Measuring Experimenter Demand
Last registered on May 18, 2017

Pre-Trial

Trial Information
General Information
Title
Measuring Experimenter Demand
RCT ID
AEARCTR-0001248
Initial registration date
May 18, 2016
Last updated
May 18, 2017 6:12 AM EDT
Location(s)
Region
Primary Investigator
Affiliation
University of Oxford
Other Primary Investigator(s)
PI Affiliation
IIES Stockholm
PI Affiliation
Department of Psychology and Public Affairs Princeton
Additional Trial Information
Status
Completed
Start date
2016-05-18
End date
2016-05-20
Secondary IDs
Abstract
Experimenter demand effects pose an important challenge to understand and interpret results from laboratory and field studies. In this paper, we manipulate participants’ beliefs about the intentions and desires of the experimenters. In particular, we are interested in how far people’s behavior in economic games is elastic to experimenter demand. In our experiment, people are randomly assigned to play either a dictator game, an investment game or to complete a convex time budget. We randomly assign whether people will be exposed to positive, negative or no experimenter demand and whether the choices involve real money or are hypothetical.
External Link(s)
Registration Citation
Citation
Haushofer, Johannes, Jonathan de Quidt and Christopher Roth. 2017. "Measuring Experimenter Demand." AEA RCT Registry. May 18. https://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/1248/history/17765
Experimental Details
Interventions
Intervention(s)
Intervention Start Date
2016-05-18
Intervention End Date
2016-05-20
Outcomes
Outcomes (end points)
Giving in a dictator game; Points invested in an investment game; Choices in convex time budgets.
Outcomes (explanation)
Experimental Design
Experimental Design
In all three different behavioral measures we either induce positive negative or no demand by telling them that they will do us a favor if, for example, they invest more in a project than they normally would. We will now outline the instructions for each of the different games:

Dictator game:
Positive Demand: You will do us a favor if you give more to the other participant than you normally would.
Negative Demand: You will do us a favor if you give less to the other participant than you normally would.
No Demand: We do not induce any demand.

Investment game:
- Positive Demand: You will do us a favor if you invest more in the project than you normally would.
- Negative Demand: You will do us a favor if you invest less in the project than you normally would.
- No Demand: We do not induce any demand.

Convex time budgets:
- Positive Demand: You will do us a favor if you choose to receive more money in seven days than you normally would.
- Negative Demand: You will do us a favor if you choose to receive less money in seven days than you normally would.
- No Demand: We do not induce any demand.

Experimental Design Details
Randomization Method
Randomization done by a computer.
Randomization Unit
Individual
Was the treatment clustered?
No
Experiment Characteristics
Sample size: planned number of clusters
4500
Sample size: planned number of observations
4500
Sample size (or number of clusters) by treatment arms
1500 positive demand (750 positive demand with monetary incentives; 750 positive demand no monetary incentives)
1500 negative demand (750 negative demand with monetary incentives; 750 negative demand no monetary incentives)
1500 control (750 control with monetary incentives; 750 control no monetary incentives)
Minimum detectable effect size for main outcomes (accounting for sample design and clustering)
For our main test of interest, i.e. comparing the behavior of people in the positive and negative demand condition we have a power of .8 to detect standardized effect sizes of .105 at alpha= 0.05. To test for heterogeneous treatment effects by incentives and gender we have a power of .8 to detect effect sizes of .145 at alpha= 0.05 respectively. Finally, to test for heterogeneous responses to demand for the three different games, we can detect effect sizes of .18 with power .8 at alpha= 0.05.
IRB
INSTITUTIONAL REVIEW BOARDS (IRBs)
IRB Name
Princeton Institutional Review Board
IRB Approval Date
2015-08-26
IRB Approval Number
IRB 6800
Analysis Plan
Analysis Plan Documents
Demand PAP

MD5: fa5b33e93a97800e4c6f9820585fc86d

SHA1: e7040a8d2aa45c4f914a180795a7341e63af205a

Uploaded At: May 18, 2016

Demand PAP Experiment 2

MD5: 778d211283c8739faeb22ca1f1ab9331

SHA1: 0f82b28db8c62b48badec564201e3a3ce5c0518a

Uploaded At: July 04, 2016

Demand Effects PAP - Rep Sample

MD5: 8301a4e0e40eb17ba3fb2b78debfa67f

SHA1: 789c878e2dfd38b4577f19eee25d9fbe17988233

Uploaded At: August 18, 2016

Demand Effects Effort: PAP

MD5: 12a00b91ddc5ae908a7cadcc27334474

SHA1: 951c8039a54bec44b25561153fae80db53021650

Uploaded At: August 26, 2016

Demand Effects Across Tasks PAP

MD5: dad8bfddae74534d89b2850e9296f4f7

SHA1: 96c59a112edbe88fe617b0f9d14761484cf8fc79

Uploaded At: September 12, 2016

Demand Effects Within

MD5: e882db67d437c7168e9a7f5a4fde4ace

SHA1: 3be845b1053a10a03e81a9d8e0730c622bda81b6

Uploaded At: May 18, 2017

Post-Trial
Post Trial Information
Study Withdrawal
Intervention
Is the intervention completed?
No
Is data collection complete?
Data Publication
Data Publication
Is public data available?
No
Program Files
Program Files
Reports and Papers
Preliminary Reports
Relevant Papers