Counterfactual Thinking and Inequality Acceptance

Last registered on August 24, 2023

Pre-Trial

Trial Information

General Information

Title
Counterfactual Thinking and Inequality Acceptance
RCT ID
AEARCTR-0011950
Initial registration date
August 18, 2023

Initial registration date is when the trial was registered.

It corresponds to when the registration was submitted to the Registry to be reviewed for publication.

First published
August 24, 2023, 6:09 AM EDT

First published corresponds to when the trial was first made public on the Registry after being reviewed.

Locations

Region
Region

Primary Investigator

Affiliation
Universitat Autónoma de Barcelona

Other Primary Investigator(s)

Additional Trial Information

Status
In development
Start date
2023-08-21
End date
2024-06-30
Secondary IDs
Prior work
This trial does not extend or rely on any prior RCTs.
Abstract
To what extent choices are shaped by circumstances is a crucial aspect of debates about inequality and redistributive policies. When information to assess this is limited, individuals can only infer about it. Do people engage in this process? Are they accurate? In this project, we investigate if people think about this and if it affects inequality acceptance. We design a theory-driven experiment that isolates self-interest considerations, capturing individual moral acceptability of inequalities. We will elicit fairness preferences and beliefs about choices in equal-opportunity counterfactual scenarios. We will explore if those beliefs are biased by the observed unequal circumstances and if that affects moral decisions. We will test if people demand better information to decide and if thinking about counterfactual scenarios impacts their decisions.
External Link(s)

Registration Citation

Citation
Brun, Martin. 2023. "Counterfactual Thinking and Inequality Acceptance." AEA RCT Registry. August 24. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.11950-1.0
Experimental Details

Interventions

Intervention(s)
Spectators decide on the distribution of the rewards between two workers with unequal opportunities. Workers complete a number of effort-tasks. We match workers in pairs consisting of workers with high and low opportunities. Spectators decide on final payments for each worker in a pair.

Spectators are always provided with information about workers opportunities, number of tasks completed, and initial payment reward. In different treatments, we additionally provide spectators with information on counterfactual scenarios, or we incentivize counterfactual thinking before spectator's decision-making.
Intervention Start Date
2023-09-04
Intervention End Date
2023-09-06

Primary Outcomes

Primary Outcomes (end points)
Inequality acceptance.
Primary Outcomes (explanation)
See attached document.

Secondary Outcomes

Secondary Outcomes (end points)
Belief biases, Acquired information.
Secondary Outcomes (explanation)
See attached document.

Experimental Design

Experimental Design
We use the spectator design. Workers complete effort-tasks under unequal opportunities. We pair workers with high and low opportunities. Spectators decide on the distribution of the final rewards between both workers. We focus on the distribution decisions of the spectators. We experimentally vary the information available for spectators, or we incentivize counterfactual thinking before spectators make their decisions.
Experimental Design Details
We use the spectator design.

We recruit workers in the United States through an online platform. Workers commit on the completion of a number of effort-tasks for a low and high piece-rate payment. The resulting piece-rate payment is randomly assigned, and workers need to fulfill their commitment for the assigned piece-rate payment. We match workers in pairs consisting of one worker with a low piece-rate payment, and one worker with a high piece-rate payment.

Spectators decide on the distribution of the final rewards between both workers. We focus on the distribution decisions of the spectators. The sample is composed by Uruguayan school students who share similar socio-economic and educational backgrounds. Each student will answer about at least 5 worker pairs. We experimentally vary the information available for spectators, or we incentivize counterfactual thinking before spectators make their decisions. We also provide spectators the opportunity to access more complete information. To do so, they need to complete an effort-task (different to the one completed by the workers).
Randomization Method
Randomization done by a computer.
Randomization Unit
Individual.
Was the treatment clustered?
No

Experiment Characteristics

Sample size: planned number of clusters
200 respondents.
Sample size: planned number of observations
1000 responses.
Sample size (or number of clusters) by treatment arms
Around 65 respondents in each treatment.
Minimum detectable effect size for main outcomes (accounting for sample design and clustering)
IRB

Institutional Review Boards (IRBs)

IRB Name
Comisión de Ética en la Experimentación Animal y Humana de la Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona
IRB Approval Date
2023-07-14
IRB Approval Number
6532
Analysis Plan

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Post-Trial

Post Trial Information

Study Withdrawal

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Intervention

Is the intervention completed?
No
Data Collection Complete
Data Publication

Data Publication

Is public data available?
No

Program Files

Program Files
Reports, Papers & Other Materials

Relevant Paper(s)

Reports & Other Materials