Intervention(s)
We evaluate the randomized implementation of a large-scale legal capacity building program in the city of Kananga (DRC). This program, overseen by the Ministry of Justice, has the goal of boosting the resolution of local disputes over property, debt, and petty theft. Given the coexistence of the state and customary sectors in DRC, the program has two main arms: a state legal capacity building arm, where state lawyers serve as mediation authorities, and a customary capacity building arm where customary chiefs instead take on this role. After creating a systematic register of all disputes in the city, cases are randomly assigned to mediation overseen by a state lawyer, a customary chief, or to remain in the status quo in which citizens could pursue either of these options (unsubsidized) or seek mediation by the neighborhood chief, though most often disputes remain unresolved.
In addition, we cross-randomize three sub-treatments:
1. Escalation to higher court: in both treatments, a share of cases is randomly assigned to receive the option of escalation to a higher state or customary court. If the first stage of mediation fails, parties have the opportunity to escalate the case to the Public Prosecutor in the state legal arm or to the customary Royal Court in the customary arm, at a subsidized cost.
2. Formal Document: in both treatments, a share of cases is randomly assigned to have the adjudicators issue a formal letter outlining the mediation outcome with signatures from all relevant parties.
3. Leopard Skin: in the customary arm, a share of cases is randomly assigned to grant the option to customary mediators to use a leopard skin in the mediation process. Leopard skins, in customary tradition, represent a high-stake tool to coerce conflict parties into telling the truth.
We compare the impartiality of the state and customary justice system and examine effects of the program on property rights security and citizens’ views of and willingness to pay for the formal state.