The expressive effect of legal norms on sustainable consumption

Last registered on August 09, 2023

Pre-Trial

Trial Information

General Information

Title
The expressive effect of legal norms on sustainable consumption
RCT ID
AEARCTR-0011867
Initial registration date
August 01, 2023

Initial registration date is when the trial was registered.

It corresponds to when the registration was submitted to the Registry to be reviewed for publication.

First published
August 09, 2023, 2:30 PM EDT

First published corresponds to when the trial was first made public on the Registry after being reviewed.

Locations

Region

Primary Investigator

Affiliation
University Kassel

Other Primary Investigator(s)

PI Affiliation
University Kassel
PI Affiliation
University Kassel
PI Affiliation
University Kassel
PI Affiliation
University Kassel

Additional Trial Information

Status
On going
Start date
2023-07-12
End date
2023-08-12
Secondary IDs
Prior work
This trial does not extend or rely on any prior RCTs.
Abstract
Legal norms can affect individual behavior in multiple ways. Most straightforwardly, they can restrict individual freedom of choice by prohibitions. However, they may also have an impact by signaling what should generally be considered right or wrong, or else, common or uncommon behavior. In this paper, we exploit the recent introduction of the so-called Supply Chain Act in Germany to explore the relevance of the latter channel in the domain of social sustainability. In an online survey among a widely representative sample of about 1,000 individuals in Germany, we examine the expressive effect of information about the German Supply Chain Act on individuals’ willingness to pay for sustainably produced socks that are not directly covered by the law. The willingness to pay is measured via an incentivized consumption decision experiment in which respondents must choose between different sock alternatives in a multiple price list. Finally, we measure subjects’ personal injunctive norm, perceived social injunctive norm, perceived social descriptive norm, as well as subjects’ beliefs on sustainable consumption, which gives us the opportunity to examine whether treatment effects may be attributable to a change in these norms or beliefs.
External Link(s)

Registration Citation

Citation
Engler, Daniel et al. 2023. "The expressive effect of legal norms on sustainable consumption." AEA RCT Registry. August 09. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.11867-1.0
Experimental Details

Interventions

Intervention(s)
We will base this study on a widely representative online survey among about 1,000 individuals in Germany that will be conducted in July and August 2023. The survey includes an incentivized consumption decision experiment in which respondents will choose between two different socks alternatives in a multiple price list in which the socks will vary with regard to certification and price. In our experiment, we focus on the Fair Wear certification as this certification particularly intends to improve labor conditions in the textile industry. Respondents will be randomly allocated to the control group or the legal norm information group. Depending on the group, respondents will receive different information prior to their consumption decision. Respondents will receive an initial endowment which they can allocate to one of the two socks options in each of the different choices of the multiple price list.
Intervention Start Date
2023-07-12
Intervention End Date
2023-08-12

Primary Outcomes

Primary Outcomes (end points)
Our main dependent variable is the willingness to pay (WTP) for Fair Wear socks derived from the multiple price list. Our key explanatory variable for this analysis will be a dummy variable for the treatment.
Hypothesis 1: Information about the legal norm increases willingness to pay for the socks with more transparent and socially sustainable working conditions.
Primary Outcomes (explanation)
Mean value between the maximum price the respondent is willing to pay for socks with a Fair Wear label (in €) and the price for socks without Fair Wear label

Secondary Outcomes

Secondary Outcomes (end points)
To shed light on the channels that convey a potential change in the willingness to pay for sustainably produced socks, we further elicit underlying personal injunctive norms, perceived social injunctive norms, and perceived social descriptive norms of the respondents. Furthermore, we include questions about the beliefs regarding working conditions for the production of goods sold in Germany to measure whether individuals update their beliefs due to the treatment information.
Hypothesis 2a: Information about the legal norm has a positive effect on the personal injunctive norm about socially sustainable textile consumption.
Hypothesis 2b: Information about the legal norm has a positive effect on the perceived social injunctive norm about socially sustainable textile consumption.
Hypothesis 2c: Information about the legal norm has a positive effect on the perceived social descriptive norm about socially sustainable textile consumption.
Secondary Outcomes (explanation)
For personal injunctive norm: Additional payment (in €) the respondent considers appropriate for the socks with Fair Wear label compared to socks without Fair Wear label

For perceived social injunctive norm: Respondent’s estimate of the average additional payment (in €) that other respondents consider appropriate for the socks with Fair Wear label compared to socks without Fair Wear label

For perceived social descriptive norm: Respondent’s estimate of the average additional payment (in €) that other respondents actually pay for the socks with Fair Wear label compared to socks without Fair Wear label

Experimental Design

Experimental Design
In our experiment, we will apply a multiple price list mechanism to elicit the willingness to pay for socks with a Fair Wear label certification. Respondents will be asked to decide between two options of three pairs of socks, each varying in price and whether they are certified by the Fair Wear label. The first option will be three noncertified pairs of socks that are provided for a price of 7.50€. The second option will be three certified pairs of socks that are provided for a price that varies between 6.00€ and 24.00€. For each individual, the order of the prices for certified pairs of socks is randomized, either in ascending or descending order. Additionally, on the individual level, whether the certified socks are displayed on the left or on the right is also randomized. In total, the multiple price list includes 13 decisions. Respondents will receive an initial endowment of 24.00€ which they can use in each of the decisions to buy one of the two socks options. They will be further informed that after every respondent finishes the survey, 10% of them will be randomly chosen, and for these respondents, one of their 13 choices will be randomly chosen for realization. Respondents will also be notified that they will additionally receive the difference between the endowment of 24.00€ and the price of the three pairs of socks selected.
Before viewing the multiple price list, the treatment group receives specific information. Other than that, the basic structure of the price list is the same for all participants. We randomly assign our participants to two different groups. The two groups are the control group and the legal norm information group. The groups differ with regard to the information participants receive prior to their choice. Both groups receive the information that the pairs of socks included in the experiment are produced by companies with less than 3,000 employees. This information is especially relevant since the German Supply Chain Act, as for now, only applies to companies with more than 3,000 employees. Thus, participants can only choose between socks from companies for which the German Supply Chain Act does not apply, i.e., individual choices are not restricted by the law. Exploiting the discontinuity of the law, this experimental design makes it possible to test the ‘expressive effect’ of the law. The treatment specific information for the legal norm information group is described in more detail in the following (translated from German):
“Information:
Since January of this year, the so-called Supply Chain Act has been in force in Germany, the aim of which is to create more transparency about companies' supply chains. In particular, the law aims to protect human rights along the supply chain and ensure fair working conditions. If a company does not comply with its obligations under the law, it can be punished (for more information, click here). The Supply Chain Act applies to all companies with more than 3,000 employees. However, we source the socks shown below from companies with fewer than 3,000 employees, so the Supply Chain Act does not apply here.”

We collect information about preferences and attitudes, consumption behavior, personal injunctive norms, perceived social injunctive norms, perceived social descriptive norms, as well as other socio-demographic variables.
Experimental Design Details
Randomization Method
At the individual level
Randomization Unit
At the individual level
Was the treatment clustered?
No

Experiment Characteristics

Sample size: planned number of clusters
About 1,000 survey participants
Sample size: planned number of observations
About 1,000 survey participants
Sample size (or number of clusters) by treatment arms
About 500 participants in the control group and 500 participants in the treatment group
Minimum detectable effect size for main outcomes (accounting for sample design and clustering)
Using conventional levels of significance (α = 0.05) and power (β = 0.80) we can detect an expected effect size of less than 0.2 standard deviations using sample size of 500 per treatment, hence 1,000 in total for treatment and control group.
IRB

Institutional Review Boards (IRBs)

IRB Name
German Association for Experimental Economic Research e.V.
IRB Approval Date
2023-06-07
IRB Approval Number
VRcMgRny
Analysis Plan

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Post-Trial

Post Trial Information

Study Withdrawal

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Intervention

Is the intervention completed?
No
Data Collection Complete
Data Publication

Data Publication

Is public data available?
No

Program Files

Program Files
Reports, Papers & Other Materials

Relevant Paper(s)

Reports & Other Materials