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Field
Intervention (Public)
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Before
The intervention we employ is revealing full information feedback about the performance of all group members in the four-group competitive environment. We compare this to a control where participants only receive information about their own performance. This question is important because there are many Government, companies, and other entities evaluating the implementation of fully transparent wage policies as a way to promote competition and reduce gender and other wage inequities.
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After
The intervention we employ is revealing information feedback about the performance of other group members in the four-group competitive environment. We compare this to a control where participants receive information about their own performance and competitive thresholds only if competing. This question is important because there are many Government, companies, and other entities evaluating the implementation of fully transparent wage policies as a way to promote competition and reduce gender and other wage inequities.
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Field
Experimental Design (Public)
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Before
Subjects are randomly assigned to groups of four members and groups are randomly assigned to one of two feedback conditions. In the Baseline condition, subjects learn the outcome of the round if competing (won/lost), their own score and earnings for the round and the payment scheme they selected. In the Tier-Score-Disclosure treatment, subjects receive information about the scores of the other group members (and tier-scores) regardless of the endogenously selected payment scheme along with the information provided in Baseline. In both treatments, subjects complete a forced piece-rate in round 1, followed by a forced tournament in round 2. Following these two rounds, subjects make endogenous competitive-tiered or piece-rate entries for the next 10 rounds with feedback following round 3.
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After
Subjects are randomly assigned to groups of four members and groups are randomly assigned to one of two feedback conditions. In the Baseline condition, subjects learn the outcome of the round if competing, their own score and the score they had to beat, earnings for the round and the payment scheme they selected. In the Tier-Score-Disclosure treatment, subjects receive information about the scores of the other group members (and tier-scores) regardless of the endogenously selected payment scheme along with the information provided in Baseline. In both treatments, subjects complete a forced piece-rate in round 1, followed by a forced tournament in round 2. Following these two rounds, subjects make endogenous competitive-tiered or piece-rate entries for the next 10 rounds with feedback following round 3.
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