Drivers of of High-skill Emigration during a Crisis: Experimental evidence from graduates in Myanmar

Our study consists of a randomized questionnaire module that will be implemented as part of a large representative survey. Our experiment measures the valuation of emigration opportunities among high-skilled youth (in terms of the rate of wage premium or discount at which the individual is indifferent between staying and migrating) and how this is affected by alternative scenarios of improvements in the political and economic situation of the area of origin, using a randomized survey experiment that assigns alternate scenarios to respondents. Specifically, we examine the value attached to migrating abroad among (i) high-skilled workers in Myanmar when offered a similar job abroad as what they currently are engaged in, and (ii) high-skilled workers in Myanmar when offered a lower-skilled job abroad than what they currently are engaged in – both under alternate scenarios representing the status quo, political stabilization, and economic stabilization. We also propose to measure the value attached to returning to the home country (Myanmar) among Myanmar nationals living abroad when offered a similar job as what they are currently doing abroad, again under alternate scenarios representing the status quo, political stabilization, and economic stabilization, respectively.

Our experiment measures the valuation of emigration opportunities among high-skilled youth (in terms of the rate of wage premium or discount at which the individual is indifferent between staying and migrating) and how this is affected by alternative scenarios of improvements in the political and economic situation of the area of origin, using a randomized survey experiment that assigns alternate scenarios to respondents.

By doing so we seek to study the following:
(i) At what wage differential are respondents indifferent between migrating abroad and staying on in their country of origin (Myanmar)? This in turn indicates the intrinsic preference for emigration for an individual. While some individuals would, ceteris paribus, prefer not to migrate, as the excess of wages offered abroad over those earned in country (for the same kind of job they are currently doing) increases this preference may switch and at a sufficiently high wage premium, the individual may choose to migrate. The lowest premium at which the individual’s preference switches (from choosing not to migrate to in face migrate) can be seen as the threshold wage premium at which the individual becomes indifferent. In other cases, some individuals would, ceteris paribus, want to migrate abroad. They may even be willing to accept a wage discount to move abroad. However, as the wage discount increases and the earnings abroad become a smaller fraction of wages earned in the country of origin, at some threshold the individual may choose not to migrate. This level may be seen as the threshold wage discount at which the individual is indifferent between migrating and staying back/ not migrating. The individual’s threshold wage premium/ penalty at which they are indifferent between migrating and staying may then be seen as their implicit valuation of the option to emigrate. We seek to answer this question by deploying an iterative question that elicits the respondents’ preference to migrate when offered different combinations of wages at home and in the migration destination of choice, holding other factors such as the cost of migrating and the type of work offered abroad constant.
(ii) How do alternative scenarios of political and economic improvements in the home country (Myanmar) affect the valuation of emigration opportunities. We attempt to answer this question using the iterative valuation method described in (i) above, combined with a randomly assigned scenario representing improvements in either the economic or political situation in the country, compared to a control-group scenario that offers no such prospects of improvements. This would help identify whether prospective migrants’ valuation of emigration opportunities is reduced when they anticipate political stability, compared to when they anticipate economic stability. This in turn can help identify which forms of greater certainty, economic, or political, are more important for determining emigration among high-skilled individuals.
(iii) At what wage differential would high-skilled workers be willing to take up work they are overqualified for, and how would this threshold vary under alternate scenarios of economic and political stabilization? We propose to introduce another variation to the experiment described in (i) and (ii) above by proposing to offer a less-skilled job abroad compared to what the respondent is currently engaged in at home (i.e. a job they are overqualified for). We propose to calculate the wage differential threshold at which the respondent would become indifferent between staying on in their home country in their current job, and taking up a job that they are overqualified for abroad. Similar to the experiment described in (ii), we will also assess the valuation of emigration options implying the uptake of work that respondents are over-qualified for under alternate hypothetical scenarios of (a) political and (b) economic stabilization compared to a neutral control group that is not offered a hypothetical scenario of any kind of stabilization.
(iv) At what wage differential and under which scenarios of stabilization would emigrants from Myanmar living abroad be willing to return to Myanmar? As an extension to the main survey of high-skilled youth currently residing and working in Myanmar, we also propose to conduct a short online survey of their contacts living abroad to conduct an experiment similar to that described in (i) and (ii). We will attempt to measure the wage differential that Myanmar nationals living abroad would be willing to accept/ will be needed to be paid to make them indifferent between staying on abroad and returning to their home country. Again, this will be assessed under alternate and randomly assigned hypothetical scenarios of (a) political and (b) economic stabilization in Myanmar to reveal which dimensions of stabilization would be most attractive for emigrants to contemplate returning to Myanmar.


To do so, we are proposing the following crossing of two experimental treatment arms for each of the two surveys proposed:
Individuals will be told to imagine a hypothetical scenario that represents either (a) political stabilization – T1, (b) economic stabilization – T2, or (c) a neutral scenario with no signal of either type of stabilization – Control Scenario, C. The will then be asked iterative questions about their preference between two jobs – one in Myanmar and one in another country of their choice, where the wage differential between the two cases will be progressively increased or decreased until the point the respondent becomes indifferent between staying and leaving (this value will be treated as the valuation of the option to emigrate; expressed as a percentage of the respondent’s current wages – and will be our main outcome of interest).

Survey 1: High Skilled Youth Residing in Myanmar Survey 2: Myanmar nationals living abroad
Offered job with same occupation abroad

A Offered job with lower-skilled occupation abroad

B Offered job with same occupation in Myanmar

C
Control (C)
No signal of stabilization Ca Cb Cc
Political Stabilization Scenario Ta1 Tb1 Tc1
Economic Stabilization Scenario Ta2 Tb2 Tc2

This experimental matrix enables us to disentangle the role of macro-level factors that may motivate or reduce high-skilled emigration.

Hypothesis 1: Scenarios of political or economic stabilization would make respondents less willing to migrate abroad compared to a situation of no implied stabilization
Hypothesis 2: A scenarios of political stabilization would make respondents less willing to migrate abroad compared to a scenario of economic stabilization. The wage premium required to make respondents indifferent between migrating and staying would be higher under an economic rather than under political stabilization scenario.
Hypothesis 3: Under all scenarios, individuals would be less willing to migrate abroad when offered a job abroad that they are overqualified for, and would therefore demand a higher wage premium to accept such a job.
Hypothesis 4: Scenarios of political or economic stabilization would make respondents less willing to migrate abroad to take up work they are overqualified for compared to a situation of no implied stabilization.
Hypothesis 5: Emigrants already living abroad would require a lower wage premium (higher wage discount) to move back to Myanmar under scenarios of economic or political stabilization compared to the status quo.

Regression approach

Given the different channels at play, and the different framing of the randomized scenarios, we will always run separate regressions for each hypothesis. For the analysis of heterogeneous treatment effects, we will analyse the extent to which the wage premium/ discount required to make an individual indifferent between migrating and staying is linked with individual socio-demographic and labour market characteristics, spatial properties, exposure to conflict and characteristics such as skills levels.

2024-02-01

2024-04-30

Our primary measures of interest are:
(1) The (binary) willingness to migrate abroad holding the level of earnings constant
(2) The wage premium (discount) at which the individual becomes indifferent between migrating abroad and staying on (for diaspora respondents in survey C – between returning to Myanmar and staying on in their country of residence).

We will rely on two primary outcomes. The first will measure the willingness to migrate using a binary variable as a response to the following question:

Q1. Imagine a situation: You are offered a job in <Country entered)> which involves the same type of work that you currently do, and which pays you <Current wage>. Your employer at the new job will also help you with relocation, including any travel costs and visas. Will you take the job?

The other primary outcome would be measured as the wage differential (premium or discount) that would make the respondent indifferent between migrating and staying. This would be calculated following a set of iterative questions following Q1 above, depending on the response to Q1.

If the respondent replies to Q1 indicating that s/he would not like to migrate, the following question will be asked:

Q2. E.1.b1. If instead of paying you <Current wage>, the job were to pay you 10% more than that, would you take the job?

If the respondent now replies to say the would accept the job offer abroad, we would record 10 percent as the wage premium at which the respondent has become indifferent, i.e. switched from not wanting to migrate to wanting to migrate. If however they are still not willing to migrate, they will be subsequently asked the same question offering progressively higher wage differentials (in multiples of 10% i..e 20%, 30%, 40 %... 100%, then 150% and finally 200%) to determine the wage premium at which they may become indifferent between migrating and not migrating. Those who refuse to migate even when offered a 200% wage increase will be treated separately as having an exceptionally high preference not to migrate.

While some individuals would, ceteris paribus, prefer not to migrate, as the excess of wages offered abroad over those earned in country (for the same kind of job they are currently doing) increases this preference may switch and at a sufficiently high wage premium, the individual may choose to migrate. The lowest premium at which the individual’s preference switches (from choosing not to migrate to in face migrate) can be seen as the threshold wage premium at which the individual becomes indifferent.

In other cases, some individuals would, ceteris paribus, want to migrate abroad in response to Q1. To such individuals we would pose the following question:

Q3: If instead of paying you <Current wage>, the job were to pay you 10% less than that, would you take the job?

If they do not accept to migrate when offered a 10% wage cut (discount or negative premium) we treat a 10% wage cut (-10% wage premium) as the threshold wage differential at which the respondent’s migration preference switches. If the respondent replies by indicating “yes” to migrating, they will subsequently be asked about their decision to migrate with progressively higher wage cuts (in multiples of 10%) until their preference switches to not to migrate. Those who would like to migrate even after at 90% wage cut will be treated separately as having an exceptionally high preference to migrate.

Similar to the primary outcomes but for (1) in Survey 1 - the specification offering a job abroad that the respondent is overqualified for, and (2) in Survey 2 - for Myanmar migrants living abroad to consider wage premia(discounts) that would induce them to return to Myanmar.

As with the primary outcomes described above

Our experiment measures the valuation of emigration opportunities among high-skilled youth (in terms of the rate of wage premium or discount at which the individual is indifferent between staying and migrating) and how this is affected by alternative scenarios of improvements in the political and economic situation of the area of origin, using a randomized survey experiment that assigns alternate scenarios (political stabilization, economic stabilization, status quo) to respondents.

The experiment proceeds as follows:

In initial modules of the survey the respondent will be asked about their current wages, and a country of choice they would like to migrate to if they have to migrate. These details will be plugged into subsequent experimental questions.

Experiment 1
The first survey experiment involves the random assignment of scenarios under which respondents are asked any one of the below three randomly assigned versions of the survey question.

• Version 1: Imagine a situation: You are offered a job in <Country entered> which involves the same type of work that you currently do, and which pays you <Current Wage>. Your employer at the new job will also help you with relocation, including any travel costs and visas. Will you take the job?
• Version 2: Imagine a situation: The political situation in Myanmar improves, violent conflict reduces substantially, and a political agreement is reached. You are offered a job in <Country entered> which involves the same type of work that you currently do, and which pays you <Current Wage>. Your employer at the new job will also help you with relocation, including any travel costs and visas Will you take the job?
• Version 3: Imagine a situation: The economic situation in Myanmar improves, growth picks up and prices stabilize. You are offered a job in <Country entered> which involves the same type of work that you currently do, and which pays you <Current Wage>. Your employer at the new job will also help you with relocation, including any travel costs and visas. Will you take the job?


Depending on the response to the question asked above, the survey then proposes the following schedule of questions to determine the wage premium / discount at which the respondent becomes indifferent between migrating and staying:

If answer to initial question is YES:
E.1.a1. If instead of paying you <Current Wage>, the job were to pay you 10% less than that, would you take the job? 1 = YES >> E.1.a2
0 = NO >> E.2
E.1.a2. If instead of paying you <Current Wage>, the job were to pay you 20% less than that, would you take the job? 1 = YES >> E.1.a3
0 = NO >> E.2
E.1.a3. If instead of paying you <Current Wage>, the job were to pay you 30% less than that, would you take the job? 1 = YES >> E.1.a4
0 = NO >> E.2
E.1.a4. If instead of paying you <Current Wage>, the job were to pay you 40% less than that, would you take the job? 1 = YES >> E.1.a5
0 = NO >> E.2
E.1.a5. If instead of paying you <Current Wage>, the job were to pay you 50% less than that, would you take the job? 1 = YES >> E.1.a6
0 = NO >> E.2
E.1.a6. If instead of paying you <Current Wage>, the job were to pay you 60% less than that, would you take the job? 1 = YES >> E.1.a7
0 = NO >> E.2
E.1.a7. If instead of paying you <Current Wage>, the job were to pay you 70% less than that, would you take the job? 1 = YES >> E.1.a8
0 = NO >> E.2
E.1.a8. If instead of paying you <Current Wage>, the job were to pay you 80% less than that, would you take the job? 1 = YES >> E.1.b
0 = NO >> E.2

If answer to initial question is NO
E.1.b1. If instead of paying you <Current Wage>, the job were to pay you 10% more than that, would you take the job? 1 = YES >> E.2
0 = NO >> E.1.b2
E.1.b2. If instead of paying you <Current Wage>, the job were to pay you 20% more than that, would you take the job? 1 = YES >> E.2
0 = NO >> E.1.b3
E.1.b3. If instead of paying you <Current Wage>, the job were to pay you 30% more than that, would you take the job? 1 = YES >> E.2
0 = NO >> E.1.b4
E.1.b4. If instead of paying you <Current Wage>, the job were to pay you 40% more than that, would you take the job? 1 = YES >> E.2
0 = NO >> E.1.b5
E.1.b5. If instead of paying you <Current Wage>, the job were to pay you 50% more than that, would you take the job? 1 = YES >> E.2
0 = NO >> E.1.b6
E.1.b6. If instead of paying you <Current Wage>, the job were to pay you 60% more than that, would you take the job? 1 = YES >> E.2
0 = NO >> E.1.b7
E.1.b7. If instead of paying you <Current Wage>, the job were to pay you 70% more than that, would you take the job? 1 = YES >> E.2
0 = NO >> E.1.b8
E.1.b8. If instead of paying you <Current Wage>, the job were to pay you 80% more than that, would you take the job? 1 = YES >> E.2
0 = NO >> E.1.b9
E.1.b9. If instead of paying you <Current Wage>, the job were to pay you 90% more than that, would you take the job? 1 = YES >> E.2
0 = NO >> E.1.b10
E.1.b10. If instead of paying you <Current Wage>, the job were to pay you two times that amount, would you take the job? 1 = YES >> E.2
0 = NO >> E.1.b11
E.1.b11. If instead of paying you <Current Wage>, the job were to pay you two-and-a-half times that amount, would you take the job? 1 = YES >> E.2
0 = NO >> E.1.b12
E.1.b12. If instead of paying you <Current Wage>, the job were to pay you three times that amount, would you take the job? 1 = YES >> E.2
0 = NO >> E.2

(see attached questionnaires for more detail)

Experiment 2

The second experiment proceeds similarly to Experiment 1 described above, but with the initial question posing a choice between the respondent’s current job in Myanmar and that of a cashier at a supermarket (as an example of a routine cognitive job that a graduate would be overqualified for) abroad. Accordingly, the respondents will be randomly assigned one of the following versions of the opening question (scenario):

• Version 1: Imagine a situation: You are offered a job in <Country entered> but, as a cashier in a supermarket. The job will pay you <Current wage>. Your employer at the new job will also help you with relocation, including any travel costs and visas Will you take the job?
• Version 2: Imagine a situation: The political situation in Myanmar improves, violent conflict reduces substantially, and a political agreement is reached. You are offered a job in <Country entered> but as a cashier in a supermarket. The job will pay you <Current wage>. Your employer at the new job will also help you with relocation, including any travel costs and visas. Will you take the job?
• Version 3: Imagine a situation: The economic situation in Myanmar improves, growth picks up and prices stabilize. You are offered a job in <Country entered> , but as a cashier in a supermarket. The job will pay you <Current wage>. Your employer at the new job will also help you with relocation, including any travel costs and visas. Will you take the job?

Following this opening question, the respondent is asked follow up questions to determine the wage premium/ discount at which s/he may become indifferent between migrating abroad and staying on in Myanmar, as described and set out in Experiment 1 above. (see attached questionnaires for more detail)

Experiment 3

Finally, in the survey of Myanmar nationals living abroad (contacts of Survey 1 respondents), the experiment involves the random assignment of scenarios under which respondents are asked any one of the below three randomly assigned versions of the survey question – this time focusing on the choice of returning to Myanmar or staying on in their country of residence.

• Version 1: Imagine a situation: You are offered a job in Myanmar which involves the same type of work that you currently do. If the job in Myanmar were to pay you exactly what you are currently paid, would you take the job and move to Myanmar?
• Version 2: Imagine a situation: The political situation in Myanmar improves, violent conflict reduces substantially, and a political agreement is reached. You are offered a job in Myanmar which involves the same type of work that you currently do. If the job in Myanmar were to pay you exactly what you are currently paid, would you take the job and move to Myanmar?
• Version 3: Imagine a situation: The economic situation in Myanmar improves, growth picks up and prices stabilize. You are offered a job in Myanmar which involves the same type of work that you currently do. If the job in Myanmar were to pay you exactly what you are currently paid, would you take the job and move to Myanmar?
Depending on the response to the question asked above, the survey then proposes the following schedule of questions to determine the wage premium / discount at which the respondent becomes indifferent between returning to Myanmar and staying on in their country of residence, on similar lines as outlined for Experiment 1 (see attached questionnaires for more detail)

Computer-based during the survey

Individual

No

1,600

1,600 The experiment is part of a CATI survey administer using random digit dialling and using screening filters to ensure that respondents meet the sample criteria: high-skilled, between the ages of 18 and 45, and currently or recently employed full-time. The survey will be nationally representative of the target population (high-skilled recently/ currently employed youth) and will be roughly equally allocated across provinces and by gender. The survey includes other modules on individual and household demographic, labor market and wealth characteristics, the ability to migrate, skills, risk appetite, recent shocks and coping strategies, and migration intentions and hypothesis. As we interview only one member household who meets the target criteria, we do not cluster our standard errors at the household level and avoid any spillover effects. In an ideal scenario, the number of experimental observations will match the number of individuals in the sample.

For Survey 1 of high-skilled youth in Myanmar, the whole sample is split into 3 equal treatment arms. When disregarding attrition and non-response, we expect to have at least 530 respondents per treatment arm among the target respondents in Myanmar.
For the online survey (Survey 2) of the contacts of respondents of Survey 1 living abroad, we expect to have a minimum of 1 referred respondent living abroad per respondent and therefore a total sample of 1600 respondents. In case respondents of Survey 1 refer more than one respondent for Survey 2, we will cluster standard errors by the refereeing respondent from Survey 1; this can be done easily as we plan to send unique survey links to each Survey 1 respondent through which we can track the refereeing respondent in Survey 1 for each completed online survey in Survey 2.

The analysis will be conducted separately for Surveys 1 and 2 on high-skilled youth in Myanmar (Survey 1) and their referred contacts living abroad (Survey 2), and will enable us to separately examine the five distinct hypotheses. Consequently, we have provided below the Minimum Detectable Effect size across the five hypotheses. Survey 1 respondents: High-skilled Youth in Myanmar (N=1600) Survey 2 respondents: Contacts of Survey 1 respondents (N=1600) H1, H5: n1=1066 (treatment group) n2=533 (control group) Power=0.8 MDE=0.0696 n1=1066 (treatment group) n2=533 (control group) Power=0.8 MDE=0.0696 H2, H3, H4: n1=533 (treatment group) n2=533 (control group) Power=0.8 MDE=0.0804 n1=533 (treatment group) n2=533 (control group) Power=0.8 MDE=0.0804 These MDEs are realistic, given the results of similar strands of literature (e.g. Batista and McKenzie (2023), Ghorpade (2024)).