; following this, participants will choose which specific charity they would like to earn money for, but will be required to work for a charity), and rank_thenchoice_unrestricted (same as rank_thenchoice, but participants will be given the choice to work only for themselves rather than also working for a charity).