Reciprocal Prefernces in Non-Routine Work

Last registered on June 28, 2023


Trial Information

General Information

Reciprocal Prefernces in Non-Routine Work
Initial registration date
June 28, 2023

Initial registration date is when the trial was registered.

It corresponds to when the registration was submitted to the Registry to be reviewed for publication.

First published
June 28, 2023, 5:12 PM EDT

First published corresponds to when the trial was first made public on the Registry after being reviewed.



Primary Investigator

Max Planck Institute for Innovation and Competetion & MGSE LMU Munich

Other Primary Investigator(s)

Additional Trial Information

In development
Start date
End date
Secondary IDs
Prior work
This trial does not extend or rely on any prior RCTs.
We often prefer to interact with individuals who also want to interact with us. Experimental evidence shows higher cooperation between partners who like to be matched with each other. In a stylized Public Goods Game setting, participants expect those who want to be matched with you to be more cooperative, and you act more altruistically yourself (Opitz and Schwaiger, 2022). At the same time, it remains unclear whether such preferences impact behavior in collaborative teamwork. Therefore, I investigate how knowing your partner's preferences about you affects (non-routine) teamwork.
External Link(s)

Registration Citation

Opitz, Timm. 2023. "Reciprocal Prefernces in Non-Routine Work." AEA RCT Registry. June 28.
Experimental Details


Intervention Start Date
Intervention End Date

Primary Outcomes

Primary Outcomes (end points)
See the PAP for details. The main outcome is (objective) team performance.
Primary Outcomes (explanation)

Secondary Outcomes

Secondary Outcomes (end points)
See the PAP for details. Secondary outcomes address beliefs about individual/partner/team performance, and collaboration (preferences).
Secondary Outcomes (explanation)

Experimental Design

Experimental Design
The experiment crucially consists of a team-formation process and a non-routine team task that participants perform within the formed dyads. Preferences over team partners are submitted to a (two-sided) strategy-proof mechanism. The underlying preferences of players are based on self-reported questionnaire information of the potential partners. While the ranking refers to a payoff-irrelevant interaction task, the incentivized non-routine task is played with a randomly matched partner. I compare behavior under two information structures in a between-subject design. In the baseline condition , participants never know their partner ranks them. In the treatment condition, participants do receive the information before the non-routine team task. This allows them to incorporate this information into their behavior in the joint team task.
Experimental Design Details
Randomization Method
Randomization by computer
Randomization Unit
Group level randomization
Was the treatment clustered?

Experiment Characteristics

Sample size: planned number of clusters
30 Matching Groups --> 120 Teams
Sample size: planned number of observations
240 Individuals
Sample size (or number of clusters) by treatment arms
15 Matching Groups per Treatment
Minimum detectable effect size for main outcomes (accounting for sample design and clustering)

Institutional Review Boards (IRBs)

IRB Name
German Association for Experimental Economic Research e.V.
IRB Approval Date
IRB Approval Number
Analysis Plan

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Post Trial Information

Study Withdrawal

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Is the intervention completed?
Data Collection Complete
Data Publication

Data Publication

Is public data available?

Program Files

Program Files
Reports, Papers & Other Materials

Relevant Paper(s)

Reports & Other Materials