Incentives and Productivity: A Field RCT with Agricultural Firms

Last registered on November 16, 2023
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Pre-Trial

Trial Information

General Information

Title
Incentives and Productivity: A Field RCT with Agricultural Firms
RCT ID
AEARCTR-0012006
Initial registration date
October 23, 2023

Initial registration date is when the trial was registered.

It corresponds to when the registration was submitted to the Registry to be reviewed for publication.

First published
November 01, 2023, 2:39 PM EDT

First published corresponds to when the trial was first made public on the Registry after being reviewed.

Last updated
November 16, 2023, 4:04 AM EST

Last updated is the most recent time when changes to the trial's registration were published.

Locations

Country
Spain
Region

Primary Investigator

Name
Ana Lleo Bono
Affiliation
University of Cambridge
Contact Primary Investigator

Other Primary Investigator(s)

Additional Trial Information

Status
In development
Start date
2023-10-24
End date
2024-07-01
Keywords
Behavior, Firms & Productivity, Labor
Additional Keywords
Incentives, Social Cohesion, Organizational Economics.
JEL code(s)
Secondary IDs
Prior work
This trial does not extend or rely on any prior RCTs.
Abstract
The incentives of the workers are not always fully aligned with the manager's. This paper uses a field experiment to understand which types of incentives, other than workers’ salaries, can be provided when more than one factor is crucial for the firms’ productivity. In this industry, salary incentivises all workers individually for one of the factors, and this intervention introduces a team incentive to improve the other factor. Moreover, I will run surveys and economic games to get richer data on team characteristics that might matter for the team incentive’s efficacy.
External Link(s)

Registration Citation

Citation
Lleo Bono, Ana. 2023. "Incentives and Productivity: A Field RCT with Agricultural Firms." AEA RCT Registry. November 16. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.12006-2.0
Sponsors & Partners
Experimental Details

Interventions

Intervention(s)
Intervention Start Date
2023-11-20
Intervention End Date
2024-02-12

Primary Outcomes

Primary Outcomes (end points)
Productivity, incentives, social cohesion.
Primary Outcomes (explanation)

Secondary Outcomes

Secondary Outcomes (end points)
Outside work options, peer pressure, family ties, directive/supportive leadership, task cohesion, competitiveness, risk-taking.
Secondary Outcomes (explanation)

Experimental Design

Experimental Design
There are two key factors in the output of the companies. Salary incentivises all workers individually for one of the factors, and this intervention introduces a team incentive to improve the other factor. This consists of implementing a monthly competition to the treatment group, where the winner earns a prize. I will randomize at the team level, stratifying by company. Moreover, I will run surveys and economic games to get richer data on team characteristics that might matter for the team incentive’s efficacy.
Experimental Design Details
This experiment is carried out with the collaboration of some companies from the Spanish citrus industry. There are two key factors, quantity and quality. Salary incentivises quantity only, and this intervention introduces a monthly quality competition to the treatment group, where the members of the winning team earn a prize.
Quantity picked is a crucial factor to measure workers’ productivity. Moreover, company managers need them to pick fruits relatively quick, as they often need to be picked within a short time range so they do not go overriped. However, because of being paid by kilogram, workers’ salary structure prompts them to pick up as many fruits as they can, even if these are rotten or their peals are damaged. Hence, an additional incentive to account for this is needed. For this context, I define fruits being of “good quality” as fruits picked “lacking of a defect”, and not if the fruit variety is more premium.
I will randomize at the team level, stratifying by company. All workers (from both, control and treatment groups) will receive clear information on the quality, or lacking of defect, expected from their picked fruits. Moreover, I will run surveys and economic games with the team leaders to get richer data on team characteristics that might matter for the team incentive’s efficacy. These will be run pre- and post-implementation. Moreover, I plan on sending a short survey to the team leaders in the treatment group asking about winning expectations before the winning team is announced.
Randomization Method
Randomization done in office by a computer.
Randomization Unit
Randomized at team level.
Was the treatment clustered?
No

Experiment Characteristics

Sample size: planned number of clusters
70-80 teams.
Sample size: planned number of observations
70-80 teams.
Sample size (or number of clusters) by treatment arms
50% control, 50% treatment.
Minimum detectable effect size for main outcomes (accounting for sample design and clustering)
Supporting Documents and Materials
IRB

Institutional Review Boards (IRBs)

IRB Name
Director of Research, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge
IRB Approval Date
2023-06-15
IRB Approval Number
N/A
Analysis Plan

Post-Trial

Post Trial Information

Study Withdrawal

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Intervention

Is the intervention completed?
No
Data Collection Complete
Data Publication

Data Publication

Is public data available?
No

Program Files

Program Files
Reports, Papers & Other Materials

Relevant Paper(s)

Reports & Other Materials