Matching with non-induced preferences

Last registered on November 01, 2023

Pre-Trial

Trial Information

General Information

Title
Matching with non-induced preferences
RCT ID
AEARCTR-0012118
Initial registration date
October 26, 2023

Initial registration date is when the trial was registered.

It corresponds to when the registration was submitted to the Registry to be reviewed for publication.

First published
November 01, 2023, 3:50 PM EDT

First published corresponds to when the trial was first made public on the Registry after being reviewed.

Locations

Region

Primary Investigator

Affiliation

Other Primary Investigator(s)

PI Affiliation
Paderborn University
PI Affiliation
Paderborn University
PI Affiliation
Paderborn University
PI Affiliation

Additional Trial Information

Status
In development
Start date
2023-10-23
End date
2023-12-31
Secondary IDs
Prior work
This trial is based on or builds upon one or more prior RCTs.
Abstract
As a matching takes the preference lists of the agents as input, the preferences have a leading role in matching experiments. However, the experimenters rely on induced preferences to simulate real-world applications. We investigate participants’ behavior in matching experiments given induced and non-induced preferences. Building on the experiment by Chen and Sönmez (2006), we investigate the most frequently used school choice mechanisms (Boston school choice mechanism, Deferred Acceptance mechanism and Top Trading Cycles mechanism). In our experiment, the monetary incentives are supplemented by incentivizing participants via own preferences. As a main contribution our paper demonstrates how induced and non-induced preferences change the participants behavior (e.g. truth-telling and understanding) given different mechanisms.
External Link(s)

Registration Citation

Citation
Duman, Papatya et al. 2023. "Matching with non-induced preferences." AEA RCT Registry. November 01. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.12118-1.0
Experimental Details

Interventions

Intervention(s)
Intervention Start Date
2023-10-23
Intervention End Date
2023-12-31

Primary Outcomes

Primary Outcomes (end points)
Truth-telling rates and Efficiency
Primary Outcomes (explanation)

Secondary Outcomes

Secondary Outcomes (end points)
Secondary Outcomes (explanation)

Experimental Design

Experimental Design
We implement three matching mechanism each as a one-shot game with incomplete information. Each mechanism is tested by a control group with induced and a treatment group with non-induced preferences. We hereby create a 3 x 2 design.
Experimental Design Details
Randomization Method
randomization done by a computer
Randomization Unit
randomized assignment to group, randomization within group
Was the treatment clustered?
Yes

Experiment Characteristics

Sample size: planned number of clusters
6 (Treatment and control groups each with 3 mechanisms)
Sample size: planned number of observations
252
Sample size (or number of clusters) by treatment arms
42 Deferred Acceptance Mechanism Treatment
42 Boston School Choice Mechanism Treatment
42 Top Trading Cycles Mechanism Treatment
42 Deferred Acceptance Mechanism Control
42 Boston School Choice Mechanism Control
42 Top Trading Cycles Mechanism Control
Minimum detectable effect size for main outcomes (accounting for sample design and clustering)
IRB

Institutional Review Boards (IRBs)

IRB Name
IRB Approval Date
IRB Approval Number

Post-Trial

Post Trial Information

Study Withdrawal

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Intervention

Is the intervention completed?
No
Data Collection Complete
Data Publication

Data Publication

Is public data available?
No

Program Files

Program Files
Reports, Papers & Other Materials

Relevant Paper(s)

Reports & Other Materials