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Last Published	April 03, 2024 01:01 PM	April 26, 2024 01:30 AM
Primary Outcomes (End Points)	1) Job take-up on the worker side 2) Probability of acceptance of contract by firms	1) Job take-up on the worker side 2) Take-up of contracts on the firm side
Experimental Design (Public)	The workers are cross-randomized into treatments which offer a job, with or without insurance against wage theft, and with or without back-loading of wages. The firms are cross-randomized into treatments which offer compensation against worker separation or not, credit to pay workers or not, and with or without back-loading of wages. Firms and workers which accept the contracts are matched with each other.	The workers are cross-randomized into treatments which offer a job, with or without insurance against wage theft, and with or without back-loading of wages. The firms are offered contracts which provide compensation against worker separation or not, credit to pay workers or not, and with or without back-loading of wages. Firms and workers which accept the contracts are matched with each other.
Randomization Method	Worker side: A Unique ID with treatment cells randomly allocated to them is created in the office. Enumerators recruit the workers in the order of unique id. Firm side: A Unique ID with treatment cells randomly allocated to them is created in the office. Random sample of firms are surveyed in the order of unique id.	Worker side: A Unique ID with treatment cells randomly allocated to them is created in the office. Enumerators recruit the workers in the order of unique id. Firm side: We randomize the order in which questions are asked. This is done in the office.
Planned Number of Observations	Workers: Approximately 2000. 50% of workers who accept contracts will be provided jobs. Firms: Up to 800 There is a possibility that we might not be able to reach 2000 workers. Similarly, number of firms may be below 800.	Workers: Approximately 2000. 25% of workers who accept contracts will be provided jobs. Firms: Up to 800 There is a possibility that we might not be able to reach 2000 workers. Similarly, number of firms may be below 800.
Intervention (Hidden)	The study will be conducted in urban areas of Patna, the capital of the state of Bihar, which is one of the poorest in the country. Casual workers in the city, and in other parts of India, often seek work at labor stands. These stands are public places which are spread across the city. Almost all workers seeking work at these stands work in construction or related industries. They arrive at the stand early in the morning and stay there till noon, expecting work, and firms hire them from the stand and take them to the work site. Firms hire workers from these stands. The contracts between the firms and workers range from a single day to several days. Workers and firms do not know each other. The contractual environment is one of limited commitment and contracts are oral. Thus it is important for the worker to know if the firm is trustworthy and will not renege on its word at the end of work day. Similarly, firms are unaware of the productivity of workers. Ideally, firms and workers would want to engage in a long-term contract as it reduces search costs. However, asymmetric information about each other's type can prevent this from happening. Liquidity constraints on the both the firm and worker side can exacerbate this issue. Additionally, high levels of unemployment can allow firms to exploit workers by asking them to work for longer than they contractually agreed. Hence, workers would want to know ex-ante whether the firm is of the type which tends to exploit workers. This may result in workers not taking up contracts which allow firms to extract excessive labor from them. HYPOTHESIS Worker side H1) Workers are less likely to take up jobs which offer back-loaded contracts. H2) Offering insurance against wage-theft can increase the take-up of jobs by workers H3) Workers prefer contracts which protect them from exploitation against excess labor H4) Workers prefer short contracts than long contracts and this is driven by risks of wage theft being higher in long contracts. Firm side F1) Firms prefer back-loaded contracts to contracts which pay workers daily F2) Firms prefer longer contracts to short contracts F3) Provision of credit to firms (which they pay back) leads firms to hire more workers. Worker-firm match M1) Workers work for shorter hours in daily wage contracts M2) Worker absenteeism is higher in daily wage contracts. To test these hypothesis we recruit workers in several labor stands in Patna. Workers are offered contracts (which are randomized at an individual level) that vary the length, the payment structure and insurance. We work with firms recruited through snowball sampling. We offer to hire workers for firms on different contracts. Firms and workers which accept the respective contracts are matched with each other. We will measure productivity of workers after they are matched with the firm. We list the treatment arms in detail and our hypotheses in comparing these treatment arms in the 'experimental design' section of this filing.	The study will be conducted in urban areas of Patna, the capital of the state of Bihar, which is one of the poorest in the country. Casual workers in the city, and in other parts of India, often seek work at labor stands. These stands are public places which are spread across the city. Almost all workers seeking work at these stands work in construction or related industries. They arrive at the stand early in the morning and stay there till noon, expecting work, and firms hire them from the stand and take them to the work site. Firms hire workers from these stands. The contracts between the firms and workers range from a single day to several days. Workers and firms do not know each other. The contractual environment is one of limited commitment and contracts are oral. Thus it is important for the worker to know if the firm is trustworthy and will not renege on its word at the end of work day. Similarly, firms are unaware of the productivity of workers. Ideally, firms and workers would want to engage in a long-term contract as it reduces search costs. However, asymmetric information about each other's type can prevent this from happening. Liquidity constraints on the both the firm and worker side can exacerbate this issue. Additionally, high levels of unemployment can allow firms to exploit workers by asking them to work for longer than they contractually agreed. Hence, workers would want to know ex-ante whether the firm is of the type which tends to exploit workers. This may result in workers not taking up contracts which allow firms to extract excessive labor from them. HYPOTHESIS Worker side H1) Workers are less likely to take up jobs which offer back-loaded contracts. H2) Offering insurance against wage-theft can increase the take-up of jobs by workers H3) Workers prefer contracts which protect them from exploitation against excess labor. H4) Workers prefer short contracts than long contracts and this is driven by risks of wage theft being higher in long contracts. Firm side F1) Firms prefer back-loaded contracts to contracts which pay workers daily F2) Firms prefer longer contracts to short contracts F3) Provision of credit to firms (which they pay back) leads firms to hire more workers. Worker-firm match M1) Workers work for shorter hours in daily wage contracts M2) Worker absenteeism is higher in daily wage contracts. To test these hypothesis we recruit workers in several labor stands in Patna. Workers are offered contracts (which are randomized at an individual level) that vary the length, the payment structure and insurance. We work with firms recruited through snowball sampling. We use a BDM procedure to elicit the preferences of firms for contracts. Each firm is offered to hire workers on 12 different types of contracts, one of which is implemented randomly. Firms and workers which accept the respective contracts are matched with each other. We will measure productivity of workers after they are matched with the firm. We list the treatment arms in detail and our hypotheses in comparing these treatment arms in the 'experimental design' section of this filing.