Secondary Outcomes (end points)
Correlations between Elicitation 1 outcomes and Elicitation 2, 3, and 4 outcomes (pairwise and joint)
Tagging people as non-welfarist. We will identify people as non-welfarist if they engage in non-welfarist behaviors in any, some, or all of Eliciations 2, 3, and 4. We will report these numbers.
Incentives. In Elicitation 1a, we employ a secondary treatment to test whether incentives affect behaviors. In 1a, we randomize whether we incentivize lawyers and placebos. The purpose of this randomization is to test the extent to which incentives matter (insofar as it could generate differences between lawyers and health care).
In a second test for the effect of incentives, we leverage the following source of variation. Because the presentation for the health care and lawyers varies slightly (including discussion of incentives), we randomize placebo goods into seeing the exact framing as lawyers versus health care, so some placebo goods are not incentivized throughout (see Experiment Details). This variation jointly tests the effects of presentation and incentives. Since we expect the presentation alone is small, it is also a test of the effects of incentives.
Elicitation 1a: Valuation
Willingness to pay for the good (indifference point)
Elicitation 1b: Information
Share of people who revise choice about how to allocate good
Magnitude of revision in choice about how to allocate good
Suggestive: instrumental-variables specification that instruments for the effect of beliefs on Elicitation 1-outcomes.
The relationship between political party and exhibiting non-welfarist preferences (behaviors in Elicitations 1–4)
The relationship between personal experience (with facing legal problems without a lawyer or not seeking health care due to cost) and exhibiting non-welfarist preferences (behaviors in Elicitations 1–4)
The relationship between support for Right to Counsel and health care and exhibiting non-welfarist preferences (behaviors in Elicitations 1–4)
The relationship between income and exhibiting non-welfarist preferences (behaviors in Elicitation 1–4). This heterogeneity is useful to explore because non-welfarist preferences may only be prevalent among the rich and/or those with high levels of education, in which case welfarist social welfare functions that aggregate up such preferences and place significant weight on “rights” would be regressive.