The role of emotions and norms in team incentives: Theory and Evidence

Last registered on December 09, 2023
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Pre-Trial

Trial Information

General Information

Title
The role of emotions and norms in team incentives: Theory and Evidence
RCT ID
AEARCTR-0012231
Initial registration date
October 04, 2023

Initial registration date is when the trial was registered.

It corresponds to when the registration was submitted to the Registry to be reviewed for publication.

First published
October 04, 2023, 5:08 PM EDT

First published corresponds to when the trial was first made public on the Registry after being reviewed.

Last updated
December 09, 2023, 1:23 AM EST

Last updated is the most recent time when changes to the trial's registration were published.

Locations

Country
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
Region
Most likely the University of Nottingham
Country
India
Region
Various universities across India
Country
United States of America
Region
Most likely the University of Chicago

Primary Investigator

Name
Aayush Agarwal
Affiliation
Centre for Social and Behaviour Change at Ashoka University
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Other Primary Investigator(s)

PI Name
Prof. Sanjit Dhami
PI Affiliation
School of Business, University of Leicester
Contact Investigator
PI Name
Dr. Mengxing Wei
PI Affiliation
School of Economics, The Laboratory for Economic Behaviors and Policy Simulation, Nankai University
Contact Investigator
PI Name
Dr. Pavan Mamidi
PI Affiliation
Director, Centre for Social and Behaviour Change, Ashoka University
Contact Investigator

Additional Trial Information

Status
In development
Start date
2023-10-10
End date
2023-12-31
Keywords
Behavior, Firms & Productivity, Lab
Additional Keywords
Social Norms
JEL code(s)
Secondary IDs
Prior work
This trial does not extend or rely on any prior RCTs.
Abstract
We explore the role of emotions such as guilt-aversion and shame-aversion, and of social/workplace norms in the determining effort choices of team members. We build a rigorous beliefs-based model to derive predictions in four different treatments that isolate the effects of various emotions and social norms. Participants will be asked to choose the amount of effort they wish to exert in a team project, while being aware of either their team partner’s effort expectations (private signals), their social group’s effort expectations (social signals with and without sanctions), or a combination of both expectations.
External Link(s)

Registration Citation

Citation
Agarwal, Aayush et al. 2023. "The role of emotions and norms in team incentives: Theory and Evidence." AEA RCT Registry. December 09. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.12231-3.1
Sponsors & Partners

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Experimental Details

Interventions

Intervention(s)
Intervention Start Date
2023-10-10
Intervention End Date
2023-12-31

Primary Outcomes

Primary Outcomes (end points)
The amount of effort a subject expects their partner to put into the project, and the amount of effort a subject wishes to put into the project based on the information available to them
Primary Outcomes (explanation)

Secondary Outcomes

Secondary Outcomes (end points)
Guilt: Subject is asked whether they would feel guilt from falling behind the expectations of their partner
Shame: Subject is asked whether they would feel shame from falling behind the expectations of their social group
Disapproval: Subject is asked whether potential disapproval from their social group would influence the amount of shame they would feel for not meeting expectations
Belief hierarchy: Subject is asked which type of expectations is more important for them in deciding their effort level
Secondary Outcomes (explanation)

Experimental Design

Experimental Design
There are 5 treatment arms.
T0: Control group with no expectations conveyed to the subject, a straightforward elicitation of effort choice in a team project

T1: Private signals (team partner’s effort expectations) conveyed to the subject, the strategy method is used to elicit effort choices by varying partner expectations

T2: Social signals (social group’s effort expectations) conveyed to the subjects, the strategy method is used to elicit effort choices by varying social group’s expectations

T3: Mixed signals (combination of partner’s and social group’s effort expectations) conveyed to subjects, strategy method used to elicit effort choices by varying both types of expectations

T4: Mixed signals with sanctions (combination of partner’s and social group’s effort expectations) conveyed to subjects, strategy method used to elicit effort choices by varying both types of expectations

Subjects are randomly allocated to one of the 5 treatments, and further randomly matched with team partners within each treatment to play the effort game.
Experimental Design Details
Randomization Method
Individual subject-level randomization into one of five treatment arms through a randomizer programmed into Qualtrics.
Randomization Unit
Individual
Was the treatment clustered?
No

Experiment Characteristics

Sample size: planned number of clusters
NA
Sample size: planned number of observations
625 individuals
Sample size (or number of clusters) by treatment arms
125 individuals each in 5 arms
Minimum detectable effect size for main outcomes (accounting for sample design and clustering)
Supporting Documents and Materials
IRB

Institutional Review Boards (IRBs)

IRB Name
IRB at Ashoka University
IRB Approval Date
2023-08-04
IRB Approval Number
23-E-10062-Agarwal
Analysis Plan

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Post-Trial

Post Trial Information

Study Withdrawal

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Intervention

Is the intervention completed?
No
Data Collection Complete
Data Publication

Data Publication

Is public data available?
No

Program Files

Program Files
Reports, Papers & Other Materials

Relevant Paper(s)

Reports & Other Materials