Experimental Design Details
Experiments A & B are conducted in four CWS, Musasa, Karenge, Kibirizi and Kayumbu, in which two years of FDP have been implemented. In these CWS, we launched a farmer loyalty program and informed farmers that they may become eligible for benefits, such as tree stumping, based on their performance. See AEARCTR-000872 for details on this intervention.
After harvest season 2023 (June 2023), farmers in catchment areas of these four CWSs were ranked based on their performance. Key performance indicators include volume of coffee delivery, traceability of coffee delivery (i.e., usage of farmer card when delivering), loyalty in delivering across last two years, and engagement with partner (i.e., phone number verified). The top 15% of farmers were assigned 'gold' status, the following 35% of farmers received 'silver' status, and the bottom 50% received 'bronze' status. Experiment A focuses on the silver and gold farmers, and Experiment B focuses on the bronze farmers in these four CWS.
In addition to the standard variables mentioned above, randomization for Experiment A & B was also stratified on zone intensity (i.e., zones in which top 80% farmers in FDP or top 40% farmers where assigned to FDP), FDP tier 2023, and phone ownership.
Experiment C is conducted in three different CWSs (i.e., Mpanga, Karambi, Nyamyumba). FDP was introduced to 50% of the farmers in the catchment areas of these CWS in January 2023. In these CWS, all farmers, regardless of position relative to a certain threshold based on size and delivery volume, were not excluded. In Experiment C, all farmers are offered a choice between the relational scheme, upfront scheme, or no scheme. Additionally, we cross-randomize digital support intervention (Tx).
In addition to the standard variables mentioned above, randomization for Experiment C was also included Village Treat Intensity (75% farmers in FDP or 25% farmers in FDP), FDP assignment, FDP tier 2023 and phone ownership.
We plan to use to elicit two effects: i) the (differential) effect of incentive schemes on tree rejuvenation adoption and ii) the impact of FDP on choice and take-up of incentive schemes. Additionally, we aim to evaluate the additional effect of a digital support intervention.
By comparing choice of scheme and take-up between FDP and non-FDP farmers in Experiment C, we are able to estimate the impact of FDP on the take-up of relational scheme. By comparing farmers offered the relational scheme to farmers offered the upfront scheme in Experiment A, we are able to estimate the differential effect of relational compared to the upfront scheme. By comparing farmers offered the relational scheme to no scheme in Experiment B, we can estimate the effect of the relational scheme compared to the status quo on tree stumping.
Last, we will present both the intention-to-treat (ITT) effects (i.e., impacts of being assigned to a scheme) and the treatment effects on the treated (TOT) (i.e., impacts of taking-up a scheme).