Advice and behavior in a dictator game: An experimental study

Last registered on November 01, 2023

View Trial History

Pre-Trial

Trial Information

General Information

Title

Advice and behavior in a dictator game: An experimental study

RCT ID

AEARCTR-0012344

Initial registration date

October 24, 2023

Initial registration date is when the trial was registered.

It corresponds to when the registration was submitted to the Registry to be reviewed for publication.

First published

November 01, 2023, 2:40 PM EDT

First published corresponds to when the trial was first made public on the Registry after being reviewed.

Locations

Country

China

Region

Primary Investigator

Name

Xintong Pan

Affiliation

Shanghai University of Finance and Economics

Contact Primary Investigator

Other Primary Investigator(s)

PI Name

Simin He

PI Affiliation

Shanghai University of Finance and Economics

Contact Investigator

Additional Trial Information

Status

On going

Start date

2023-05-31

End date

2023-12-31

Keywords

Behavior

Additional Keywords

advice, dictator games, laboratory experiment

JEL code(s)

C91, D63, D83

Secondary IDs

Prior work

This trial does not extend or rely on any prior RCTs.

Abstract

We experimentally study the effects of advice on decision-making in a dictator game. In the experiment, participants receive no advice, selfish advice, or fair advice before making decisions. Advisors do not benefit from the actions of the decision-makers. We hypothesize that participants who receive fair (selfish) advice are more likely to choose the fair (selfish) option, compared to those who receive no advice. However, the impact of selfish advice is stronger than that of fair advice. The experimental design enables us to investigate the impact of both fair and selfish advice in moral dilemmas.

External Link(s)

Registration Citation

Citation

He, Simin and Xintong Pan. 2023. "Advice and behavior in a dictator game: An experimental study ." AEA RCT Registry. November 01. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.12344-1.0

Sponsors & Partners

Experimental Details

Interventions

Intervention(s)

In a between-subjects design, participants are randomly assigned to one of the three treatments: baseline, fair advice, and selfish advice treatments. Participants are randomly and independently assigned into pairs and play a one-shot binary dictator game in each treatment. In the baseline, dictators directly choose between the fair and the selfish options that determine the earnings of dictators and their corresponding receivers. In the fair (selfish) advice treatment, dictators receive fair (selfish) advice before making their choices.

Intervention (Hidden)

Intervention Start Date

2023-05-31

Intervention End Date

2023-12-31

Primary Outcomes

Primary Outcomes (end points)

Dictators’ choices between the selfish and fair options.

Primary Outcomes (explanation)

We can investigate the effect of fair and selfish advice on decision-making in a moral context where individuals have to choose between maximizing personal benefits and collective welfare.

Secondary Outcomes

Secondary Outcomes (end points)

Participants’ social value orientation test.

Secondary Outcomes (explanation)

Social value orientation test can be employed as a control variable to conduct differential analysis among the samples in treatments, and be used to explore the relationship between participants' value orientations and their decisions.

Experimental Design

The main experiment comprises two distinct parts. The game in each part is played only once. In Part 1, participants are required to complete a social value orientation test that assesses their preferences regarding the monetary payoffs of both themselves and others. In Part 2, participants participate a binary dictator game, where the advice given to the dictators varies across treatments. The game offers two options: the selfish option yields 50 points for the decision-maker (dictator) and zero points for the other player (receiver), and the fair option yields 40 points for both players. In the baseline, dictators directly choose between the fair and the selfish options that determine the earnings of dictators and their corresponding receivers. In the fair (selfish) advice treatment, dictators receive fair (selfish) advice before making their choices.

To obtain advice from advisors for use in the main experimental treatments, we first conduct an independent advice-eliciting experiment. During this experiment, participants are recruited as advisors, and are asked to provide advice to the dictators in a similar dictator game which fair option is default.

Experimental Design Details

Randomization Method

Within each experiment session, multiple treatments are implemented by randomization; the randomization is pre-determined.
Subjects who sign up for the experiment receive a seat number randomly before entering the laboratory; the seat number determines the treatment subjects will experience.

Randomization Unit

Individual-level randomization

Was the treatment clustered?

Experiment Characteristics

Sample size: planned number of clusters

We aim to collect about 160-200 subjects for baseline treatment,160-200 subjects for the fair advice treatment, and 70-90 subjects for the selfish advice treatment.
We hypothesize that the difference between the fair treatment and the baseline is smaller compared to that between the selfish treatment and the baseline. Therefore, we plan to include roughly twice as many subjects in baseline and fair treatment in comparison to the selfish treatment to detect this difference.

Sample size: planned number of observations

About 390-490 individuals, recruited via the subject pool of the Economic Lab of the Shanghai University of Finance and Economics.

Sample size (or number of clusters) by treatment arms

160-200 subjects in baseline and fair advice treatment, 70-90 in selfish advice treatment.

Minimum detectable effect size for main outcomes (accounting for sample design and clustering)

Supporting Documents and Materials

IRB