Impact of Gender-Based Social Norms on Intra-Household Financial Decision-Making

Last registered on January 31, 2024


Trial Information

General Information

Impact of Gender-Based Social Norms on Intra-Household Financial Decision-Making
Initial registration date
January 27, 2024

Initial registration date is when the trial was registered.

It corresponds to when the registration was submitted to the Registry to be reviewed for publication.

First published
January 31, 2024, 11:47 AM EST

First published corresponds to when the trial was first made public on the Registry after being reviewed.


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Primary Investigator

CSBC, Ashoka University

Other Primary Investigator(s)

PI Affiliation
CSBC, Ashoka University

Additional Trial Information

In development
Start date
End date
Secondary IDs
Prior work
This trial does not extend or rely on any prior RCTs.
Through a lab-in-the-field experiment, we will study the effect of gender-based social norms on intra-household financial decision-making among couples across three neighbouring societies in India - the Khasi society in Meghalaya, the Karbi society and the Dimasa society in Assam. Outcomes will be measured through behavioural experiment games and a post-experiment survey separately among spouses at a lab-in-the-field setting.
External Link(s)

Registration Citation

Mondal, Dinabandhu and Shagata Mukherjee. 2024. "Impact of Gender-Based Social Norms on Intra-Household Financial Decision-Making." AEA RCT Registry. January 31.
Experimental Details


We would use two public goods game and willingness to pay game with both the spouses separately, aimed at understanding the effects of gender norms on intra-household financial decision making among three different communities - Khasi, Karbi, and Dimasa.
Intervention Start Date
Intervention End Date

Primary Outcomes

Primary Outcomes (end points)
Intra-household allocation efficiency and intra-household bargaining power.

Primary Outcomes (explanation)
Intra-household allocation efficiency between husband and wife in the incentive-based game will be assessed through contribution by both the husband and wife to common fund.
Intra-household bargaining power will be measured by the split of money between the spouses from common fund and willingness to pay to receive the money himself or herself rather than the spouse.

Secondary Outcomes

Secondary Outcomes (end points)
Women empowerment index.
Secondary Outcomes (explanation)
Women empowerment index will be computed through a survey-based measures.

Experimental Design

Experimental Design
The experiment will test intra-household bargaining power between husband and wife. It will be measured by (a) two versions of public-goods games played by the husband and wife and (b) willingness to pay game.
Experimental Design Details
Not available
Randomization Method
Randomization will be done by a computer system as well as by rolling a die.
Randomization Unit
Couple level for public goods game and which game will be selected for final payment; Individual level for order of games.
Was the treatment clustered?

Experiment Characteristics

Sample size: planned number of clusters
450 couples (900 individuals)
Sample size: planned number of observations
450 couples (900 individuals)
Sample size (or number of clusters) by treatment arms
150 couples from each of the three communities - Karbi, Khasi and Dimasa.
Minimum detectable effect size for main outcomes (accounting for sample design and clustering)

Institutional Review Boards (IRBs)

IRB Name
Ashoka University Institutional Review Board
IRB Approval Date
IRB Approval Number