|
Field
Abstract
|
Before
In large elections the probability that any particular voter will be pivotal is vanishingly small. Even small costs of voting then make it irrational to vote, but many people do vote– the paradox of voting. We explore two main motivations using a rigorous theoretical model, duty of voting underpinned by the emotion of guilt from violating internal moral moral norms, and social norms underpinned by the emotion of shame from violating norms of voting. We also test for the importance of descriptive norms alone, and social image concerns, while we successfully shut down other explanatory channels such as expressive voting, and identity based voting. We then test our predictions using pre-registered experiments.
|
After
We explore the role of emotions such as guilt-aversion and shame-aversion, and of social/workplace norms in the determining effort choices of team members. We build a rigorous beliefs-based model to derive predictions in four different treatments that isolate the effects of various emotions and social norms. Participants will be asked to choose the amount of effort they wish to exert in a team project, while being aware of either their team partner’s effort expectations (private signals), their social group’s effort expectations (social signals with and without sanctions), or a combination of both expectations.
|