Correcting mistaken beliefs about democracy, populism and economic performance

Last registered on October 18, 2023
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Pre-Trial

Trial Information

General Information

Title
Correcting mistaken beliefs about democracy, populism and economic performance
RCT ID
AEARCTR-0012309
Initial registration date
October 16, 2023

Initial registration date is when the trial was registered.

It corresponds to when the registration was submitted to the Registry to be reviewed for publication.

First published
October 17, 2023, 1:53 PM EDT

First published corresponds to when the trial was first made public on the Registry after being reviewed.

Last updated
October 18, 2023, 10:40 AM EDT

Last updated is the most recent time when changes to the trial's registration were published.

Locations

Country
Argentina
Region
Countrywide

Primary Investigator

Name
Nicolas Ajzenman
Affiliation
Sao Paulo School of Economics - FGV
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Other Primary Investigator(s)

PI Name
Guillermo Cruces
PI Affiliation
UNLP-UofN
Contact Investigator
PI Name
Martin Fiszbein
PI Affiliation
BU
Contact Investigator
PI Name
Gaston Garcia-Zavaleta
PI Affiliation
UdeSA
Contact Investigator

Additional Trial Information

Status
On going
Start date
2023-10-16
End date
2023-10-31
Keywords
Behavior, Electoral
Additional Keywords
Democracy, Performance, Populism, Autocracy
JEL code(s)
Secondary IDs
Prior work
This trial does not extend or rely on any prior RCTs.
Abstract
In the last few years, the world has been experiencing a decline in support for democratic regimes. This fact is evident from surveys (such as the World Values Survey) and electoral results across the globe. As documented by Guriev and Papaioannou (2022), the proportion of populist regimes with autocratic tendencies has grown heavily since the beginning of the century. A recent paper by Acemoglu et al. (2021) shows that democracies breed their support only when they are successful, specifically regarding specific socio-economic outcomes (growth, equality, peace, low levels of corruption, public goods). Interestingly, in the last years pre-COVID, the world has also experienced relative prosperity, which poses a puzzle: why is democracy losing support if it is relatively successful?

We hypothesize that, in the modern world, misinformation (which is widespread) could soften the relationship between successful democracies and support for democracy because many people wrongly perceive that an autocracy (or a populist government with certain autocratic tendencies) could outperform their current democratic regimes. Acemoglu et al (2019) show that, indeed, democracies cause growth and, recently Funke et al. (2020) show that populism reduces growth, but it is likely that people ignore these relationships and thus have a mistaken belief about which system has a better economic performance. If this is true, an information intervention based on scientific facts, showing that democracies that are not populist have on average better performances, could trigger an increase in support for democracy.

We propose implementing a survey/questionnaire experiment in Argentina before the upcoming presidential elections. Survey shows that Argentinians are tired of the apparent economic failures of the system (GDP per capita is virtually stagnated since 2011) and thus seem to be supporting populist candidates with clear autocratic tendencies.

Our survey experiment will have five arms:

a) A short video describing Acemoglu et al's (2019) result in a simple way, explaining that on average democracies grow faster than autocracies. It will also describe (first) the characteristics of a democracy and autocracy.
b) A short video describing Funke et al's (2020) result in a simple way, explaining that on average right wing populist governments have lower growth rates. It will also describe (first) the characteristics of a right-wing and a left-wing populist government.
c) A short video describing Funke et al's (2020) result in a simple way, explaining that on average left wing populist governments have lower growth rates. It will also describe (first) the characteristics of a right-wing and a left-wing populist government.
d) A short video describing (first) the characteristics of a right-wing and a left-wing populist government, without mentioning their economic performance. (CONTROL 1)
e) A short video describing (first) the characteristics of democracies and autocracies without mentioning their economic performance. (CONTROL 2)


We will elicit beliefs about political system and economic performance (pre and post-treatment), about attitudes towards democratic and populist (right and left) governments and, finally, voting preferences for the incoming election in Argentina.

External Link(s)

Registration Citation

Citation
Ajzenman, Nicolas et al. 2023. "Correcting mistaken beliefs about democracy, populism and economic performance." AEA RCT Registry. October 18. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.12309-1.1
Sponsors & Partners
Experimental Details

Interventions

Intervention(s)
In the last few years, the world has been experiencing a decline in support for democratic regimes. This fact is evident from surveys (such as the World Values Survey) and electoral results across the globe. As documented by Guriev and Papaioannou (2022), the proportion of populist regimes with autocratic tendencies has grown heavily since the beginning of the century. A recent paper by Acemoglu et al. (2021) shows that democracies breed their support only when they are successful, specifically regarding specific socio-economic outcomes (growth, equality, peace, low levels of corruption, public goods). Interestingly, in the last years pre-COVID, the world has also experienced relative prosperity, which poses a puzzle: why is democracy losing support if it is relatively successful?

We hypothesize that, in the modern world, misinformation (which is widespread) could soften the relationship between successful democracies and support for democracy because many people wrongly perceive that an autocracy (or a populist government with certain autocratic tendencies) could outperform their current democratic regimes. Acemoglu et al (2019) show that, indeed, democracies cause growth and, recently Funke et al. (2020) show that populism reduces growth, but it is likely that people ignore these relationships and thus have a mistaken belief about which system has a better economic performance. If this is true, an information intervention based on scientific facts, showing that democracies that are not populist have on average better performances, could trigger an increase in support for democracy.

We propose implementing a survey/questionnaire experiment in Argentina before the upcoming presidential elections. Survey shows that Argentinians are tired of the apparent economic failures of the system (GDP per capita is virtually stagnated since 2011) and thus seem to be supporting populist candidates with clear autocratic tendencies.

Our survey experiment will have five arms:

a) A short video describing Acemoglu et al's (2019) result in a simple way, explaining that on average democracies grow faster than autocracies. It will also describe (first) the characteristics of a democracy and autocracy.
b) A short video describing Funke et al's (2020) result in a simple way, explaining that on average right wing populist governments have lower growth rates. It will also describe (first) the characteristics of a right-wing and a left-wing populist government.
c) A short video describing Funke et al's (2020) result in a simple way, explaining that on average left wing populist governments have lower growth rates. It will also describe (first) the characteristics of a right-wing and a left-wing populist government.
d) A short video describing (first) the characteristics of a right-wing and a left-wing populist government, without mentioning their economic performance. (CONTROL 1)
e) A short video describing (first) the characteristics of democracies and autocracies without mentioning their economic performance. (CONTROL 2)


We will elicit beliefs about political system and economic performance (pre and post-treatment), about attitudes towards democratic and populist (right and left) governments and, finally, voting preferences for the incoming election in Argentina.

Intervention Start Date
2023-10-16
Intervention End Date
2023-10-31

Primary Outcomes

Primary Outcomes (end points)
Beliefs about political systems (democracy, autocracy, left wing and right win populism) and economic performance: we will ask if a right-wing populist, left-wing populist versus non-populist have better economic performance (Control 1 and two treatment arms related to populism). We will ask if autocrat versus democrats have better economic performance (Control 2 and one treatment arm related to autocracy). We expect citizens to update their beliefs according to the information we provided in the videos.


Preferences for different political regimes: we will mention different characteristics typically associated with popoulism, nonpopulism, democracies and autocracies and ask if the individual agrees (from 1 to 5) with different statements related to how desirable/non desirable those characteristics are in a political system.

We will ask at the end of the survey who they are planning to vote in the upcoming presidential elections.




Important 1: we have a specific control for "autocracy versus democracy" and one specific control for "populism (right or left) versus nonpopulism".
Important 2: we will show unpooled and pooled results for populism (that is, left+right populism).
Important 3: in the treatment arms, we described a populist regime but called it "personalist"; that is because the word "populism" in Spanish is too much associated (in the public view) with specific politicians.
Important 4: we will analyze the beliefs results controlling by pre-treatment beliefs (the idea is to measure the change on beliefs) and also will analyze heterogeneous effects by pre-treatment beliefs (on the relevant topic: populism or autocracy)


Primary Outcomes (explanation)

Secondary Outcomes

Secondary Outcomes (end points)
Knowledge about populist/non populist/autocracies and democratic governments: we will ask specific characteristics that we mentioned in the videos to test if individuals recall what they saw.

Demand for information: we will ask at the end of the survey if they would like to know more about democratic regimes and economic performance from scientific papers.
Secondary Outcomes (explanation)

Experimental Design

Experimental Design
We hypothesize that the support for a particular political leader partly reflects an attribution of successful economic performance to his leadership style. We focus on two types of leaders -populist leaders and dictators- and design a survey experiment to assess whether the perception of their economic performance impacts the support they receive.

Our survey is divided into five different sections:
1. Introduction and consent
2. Demographic questions
3. Prior beliefs about the economic performance of populism and dictatorships and treatment (two control groups and three treatment arms)
4. Preferences for populism and dictatorships
5. Posterior beliefs about the economic performance of populism and dictatorships.

In section 3, each respondent is randomly assigned to one of five groups. Assignment to treatment is stratified by age group and geographical zone.
1. Control 1: This group must watch a video that describes populism and answer some questions about the economic performance of right-wing and left-wing populist leaders.
2. Control 2: This group must watch a video that describes dictatorships and answer some questions about the economic performance of dictatorships.
3. Treatment 1: This group must watch a video that describes populism and answer some questions about the economic performance of right-wing and left-wing populist leaders. Additionally, we show them empirical evidence about the economic performance of right-wing populist leaders.
4. Treatment 2: This group must watch a video that describes populism and answer some questions about the economic performance of right-wing and left-wing populist leaders. Additionally, we show them empirical evidence about the economic performance of left-wing populist leaders.
5. Treatment 3: This group must watch a video that describes dictatorships and answer some questions about the economic performance of dictatorships. Additionally, we show them empirical evidence about the economic performance of dictatorships.





Experimental Design Details
We will comparte T1 versus C1, T2 versus C1, (T1+T2) vs C1 and T3 versus C2.
Randomization Method
It will be randomized in office by a computer (researches will not have access to this randomization, it will be conducted by a survey firm)
Randomization Unit
Individuals (no clustering).
Was the treatment clustered?
No

Experiment Characteristics

Sample size: planned number of clusters
We aim at 800 individuals per arm. However, we expect some attrition after the attention check.
Sample size: planned number of observations
We aim at 800 individuals per arm. However, we expect some attrition after the attention check.
Sample size (or number of clusters) by treatment arms
We aim at 800 individuals per arm. However, we expect some attrition after the attention check.
Minimum detectable effect size for main outcomes (accounting for sample design and clustering)
Supporting Documents and Materials
IRB

Institutional Review Boards (IRBs)

IRB Name
Research Ethics Board Office - McGill University
IRB Approval Date
2023-10-11
IRB Approval Number
REB# 23-10-041
Analysis Plan

Post-Trial

Post Trial Information

Study Withdrawal

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Intervention

Is the intervention completed?
No
Data Collection Complete
Data Publication

Data Publication

Is public data available?
No

Program Files

Program Files
Reports, Papers & Other Materials

Relevant Paper(s)

Reports & Other Materials