Cooperation and punishment in a nationwide experiment

Last registered on August 08, 2023

Pre-Trial

Trial Information

General Information

Title
Cooperation and punishment in a nationwide experiment
RCT ID
AEARCTR-0011829
Initial registration date
July 23, 2023

Initial registration date is when the trial was registered.

It corresponds to when the registration was submitted to the Registry to be reviewed for publication.

First published
August 08, 2023, 3:43 PM EDT

First published corresponds to when the trial was first made public on the Registry after being reviewed.

Locations

Region

Primary Investigator

Affiliation
Technical University of Munich, School of Management

Other Primary Investigator(s)

PI Affiliation
University of Innsbruck
PI Affiliation
TU Munich
PI Affiliation
TU Munich
PI Affiliation
UMIT Tirol

Additional Trial Information

Status
In development
Start date
2023-08-07
End date
2023-09-01
Secondary IDs
Prior work
This trial does not extend or rely on any prior RCTs.
Abstract
The human ability to establish cooperation depends upon the execution of cooperative norms, especially in large groups of unrelated strangers. High levels of cooperation among humans are often attributed to the possibility of third-party punishment (TPP). We study the effectiveness of TPP to increase cooperative behavior in a large-scale cooperation game in a representative sample of the German population. Our study aims to answer whether TPP fosters cooperation in a prisoner’s dilemma (PD) game in society at large.
External Link(s)

Registration Citation

Citation
Angerer, Silvia et al. 2023. "Cooperation and punishment in a nationwide experiment ." AEA RCT Registry. August 08. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.11829-1.0
Sponsors & Partners

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Experimental Details

Interventions

Intervention(s)
We investigate whether cooperation rates increase through the implementation of a third-party punishment (TPP) mechanism. Therefore, we plan to run a large-scale artefactual field experiment with a nationally representative sample of the German population, where participants play an incentivized prisoner dilemma (PD) game.

To do so, we run two experimental treatments. In the first treatment, there is no TPP, while in the second treatment, TPP is possible. We randomly divide all participants into two groups. The first group is assigned to the first treatment and plays the PD game without TPP, while the second group is assigned to the second treatment and plays the PD game with TPP.
Intervention Start Date
2023-08-08
Intervention End Date
2023-08-25

Primary Outcomes

Primary Outcomes (end points)
Cooperation rate in the PD game: The share of participants who decide to send their endowment to their partner [Question q01].
Primary Outcomes (explanation)

Secondary Outcomes

Secondary Outcomes (end points)
We will analyze beliefs concerning the decision of the other player: the share of participants believing that their partner decides to send [Question q02].
In treatment 2 (with TTP) we will analyze the beliefs concerning the decisions of the referee [Questions q05 & q06].
Furthermore, we will investigate effect-heterogeneities by age, gender, and socioeconomic status, as well as whether respondents answered the control questions correctly and whether they self-report having understood the instructions of the game [Question p26]. Furthermore, we will investigate the correlation between cooperation and punishment decisions and survey-based measures of real-life (cooperative) behavior in the context of health [Questions p09-p13] and the environment (where we build an index from the Questions p01-p08).
Secondary Outcomes (explanation)

Experimental Design

Experimental Design
We plan to sample a minimum of 2,000 adults aged between 18 and 69 years (up to a maximum of 2,500 — conditional on final costs; also see “Experiment characteristics”).
The experiment is conducted in cooperation with a survey institute. The recruitment and polling are managed by the survey institute. We collect the data via an online platform (QUALTRICS). Our participants take part in the experiment autonomously on their own digital devices. Randomization is carried out by the survey institute at the individual level, using a computer. Payment of incentives is carried out anonymously by the survey institute.
Our experiment is structured as follows:
Respondents will be randomly assigned (between subjects) to Treatment 1 (p=0.5), or Treatment 2 (p=0.5).

Treatment 1 (with TTP):
Stage 1: Cooperation
Stage 2: Beliefs about the behavior of the partner
Stage 3: Appropriateness of decisions
Stage 4: Beliefs about the behavior of the referee
Stage 5: Personal questions

Treatment 2 (without TTP):
Stage 1: Cooperation
Stage 2: Beliefs about the behavior of the partner
Stage 3: Appropriateness of decisions
Stage 4: Punishment Decision
Stage 5: Personal questions
Experimental Design Details
Randomization Method
Randomization is carried out by the survey company, using a computer.
Randomization Unit
At the individual level
Was the treatment clustered?
No

Experiment Characteristics

Sample size: planned number of clusters
2,000 individuals (adults aged between 18 and 69 years). (maximum: 2,500 – conditional final costs)
Sample size: planned number of observations
2,000 individuals (adults aged between 18 and 69 years). (maximum: 2,500 – conditional final costs)
Sample size (or number of clusters) by treatment arms
2,000 individuals (1,000 per treatment). (maximum: 2,500 (1,750/1,750) – conditional on final survey costs).
According to our conservative cost calculations, we have sufficient funding for sampling 2,000 individuals. Depending on the final costs of the survey, we envisage continuing sampling up to a maximum number of 2,500 individuals.
Minimum detectable effect size for main outcomes (accounting for sample design and clustering)
Supporting Documents and Materials

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IRB

Institutional Review Boards (IRBs)

IRB Name
Leopold-Franzens-Universität Innsbruck, Beirat für ethische Fragen in der wissenschaftlichen Forschung
IRB Approval Date
2023-05-23
IRB Approval Number
Certificate of good standing, 46/2023

Post-Trial

Post Trial Information

Study Withdrawal

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Intervention

Is the intervention completed?
No
Data Collection Complete
Data Publication

Data Publication

Is public data available?
No

Program Files

Program Files
Reports, Papers & Other Materials

Relevant Paper(s)

Reports & Other Materials