Primary Outcomes (explanation)
For the first area of exploration, we care about how sensitive principals are to the presentation of information because the Separated Information treatment makes clear the limitations on the agent's control. Thus, if punishment diminishes in these states of the world in the Separated Information treatment, the principal may have previously misattributed their loss to the agent's effort under Combined Information but no longer does because of the clarity of information. If, however, principals continue to punish based on outcomes outside of the agent's control despite the clarity of information, it is less likely to result from confusion and is more likely the result of negative affect causing the principal to "blame" the agent.
For the second area of exploration, we care about how much behavior in the principal-agent context affects the principal's perceptions of agents in other domains. In particular, we care about how the principal's perceptions are colored by the luck that the agent experienced in prior interactions. Under attribution bias, we may expect that a principal will think that a lucky agent 1) will exert more effort, on average; 2) will allocate more to them in a dictator game; or 3) will exert more effort in a real-effort task. Conditioning on luck in this way is sub-optimal behavior for the principal. Additionally, this misattribution may cause stereotyping, so we care about whether a principal may think that a lucky agent is more or less likely to be 1) male or female; 2) old or young; or 3) high or low GPA.