Undermining Trust: Can Third Party Information Destabilize Cartels

Last registered on January 09, 2024

Pre-Trial

Trial Information

General Information

Title
Undermining Trust: Can Third Party Information Destabilize Cartels
RCT ID
AEARCTR-0012805
Initial registration date
January 08, 2024

Initial registration date is when the trial was registered.

It corresponds to when the registration was submitted to the Registry to be reviewed for publication.

First published
January 09, 2024, 1:22 PM EST

First published corresponds to when the trial was first made public on the Registry after being reviewed.

Locations

Region

Primary Investigator

Affiliation
University of Michigan

Other Primary Investigator(s)

PI Affiliation
Johns Hopkins University
PI Affiliation
Johns Hopkins University

Additional Trial Information

Status
In development
Start date
2024-01-22
End date
2024-02-29
Secondary IDs
Prior work
This trial is based on or builds upon one or more prior RCTs.
Abstract
This study examines the role of trust in maintaining collusive stability. It includes a protocol designed to manipulate the extent to which the recipient of the information trusts the information.
External Link(s)

Registration Citation

Citation
Gunia, Brian, Margaret Levenstein and Valerie Suslow. 2024. "Undermining Trust: Can Third Party Information Destabilize Cartels." AEA RCT Registry. January 09. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.12805-1.0
Experimental Details

Interventions

Intervention(s)
Participants are solicited to join an online game. They complete a Qualtrics survey to explain the design of the game and confirm their understanding. Participants then play the online game in which they are asked to set a high or low price for the sale of an item. They set the price over three rounds of play and then answer questions in a follow up survey. Their payoff depends on the number of rounds during which they were able to sustain a "collusive" price.
Intervention Start Date
2024-01-22
Intervention End Date
2024-02-29

Primary Outcomes

Primary Outcomes (end points)
1. Was collusion (high price) sustained?
2. Do participants report trusting the other party in the game?
3. Do participants report wanting to play the game with the same party in the future?
Primary Outcomes (explanation)
Outcomes are measured as follows:
Do participants play "high price?"
Do participants report trust and report wanting to play with the other seller in a post-experiment survey?

Secondary Outcomes

Secondary Outcomes (end points)
1. How does the source of new information affect participants' trust in the quality of that information?
Secondary Outcomes (explanation)
We hypothesize that participants are more likely to trust reports that are consistent with the self-interests of the reporter?

Experimental Design

Experimental Design
We will solicit participants on Prolific to participate in an online game. In the game, they play three rounds in which they choose to sell an object at a high or low price. They are given the opportunity to communicate with another "seller" and a "buyer." In some rounds, they are randomly assigned to receive a message that the other seller has charged a high or low price. They are then given the opportunity to set their price. At the end of the game, all participants are asked a series of questions about whether they trust the other player and whether they would want to play with them again. Their payoffs increase in the number of times they "sell" their object and in the price for which they sell.
Experimental Design Details
Trust in Cartels - December 2023 - Moderator Study


Start of Block: Consent

PLEASE READ THE FOLLOWING CONSENT FORM AND CLICK "I CONSENT" AT THE BOTTOM. PURPOSE OF RESEARCH STUDY: The purpose of this research study is to understand how people behave in organizational settings. We anticipate that approximately 400 people will participate in this study. PROCEDURES: After indicating your consent, you will read about an organizational situation and answer a series of questions. The study is expected to last about 9 minutes. RISKS/DISCOMFORTS: The risks associated with participation in this study are no greater than those encountered in daily life. BENEFITS: Participation in this task may help you to understand your decision-making in organizational settings. This study may benefit society if the results lead to a better understanding of the regularities in organizational behavior. VOLUNTARY PARTICIPATION AND RIGHT TO WITHDRAW: Your participation in this study is entirely voluntary: You choose whether to participate. If you decide not to participate, there are no penalties, and you will not lose any benefits to which you would otherwise be entitled. If you choose to participate in the study, you can stop your participation at any time, without any penalty or loss of benefits. If you want to withdraw from the study, please close your browser. ALTERNATIVES TO PARTICIPATION: You have the alternative not to participate in this study.

CONFIDENTIALITY: No study records will identify you. The records from your participation may be reviewed by people responsible for making sure that research is done properly, including members of the Johns Hopkins University Homewood Institutional Review Board and officials from government agencies such as the National Institutes of Health and the Office for Human Research Protections. (All of these people are required to keep your identity confidential.) Otherwise, records that identify you will be available only to people working on the study, unless you give permission for other people to see the records. All study materials will refer to you by number, not by name or other identifying information. Data will be stored on a password-protected computer and will only be available to the people working on the study. COMPENSATION: If you satisfactorily complete the study, you will earn $1.50 plus a potential bonus. IF YOU HAVE QUESTIONS OR CONCERNS: You can ask questions about this research study now or at any time during the study, by emailing the researcher in charge of this study, Brian Gunia, at [email protected]. If you have questions about your rights as a research participant or feel that you have not been treated fairly, please call the Homewood Institutional Review Board at Johns Hopkins University at (410) 516-6580. CONSENT WHAT YOUR CONSENT MEANS: By clicking, "I consent" below, you indicate that you understand the information in this consent form and that you agree to participate in the study. By providing your consent, you have not waived any legal rights you otherwise would have as a participant in a research study. If you do not consent, please close your browser to exit the study.
o I consent


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First please enter your Prolific Academic ID:
________________________________________________________________


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Brushing your teeth is a very important behavior. When answering the question below, please select Never. Brushing your teeth every day helps promote hygiene and oral health.

How often do you brush your teeth?
o Never
o Once every few days
o Every other day
o Every day
o Twice per day
o More than twice per day

End of Block: Consent

Start of Block: Intro

Welcome to the study. Please read the following information carefully. You will be asked to recall certain details later.

In this study, you will interact with several other Prolific participants who are online right now. You will interact with them across several rounds. You have been randomly selected to act as a seller; you are attempting to sell a product to a buyer. First, you will interact with another seller who is attempting to sell the same product to the same buyer. Second, you interact with the buyer, who is interested in buying from you or the other seller.

You will repeat this process across multiple rounds.

Please answer the following questions:





What is your role?
o Buyer
o Seller




With whom will you interact first?
o A buyer
o A seller




With whom will you interact second?
o A buyer
o A seller




How many times will you interact with other Prolific participants?
o Once
o Multiple times

End of Block: Intro

Start of Block:

This is the first of multiple rounds.

You are a seller who is trying to sell a refrigerator to a buyer. You can choose to sell the refrigerator for one of two prices—a high price ($4000) or a low price ($1000).

You will now be paired with another participant who is trying to sell the same type of refrigerator, in the same condition, to the same buyer. Like you, the other seller can choose to sell the refrigerator for a high price ($4000) or a low price ($1000).

Please note that the buyer only needs one refrigerator, so they will only buy a refrigerator from you or from the other seller, not both of you. If the buyer buys the refrigerator from you for $4000, you will receive a $0.40 bonus. If the buyer buys the refrigerator from you for $1000, you will receive a $0.10 bonus. If the buyer buys the refrigerator from the other seller, you will receive no bonus.

Please answer the following questions:




Which of the following prices can you offer to the buyer? Please check all that apply:
▢ $5000
▢ $4000
▢ $3000
▢ $2000
▢ $1000




Which of the following prices can the other seller offer to the buyer? Please check all that apply:
▢ $5000
▢ $4000
▢ $3000
▢ $2000
▢ $1000


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Timing
First Click
Last Click
Page Submit
Click Count



Please wait while we pair you with another seller...


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Timing
First Click
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You have been randomly paired with participant 5b7369007a6y27691g88710, who is also acting as a seller. In a moment, each of you will make an offer to the buyer, after which the buyer will decide which offer to accept. The seller whose offer is accepted will receive a bonus in accordance with the instructions above.

Before either of you interacts with the buyer, you and the other seller can exchange messages in which you discuss whatever you would like.

Please wait while the other participant writes a message to you. The continue button will appear once they have finished writing their message.


Page Break


Here is a message from participant 5b7369007a6y27691g88710, the other seller:

hey nice to meet you…im gonna offer the buyer 4000 not 1000. suggest you do too



Please type your reply to the other seller here:
________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________


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Timing
First Click
Last Click
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Click Count



The other seller has received your message. They have been randomly selected to interact with the buyer first. Please wait while they do so. While you are waiting, think about what the other seller said in their message. The Continue button will appear when it is time to proceed.

End of Block:

Start of Block: Round 1 Interaction

Timing
First Click
Last Click
Page Submit
Click Count



The other seller has interacted with the buyer. Now it’s your turn to interact with the buyer. Please wait while we connect you with the buyer and they type you a message.


Page Break


Here is a message from participant 4t9365712n9yp09128q49877, the buyer:

Hi, just so you know, the other seller offered 4000…what's your offer?



Now please choose which price you wish to offer the buyer for your refrigerator:
o $4000
o $1000


Page Break


The buyer has received your offer. You will learn which offers they accepted at the end of the experiment.



Timing
First Click
Last Click
Page Submit
Click Count

End of Block: Round 1 Interaction

Start of Block: Round 2 Background and Message

This is the second of multiple rounds.

The situation is the same as before: You are a seller who is trying to sell another refrigerator to a buyer, and you can choose to sell it for $4000 or $1000. The other seller (the same person who you interacted with last round) is trying to sell the same type of refrigerator, and they can do so for $4000 or $1000.

Once again, there is a buyer who only needs one refrigerator. If the new buyer buys the refrigerator from you for $4000, you will receive a $0.40 bonus. If the buyer buys the refrigerator from you for $1000, you will receive a $0.10 bonus. If the buyer buys the refrigerator from the other seller, you will receive no bonus.

You will now exchange messages with the other seller.



Page Break


Timing
First Click
Last Click
Page Submit
Click Count



Please wait while the other participant writes a message to you. The continue button will appear once they have finished writing their message.


Page Break


Here is a message from participant 5b7369007a6y27691g88710, the other seller:

hey same as before…im gonna offer the buyer 4000, you should too




Please type your reply to the other seller here:
________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________
Randomization Method
Randomization done by a computer.
Randomization Unit
Randomization is done at the level of individual players.
Was the treatment clustered?
No

Experiment Characteristics

Sample size: planned number of clusters
None
Sample size: planned number of observations
250 players
Sample size (or number of clusters) by treatment arms
125 in each arm
Minimum detectable effect size for main outcomes (accounting for sample design and clustering)
IRB

Institutional Review Boards (IRBs)

IRB Name
John Hopkins University IRB
IRB Approval Date
2023-09-09
IRB Approval Number
HIRB00000756

Post-Trial

Post Trial Information

Study Withdrawal

There is information in this trial unavailable to the public. Use the button below to request access.

Request Information

Intervention

Is the intervention completed?
No
Data Collection Complete
Data Publication

Data Publication

Is public data available?
No

Program Files

Program Files
Reports, Papers & Other Materials

Relevant Paper(s)

Reports & Other Materials