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Field
Trial Title
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Before
Dynamic Reserve Prices in Procurement: An Experiment
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After
The Design of Recurrent Procurement Auctions
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Field
Trial End Date
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Before
March 31, 2024
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After
December 31, 2026
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Field
Last Published
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Before
October 17, 2023 01:54 PM
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After
March 13, 2025 10:10 AM
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Field
Intervention (Public)
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Before
Our intervention in procurement auction markets involves settting a dynamic reserve price based on outcomes from a previous round. Specifically, we will use the winning bid in the previous period to set the maximum bid possible for bidders in the next round. Two variants will be investigated. The first involves a single auction market, and the second uses a multi market setting. In the first variant, a market's bid cap is determined by the winning bid in that market from the previous round, while the second variant uses another market's winning bid in the previous round.
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After
Our intervention in procurement auction markets involves settting a dynamic reserve price based on outcomes from a previous round. Specifically, we will use the winning bid in the previous period to set the maximum bid possible for bidders in the next round. Two variants will be investigated. The first involves a single auction market, and the second uses a multi market setting. In the first variant, a market's bid cap is determined by the winning bid in that market from the previous round, while the second variant uses another market's winning bid in the previous round.
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Field
Intervention End Date
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Before
November 30, 2023
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After
May 30, 2025
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Field
Experimental Design (Public)
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Before
The experiment requires three treatments using the low price sealed bid mechanism: one without a dynamic reserve price, one using a dynamic reserve price in a single market, and the third, using a dynamic reserve price with multiple markets.
Using a between-subjects design, each participant is exposed to only one of the three conditions and plays multi-round auctions.
In round 1 of each sequence, everyone is told their realized cost and everyone participates. In each subsequent round, participants are told their realized cost for that round and will be allowed to choose whether or not to participate in the auction for that round. If they choose not to participate in a round, they will not be able to participate for the remaining rounds in that sequence, but they will be able to rejoin in the subsequent sequence. After deciding to participate, the participants are informed of the number of competitors who are participating. Each competitor will have received a realized cost using the same method with all draws being independent.
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After
The experiment requires four treatments using the low price sealed bid mechanism: one without a dynamic reserve price, one using a dynamic reserve price in a single market, the third using a dynamic reserve price with multiple markets, and the fourth without a bid cap splitting the award between the two lowest bidders.
Using a between-subjects design, each participant is exposed to only one of the three conditions and plays multi-round auctions.
In round 1 of each sequence, everyone is told their realized cost and everyone participates. In each subsequent round, participants are told their realized cost for that round and will be allowed to choose whether or not to participate in the auction for that round. If they choose not to participate in a round, they will not be able to participate for the remaining rounds in that sequence, but they will be able to rejoin in the subsequent sequence. After deciding to participate, the participants are informed of the number of competitors who are participating. Each competitor will have received a realized cost using the same method with all draws being independent.
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Field
Planned Number of Clusters
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Before
72 groups
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After
96 groups
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Field
Planned Number of Observations
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Before
10,800 bids
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After
14,400 bids
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