Perceived Economic Performance of Nondemocracies and Support for Democracy: Responses to Information from Different Sources.

Last registered on December 01, 2023
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Pre-Trial

Trial Information

General Information

Title
Perceived Economic Performance of Nondemocracies and Support for Democracy: Responses to Information from Different Sources.
RCT ID
AEARCTR-0012523
Initial registration date
November 16, 2023

Initial registration date is when the trial was registered.

It corresponds to when the registration was submitted to the Registry to be reviewed for publication.

First published
December 01, 2023, 4:19 AM EST

First published corresponds to when the trial was first made public on the Registry after being reviewed.

Locations

Country
Argentina
Region

Primary Investigator

Name
Gastón García Zavaleta
Affiliation
Universidad de San Andrés
Contact Primary Investigator

Other Primary Investigator(s)

PI Name
Nicolás Ajzenman
PI Affiliation
McGill University and Sao Paulo School of Economics - FGV
Contact Investigator
PI Name
Martín Fiszbein
PI Affiliation
Boston University and NBER
Contact Investigator
PI Name
Guillermo Cruces
PI Affiliation
UNLP and UofN
Contact Investigator
PI Name
Carlos Molina
PI Affiliation
MIT
Contact Investigator
PI Name
Daron Acemoglu
PI Affiliation
MIT
Contact Investigator

Additional Trial Information

Status
Completed
Start date
2023-11-14
End date
2023-11-17
Keywords
Behavior, Electoral
Additional Keywords
Democracy, Autocracy, Performance, Misinformation
JEL code(s)
Secondary IDs
Prior work
This trial does not extend or rely on any prior RCTs.
Abstract
In a recent paper, Acemoglu et al. (2023) show that democracies breed their own support, but only when they are successful along key dimensions, including economic growth, provision of public goods, limited inequality. With this background, recent decades present a somewhat puzzling combination of relative economic success with declining support for democracy at a global scale. However, there is no contradiction. One important consideration is that support for democracy is likely influenced by perceptions of economic success, which may or may not be accurate. Democracies today have to deal new patterns of political communication brought about by the spread of social media. Misinformation and echo chambers may break the link between economic success in democracies and support for democracy.

Understanding how information about the economic performance of democracies and autocracies shapes support for democracy is a key challenge for the present day, as the declining support for democracy is plausibly related to episodes of democratic backsliding and rise in right-wing populist movements. Information itself, and the medium through which it is delivered, may both be key for the formation of democratic attitudes. In this study, we propose a survey experiment with different information treatments to test how information on the performance of democracies and autocracies, coming from different sources, affect the beliefs about the economic performance of political regimes and to test how changes in these beliefs affect support for democracy.
External Link(s)

Registration Citation

Citation
Acemoglu, Daron et al. 2023. "Perceived Economic Performance of Nondemocracies and Support for Democracy: Responses to Information from Different Sources.." AEA RCT Registry. December 01. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.12523-1.0
Sponsors & Partners
Experimental Details

Interventions

Intervention(s)
We propose a survey experiment with different information treatments to test how various information sources affect the beliefs about the economic performance of autocracies and to test how these beliefs affect support for democracy.
Our survey will have six sections:
1. Introduction and consent.
2. Demographic questions. In this section we will also ask “How much time do you spend weekly informing yourself about political issues?” and “Through what media do you find out about political issues?”.
3. Treatment. Eight arms.
4. Questions about preferences for autocracies.
5. Questions about post-treatment beliefs on the economic performance of autocracies.
6. Additional questions.

In section 3, each respondent will be randomly assigned to one of eight groups.
1. Control: This group watches a video that describes dictatorships and answers questions about the economic performance of the Chilean dictator Augusto Pinochet.
2. Media - Positive: This group watches a video that describes dictatorships and answers questions about the economic performance of the Chilean dictator Augusto Pinochet. Additionally, we show them a newspaper article suggesting that the performance of the Chilean economy during the years of the authoritarian government was very good.
3. Media - Negative: This group watches a video that describes dictatorships and answers questions about the economic performance of the Chilean dictator Augusto Pinochet. Additionally, we show them a newspaper article suggesting that the performance of the Chilean economy during the years of the authoritarian government was very bad.
4. Tweet - Positive: This group watches a video that describes dictatorships and answers questions about the economic performance of the Chilean dictator Augusto Pinochet. Ad- ditionally, we show them tweets suggesting that the performance of the Chilean economy during the years of the authoritarian government was very good.
5. Tweet - Negative: This group watches a video that describes dictatorships and answers questions about the economic performance of the Chilean dictator Augusto Pinochet. Ad- ditionally, we show them tweets suggesting that the performance of the Chilean economy during the years of the authoritarian government was very bad.
6. Evidence - Positive: This group watches a video that describes dictatorships and answers questions about the economic performance of the Chilean dictator Augusto Pinochet. Additionally, we show them scientific evidence suggesting that the performance of the Chilean economy during the years of the authoritarian government was very good.
7. Evidence - Negative: This group watches a video that describes dictatorships and answers questions about the economic performance of the Chilean dictator Augusto Pinochet. Additionally, we show them scientific evidence suggesting that the performance of the Chilean economy during the years of the authoritarian government was very bad.
8. Opinion - Negative: This group watches a video that describes dictatorships and answers questions about the economic performance of the Chilean dictator Augusto Pinochet. Additionally, we tell them that, in our opinion, the performance of the Chilean economy during the dictatorship of Augusto Pinochet was very bad.

In all treatment arms (and in the control group as well) respondents will watch a video that describes autocracies, but instead of directly talking about autocracies the video uses the term “authoritarian governments”.

We will elicit beliefs about the economic performance of autocracies (pre and post-treatment), about attitudes towards democratic governments and, finally, about voting preferences for the incoming election in Argentina. We will also measure the willingness to receive additional information about political regimes and their economic performance and the willingness to receive information about the current state of the Argentinian economy.
Intervention Start Date
2023-11-14
Intervention End Date
2023-11-17

Primary Outcomes

Primary Outcomes (end points)
Beliefs about political systems (democracy and autocracy) and about their economic performance. To measure pre-treatment beliefs, we will ask the respondents about the economic performance of the Chilean economy during the years of the authoritarian government under Pinochet. To measure post-treatment beliefs, we will ask the respondents whether the Argentinian economy would have performed better under a dictatorship during the past 40 years.

Preferences for different political regimes: we will mention different characteristics typically associated with democracies and autocracies and ask if the individual agrees (from 1 to 5) with different statements related to how desirable/non desirable those characteristics are in a political system.

We will explore heterogeneous treatment effects according to pre-treatment beliefs on the economic performance of autocracies.
Primary Outcomes (explanation)

Secondary Outcomes

Secondary Outcomes (end points)
Knowledge about autocracies: we will ask specific characteristics that we mentioned in the video to test if individuals recall what they saw.

Demand for information: we will ask at the end of the survey if they would like to know more about autocratic regimes and about and about what characteristics a government should have to promote the proper functioning of the economy. Additionally, we will ask if they would like to receive information about the current state of the Argentinian economy. Finally, we will ask at the end of the survey who they are planning to vote in the upcoming presidential elections.

We will explore heterogeneous treatment effects according to three dimensions: 1) level of education, 2) time spent informing about political issues, and 3) sources of information used to inform about political issues.
Secondary Outcomes (explanation)

Experimental Design

Experimental Design
Our survey will have six sections:
1. Introduction and consent.
2. Demographic questions. In this section we will also ask “How much time do you spend weekly informing yourself about political issues?” and “Through what media do you find out about political issues?”.
3. Treatment. Eight arms.
4. Questions about preferences for autocracies.
5. Questions about post-treatment beliefs on the economic performance of autocracies.
6. Additional questions.

In section 3, each respondent will be randomly assigned to one of eight groups. Assignment to treatment is stratified by age group and geographical zone.
1. Control: This group watches a video that describes dictatorships and answers questions about the economic performance of the Chilean dictator Augusto Pinochet.
2. Media - Positive: This group watches a video that describes dictatorships and answers questions about the economic performance of the Chilean dictator Augusto Pinochet. Additionally, we show them a newspaper article suggesting that the performance of the Chilean economy during the years of the authoritarian government was very good.
3. Media - Negative: This group watches a video that describes dictatorships and answers questions about the economic performance of the Chilean dictator Augusto Pinochet. Additionally, we show them a newspaper article suggesting that the performance of the Chilean economy during the years of the authoritarian government was very bad.
4. Tweet - Positive: This group watches a video that describes dictatorships and answers questions about the economic performance of the Chilean dictator Augusto Pinochet. Ad- ditionally, we show them tweets suggesting that the performance of the Chilean economy during the years of the authoritarian government was very good.
5. Tweet - Negative: This group watches a video that describes dictatorships and answers questions about the economic performance of the Chilean dictator Augusto Pinochet. Ad- ditionally, we show them tweets suggesting that the performance of the Chilean economy during the years of the authoritarian government was very bad.
6. Evidence - Positive: This group watches a video that describes dictatorships and answers questions about the economic performance of the Chilean dictator Augusto Pinochet. Additionally, we show them scientific evidence suggesting that the performance of the Chilean economy during the years of the authoritarian government was very good.
7. Evidence - Negative: This group watches a video that describes dictatorships and answers questions about the economic performance of the Chilean dictator Augusto Pinochet. Additionally, we show them scientific evidence suggesting that the performance of the Chilean economy during the years of the authoritarian government was very bad.
8. Opinion - Negative: This group watches a video that describes dictatorships and answers questions about the economic performance of the Chilean dictator Augusto Pinochet. Additionally, we tell them that, in our opinion, the performance of the Chilean economy during the dictatorship of Augusto Pinochet was very bad.

In all treatment arms (and in the control group as well) respondents will watch a video that describes autocracies, but instead of directly talking about autocracies the video uses the term “authoritarian governments”.
Experimental Design Details
Randomization Method
It will be randomized in office by a computer (researches will not have access to this randomization, it will be conducted by a survey firm)
Randomization Unit
Individuals (no clustering).
Was the treatment clustered?
No

Experiment Characteristics

Sample size: planned number of clusters
We aim at 1000 individuals per arm. However, we expect some attrition and some respondents to fail the attention check.
Sample size: planned number of observations
We aim at 1000 individuals per arm. However, we expect some attrition and some respondents to fail the attention check.
Sample size (or number of clusters) by treatment arms
We aim at 1000 individuals per arm. However, we expect some attrition and some respondents to fail the attention check.
Minimum detectable effect size for main outcomes (accounting for sample design and clustering)
Supporting Documents and Materials
IRB

Institutional Review Boards (IRBs)

IRB Name
Research Ethics Board Office - McGill University
IRB Approval Date
2023-11-10
IRB Approval Number
REB# 23-11-024
Analysis Plan

Post-Trial

Post Trial Information

Study Withdrawal

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Intervention

Is the intervention completed?
No
Data Collection Complete
Data Publication

Data Publication

Is public data available?
No

Program Files

Program Files
Reports, Papers & Other Materials

Relevant Paper(s)

Reports & Other Materials