Rotations

Last registered on June 24, 2024

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Pre-Trial

Trial Information

General Information

Title

Rotations

RCT ID

AEARCTR-0012637

Initial registration date

June 17, 2024

Initial registration date is when the trial was registered.

It corresponds to when the registration was submitted to the Registry to be reviewed for publication.

First published

June 24, 2024, 2:06 PM EDT

First published corresponds to when the trial was first made public on the Registry after being reviewed.

Locations

Country

Austria

Region

Primary Investigator

Name

Michael Kurschilgen

Affiliation

UniDistance Suisse

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Other Primary Investigator(s)

PI Name

Ola Andersson

PI Affiliation

Uppsala University

Contact Investigator

PI Name

Daniel Spiro

PI Affiliation

Uppsala University

Contact Investigator

PI Name

Carlos Kurschilgen

PI Affiliation

Querbeat

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Additional Trial Information

Status

In development

Start date

2024-06-30

End date

2024-07-31

Keywords

Behavior

Additional Keywords

coalition proofness, inequality aversion, coordination, conflict

JEL code(s)

Secondary IDs

Prior work

This trial does not extend or rely on any prior RCTs.

Abstract

We study the incidence of different equilibria in a three-player "battle-of-the-sexes" type game. Payoff increases in coordination so that player prefer to coordinate on one action. Each player has a preferred coordination action. We study what equilibria are played when we increase the payoff to coordinate on ones preferred action.

External Link(s)

Registration Citation

Citation

Andersson, Ola et al. 2024. "Rotations." AEA RCT Registry. June 24. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.12637-1.0

Sponsors & Partners

Experimental Details

Interventions

Intervention(s)

Intervention Start Date

2024-06-30

Intervention End Date

2024-07-31

Primary Outcomes

Primary Outcomes (end points)

Subjects play a three-person Battle-of-the-Sexes game, repeated over 48 periods. We collect data on individual actions in every period.We will construct variables according to whether coordination occurred (i.e. an NE action profile was played). In addition, we will also construct variables that indicate whether a particular on-path equilibrium strategy was played. We focus on three types of equilibria:

(i) a dictator equilibrium, in which one player always prefers their preferred action (PA) x and the other two players also play action x.
(ii) a bully equilibrium, in which two players alternate synchronously between their respective PAs x and y, and the third player also alternates between x and y.
(ii) a rotation equilibrium, in which all three players rotate synchronously over their respective PAs x, y, and z.

In all these equilibria there is full coordination (i.e. all three players choose the same action in a given period), but equilibria differ in the distribution of PAs within a group of three players.

Primary Outcomes (explanation)

Secondary Outcomes

Secondary Outcomes (end points)

Which type of information (choice history and payoff history) is acquired by the players

Secondary Outcomes (explanation)

Players will be able to view payoff and action histories. We will collect information on whether they looked at payoffs, actions or both.

Experimental Design

In total, we have 3x2 treatments. Between-subjects, we vary (i) whether the marginal return from coordinating on one’s preferred action (PA) is Low (M=1.1) or High (M=3), and (ii) whether --provided M=3-- one player per group receives a choice-independent Lumpsum or not.

We also vary the labeling of the players and actions. In a first treatment we label them A, B and C. In a second treatment, they are labeled ●, ■ and ▲. The reason for this treatment is that the former contains a natural ordering which may cause a rotation strategy more salient to subjects. If we already have close to maximal rotation in the Low treatment then it will be hard to detect differences across Low and High.

Experimental Design Details

Randomization Method

Computerized randomization by experimental software

Randomization Unit

Individual participants are randomly assigned to groups (of three individuals), and to the different treatments.

Was the treatment clustered?

Yes