Non-willigness to lead and social preference

Last registered on March 15, 2024
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Pre-Trial

Trial Information

General Information

Title
Non-willigness to lead and social preference
RCT ID
AEARCTR-0013041
Initial registration date
March 11, 2024

Initial registration date is when the trial was registered.

It corresponds to when the registration was submitted to the Registry to be reviewed for publication.

First published
March 15, 2024, 6:58 PM EDT

First published corresponds to when the trial was first made public on the Registry after being reviewed.

Locations

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Primary Investigator

Name
Paul-Emile Mangin
Affiliation
University of Portsmouth
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Other Primary Investigator(s)

PI Name
Wolfgang Luhan
PI Affiliation
University of Portsmouth
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Additional Trial Information

Status
In development
Start date
2024-02-14
End date
2024-05-31
Keywords
Behavior, Electoral
Additional Keywords
Behavioural economics, experimental economics, leadership, non-willingness to lead, social preference.
JEL code(s)
D72, C91, C92
Secondary IDs
Prior work
This trial does not extend or rely on any prior RCTs.
Abstract
Willingness to lead is not homogeneously distributed in the population. There is extensive research on the attributes of a good leader, and on how willingness to lead impacts leadership. But not a lot of research focuses on those who do not want to lead, the reasons why they do not put themselves forward, and if they would actually be better leaders than those who do not want to lead.
I want to study the personality traits of those who do not want to lead, and if they would make different decisions for others than those who seek power. More precisely, I focus on distribution preference, i.e. the trade-off between efficiency (sum of individual payoffs), equality, and maximin (maximisation of the smallest payoff). Do individuals who do not want to lead take more equal or efficient decisions?
External Link(s)

Registration Citation

Citation
Luhan, Wolfgang and Paul-Emile Mangin. 2024. "Non-willigness to lead and social preference." AEA RCT Registry. March 15. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.13041-1.0
Sponsors & Partners

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Experimental Details

Interventions

Intervention(s)
I investigate if people who want power the least would make different distribution decisions than people who seek it.
Intervention Start Date
2024-02-14
Intervention End Date
2024-05-31

Primary Outcomes

Primary Outcomes (end points)
We will collect data from an incentivized online experiment to answer the following questions:
- RQ1: Do people who do not want to lead have different personality traits than those who want?
H1: people with low willingness to lead are more pro-social
- RQ2: How does not wanting to lead impact decision-makers distribution preferences?
H2: people with low WTL are more likely to make egalitarian distribution decisions.
Primary Outcomes (explanation)

Secondary Outcomes

Secondary Outcomes (end points)
What is the impact of age, disposable income, gender (see Eckel et al., 2021; Grossman et al., 2019), field of study, native language on participants’ decisions?
Secondary Outcomes (explanation)

Experimental Design

Experimental Design
We will use an in-lab survey experiment for data collection, implemented at the BaL BARE Laboratory.
Experimental Design Details
Not available
Randomization Method
Randomisation is conducted at individual level, when registering to the experiment and attending the sessions.
Randomization Unit
Individual.
Was the treatment clustered?
No

Experiment Characteristics

Sample size: planned number of clusters
None.
Sample size: planned number of observations
108
Sample size (or number of clusters) by treatment arms
324
Minimum detectable effect size for main outcomes (accounting for sample design and clustering)
We require 108 independent observations per treatment, 324 in total. This number has been computed using G*Power, for a chi-squared test with alpha=5%, beta=20% and a medium effect size w of 0.3.
Supporting Documents and Materials
IRB

Institutional Review Boards (IRBs)

IRB Name
Business and Law Faculty Ethics Committee - University of Portsmouth
IRB Approval Date
2024-02-14
IRB Approval Number
BAL/2024/04/MANGIN
Analysis Plan

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