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Field
Experimental Design (Public)
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Before
We first run two pilot sessions (14 subjects each) where we randomly assign subjects into groups of 2 for 5 rounds - in total subjects undergo 10 rounds and 2 different pairings. In each round, subjects compete for the higher bonus in a real-effort task - the addition of 5 2-digit numbers. Two bonuses are drawn each round from a uniform distribution with 3 possible outcomes: 1, 5 and 9. If the drawn bonuses are uneven, the more productive subject earns the higher bonus. If the productivities of two subjects in a group for a given round are equal, the higher and lower bonuses are assigned to subjects based on a fair coin flip. After each round subjects learn only their own bonus (baseline condition).
To address the questions in our research, we randomly assign subjects within a session to one of four treatments (baseline, wage transparency, productivity transparency, or wage and productivity transparency). Subjects are matched with subjects from pilot sessions to compete for the higher bonus - subjects undergo 10 rounds (or 2 pairings of 5 rounds each) and are matched with the real-effort of two different subjects (25th and 75th percentile) from the pilot sessions in a random order. The real-effort task is to complete as many sums of 5 2-digit numbers as possible. Treatments differ in the amount and type of feedback that is provided about subjects from the pilot sessions.
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After
We first run two pilot sessions (14 subjects each) where we randomly assign subjects into groups of 2 for 5 rounds - in total subjects undergo 10 rounds and 2 different pairings. In each round, subjects compete for the higher bonus in a real-effort task - the addition of 4 2-digit numbers. Two bonuses are drawn each round from a uniform distribution with 2 possible outcomes: 5 and 15. If the drawn bonuses are uneven, the more productive subject earns the higher bonus. If the productivities of two subjects in a group for a given round are equal, the higher and lower bonuses are assigned to subjects with equal chance. After each round subjects learn only their own bonus (baseline condition).
To address the questions in our research, we randomly assign subjects within a session to one of four treatments (baseline, wage transparency, productivity transparency, or wage and productivity transparency). Subjects are matched with subjects from pilot sessions to compete for the higher bonus - subjects undergo 10 rounds (or 2 pairings of 5 rounds each) and are matched with the real-effort of two different subjects (25th and 75th percentile) from the pilot sessions in a random order. The real-effort task is to complete as many sums of 4 2-digit numbers as possible. Treatments differ in the amount and type of feedback that is provided about subjects from the pilot sessions.
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