The impact of observability on pro-social behavior

Last registered on January 31, 2024

Pre-Trial

Trial Information

General Information

Title
The impact of observability on pro-social behavior
RCT ID
AEARCTR-0012909
Initial registration date
January 29, 2024

Initial registration date is when the trial was registered.

It corresponds to when the registration was submitted to the Registry to be reviewed for publication.

First published
January 31, 2024, 1:28 PM EST

First published corresponds to when the trial was first made public on the Registry after being reviewed.

Locations

There is information in this trial unavailable to the public. Use the button below to request access.

Request Information

Primary Investigator

Affiliation
University of Bern

Other Primary Investigator(s)

PI Affiliation
University of Bern

Additional Trial Information

Status
In development
Start date
2023-10-01
End date
2025-02-28
Secondary IDs
Prior work
This trial does not extend or rely on any prior RCTs.
Abstract
Theoretical models suggest that observability, along with its downstream consequences, is a key parameter shaping individuals’ pro-social behavior. However, empirical findings reveal mixed effects, prompting questions about when and why individual pro-social behavior is sensitive to observability. To address these questions, we will conduct an incentivized between-subject online experiment aimed at untangling possible relevant mechanisms that drive the impact of observability on pro-social behavior. Specifically, we will examine two key factors: the level of observability and observer’s feedback on the decision. In a dictator game with an observer, we will explore how the level of observability (knowing there will be an observer; exchanging photos; seeing each other in a video call) and observer’s feedback on the decision (like/dislike) influence individuals’ pro-sociality.
External Link(s)

Registration Citation

Citation
Essl, Andrea and Frauke von Bieberstein. 2024. "The impact of observability on pro-social behavior." AEA RCT Registry. January 31. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.12909-1.0
Experimental Details

Interventions

Intervention(s)
We will implement six experimental conditions and one control condition:
• Control condition: Participants will play a standard dictator game. There is no observer in this condition.
• Decision Treatment: The decision maker’s choice of the amount sent to an anonymous receiver is shared with an anonymous observer.
• Decision plus Feedback Treatment: Like the Decision treatment, but the observer can give feedback on the decision maker’s choice. Specifically, the observer can select either a “like” or a “dislike” button.
• Photo Treatment: Like the Decision treatment, but additionally the decision maker and the observer exchange photos after the decision has been made.
• Photo plus Feedback Treatment: Like the Photo treatment, but the observer can give feedback on the decision maker’s choice. Like in the Decision treatment, the observer can select either a “like” or a “dislike” button.
• Video Treatment: Like the Photo treatment, but instead of exchanging photos, decision maker and observer meet in a video call where they can see each other but cannot communicate verbally.
• Video plus Feedback Treatment: Like the Video treatment, but the observer can give feedback on the decision maker’s choice. Like in the Decision and Photo treatments, the observer can select either a “like” or a “dislike” button.

Intervention Start Date
2024-02-01
Intervention End Date
2024-03-14

Primary Outcomes

Primary Outcomes (end points)
Amount of money sent in the dictator game
Primary Outcomes (explanation)

Secondary Outcomes

Secondary Outcomes (end points)
Beliefs on social norms, social image concerns, Other in the Self (IOS) Scale, behavioral change in the amount sent in the dictator game between Part 1 and Part 2 (frequency and magnitude)
Secondary Outcomes (explanation)

Experimental Design

Experimental Design
We will conduct an incentivized between-subject online experiment aimed at untangling possible relevant mechanisms that drive the impact of observability on pro-social behavior. Specifically, we will examine two key factors: the level of observability (knowing there will be an observer; exchanging photos; seeing each other in a video call) and feedback on the decision (like/dislike).

The experiment consists of two parts and a survey. In the first part, depending on the treatment, participants play a dictator game with an observer. Thus, there are three different roles: decision maker, receiver, and observer. Participants remain in the same role throughout the experiments. We will implement six experimental conditions and a control condition:

• Control condition: Participants will play a standard dictator game. There is no observer in this condition.
• Decision Treatment: The decision maker’s choice of the amount sent to an anonymous receiver is shared with an anonymous observer.
• Decision plus Feedback Treatment: Like the Decision treatment, but the observer can give feedback on the decision maker’s choice. Specifically, the observer can select either a “like” or a “dislike” button.
• Photo Treatment: Like the Decision treatment, but additionally the decision maker and the observer exchange photos after the decision has been made.
• Photo plus Feedback Treatment: Like the Photo treatment, but the observer can give feedback on the decision maker’s choice. Like in the decision treatment, the observer can select either a “like” or a “dislike” button.
• Video Treatment: Like the Photo treatment, but instead of exchanging photos, decision maker and observer meet in a video call where they can see each other but cannot communicate verbally.
• Video plus Feedback Treatment: Like the Video treatment, but the observer can give feedback on the decision maker’s choice. Like in the Decision and Photo treatments, the observer can select either a “like” or a “dislike” button.

In the second part, independently of the treatment, participants play a standard dictator game with no observer. They are randomly matched with a new participant in the role of the receiver. This allows us to analyze behavioral stickiness or change after observation vanishes.

It is common knowledge that at the end of the study, it will be decided randomly, with equal probability, whether Part 1 or Part 2 will be relevant for payment. It is also common knowledge that the participant in the role of the receiver is recruited after the decision makers have made their decisions.

In addition, we will elicit decision makers’ beliefs on descriptive and injunctive social norms. Belief elicitation will be incentivized and takes place after participants made their decision in Part 1 of the experiment. Observers are asked to indicate the minimum sending amount they would like/dislike.

Participants will also complete a short survey on self-report scales (e.g., social image concerns, Inclusion of the Other in the Self (IOS) Scale) and answer demographic questions.

Experimental Design Details
Not available
Randomization Method
online by a computer
Randomization Unit
individual
Was the treatment clustered?
No

Experiment Characteristics

Sample size: planned number of clusters
1470
Sample size: planned number of observations
The experiment will be run on Prolific. The number of participants planned for the experiment is 4200 people completing the study. We advertise for 4730 participants to take into account individuals who might not be matched and/or who must be excluded due to the restrictions below. We will exclude subjects who: - complete the survey faster than two standard deviations from the average completion time; - do not complete the study within 30 minutes of starting; - do not complete the study for other reasons (time runs out, no match in the defined time) - exit and then re-enter the task as a new subject (as these individuals might see multiple treatments); - are not approved for any other reason (e.g., not having a valid Prolific ID, not having a working webcam); - do not answer the control question correctly the second time - are not aware that they and their decisions are observed (if this is the case in the corresponding treatment) - whose face is not visible in the call or on the photo Based on previous research, we expect to exclude about 5-10 percent of participants because they do not meet the restrictions above.
Sample size (or number of clusters) by treatment arms
For each of the experimental treatments: About 210 groups consisting of three participants (1 decision maker, 1 observer, 1 receiver)
For the control treatment: about 210 groups consisting of two participants (1 decision maker, 1 receiver)
Minimum detectable effect size for main outcomes (accounting for sample design and clustering)
Based on a two-sided Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test, an error probability of 0.05, and a power of 0.80, we require about 210 groups per treatment to detect an effect of Cohen’s d of 0.28.
IRB

Institutional Review Boards (IRBs)

IRB Name
Ehtics Committee of the Faculty of Business, Economics and Social Siences of the University of Bern
IRB Approval Date
2023-12-06
IRB Approval Number
372023
Analysis Plan

There is information in this trial unavailable to the public. Use the button below to request access.

Request Information