Perceptions of inequality: When the grass is less green on the other side

Last registered on April 02, 2024

Pre-Trial

Trial Information

General Information

Title
Perceptions of inequality: When the grass is less green on the other side
RCT ID
AEARCTR-0013113
Initial registration date
March 20, 2024

Initial registration date is when the trial was registered.

It corresponds to when the registration was submitted to the Registry to be reviewed for publication.

First published
April 02, 2024, 10:35 AM EDT

First published corresponds to when the trial was first made public on the Registry after being reviewed.

Locations

Region

Primary Investigator

Affiliation
Nanterre Université

Other Primary Investigator(s)

Additional Trial Information

Status
Completed
Start date
2024-03-03
End date
2024-03-31
Secondary IDs
Prior work
This trial does not extend or rely on any prior RCTs.
Abstract
This study explores how individuals perceive and respond to social inequalities based on intergroup comparisons. Specifically, we examine whether individuals tend to minimize the inequalities they experience when they observe more pronounced disparities in another group. To investigate this, a laboratory experiment is conducted where participants receive different allocations within their group and different types of information regarding the other group: no information, the wealthiest's allocation, the poorest's allocation, the level of inequality between the two players, and the actions taken to reduce (or not) inequalities within the group. By analyzing participants' responses and behaviors to this information, I seek to better understand the mechanisms of perception and reaction to social inequalities, as well as their potential impact on attitudes and behaviors towards equity and social justice.
External Link(s)

Registration Citation

Citation
Mollier, Claire. 2024. "Perceptions of inequality: When the grass is less green on the other side." AEA RCT Registry. April 02. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.13113-1.0
Experimental Details

Interventions

Intervention(s)
Intervention Start Date
2024-03-25
Intervention End Date
2024-03-26

Primary Outcomes

Primary Outcomes (end points)
The key outcome is the binary decision to redistribute equally the allocations within the group. I will compare this decision between the treatments.
Primary Outcomes (explanation)
The primary outcome is "inequality aversion" which is binary, takes the value 1 if the player 1 in the group chooses to the most equal distribution, 0 otherwise.

Secondary Outcomes

Secondary Outcomes (end points)
I can also analyze if the player 2's tolerance towards the decision of the player 1 (within their group) depends on the treatments.
Secondary Outcomes (explanation)
The tolerance will be captured with the answer to the question "do you think the decision made by player 1 is (un)fair? why?"

Experimental Design

Experimental Design
The experiment is a between-subjects where subjects perform a modified Dictator Game (Forsythe et al., 1994). Participants are divided into groups of two players and receive different allocations, resulting in inequalities within the group. In the first round, Player 1 (i.e. the richest) has to decide if they want to keep allocations unchanged or if they want to redistribute (at a cost) equitably the resources. In Group 1 (Group 2), Player 1 has the choice to keep 6 (6) for themself and give 3 (1) to the other player or receive 4.5 (3.5) each. In each group, Player 2 receives less but, while in Group 1 Player 2 receives 80% less, they only receive 50% less in Group 2. In the treatments, the players receive different types of information regarding the other group: no information, the wealthiest's allocation, the poorest's allocation, the level of inequality between the two players, and the actions taken to reduce (or not) inequalities within the group.
Experimental Design Details
The treatments are the following ones:
• Baseline: subjects do not receive any information regarding other group’s allocations.
• Treatment 1 : disclosure of player 1’s allocation from the other group.
• Treatment 2 : disclosure of player 2’s allocation from the other group.
• Treatment 3 : disclosure of player 1’s and 2’s allocation from the other group.
• Treatment 4 : disclosure of Group 2’s choices of redistribution to Group 1

Note that, in treatments 1 and 2, we elicit subjects' beliefs about the player whose allocation we have revealed (is it that of the richest or the poorest). In treatment 4, we ask participants what action they expect the other group to take before revealing their choice. In all conditions, we ask Player 2 if they think the allocation they receive from Player 1 is fair or not and why.
Randomization Method
The randomization will be made in the laboratory, by randomly assigning participants to a computer.
Randomization Unit
Individual
Was the treatment clustered?
No

Experiment Characteristics

Sample size: planned number of clusters
in 1 university in Spain
Sample size: planned number of observations
300 participants
Sample size (or number of clusters) by treatment arms
baseline + 4 treatments
60 participants by treatment + baseline
one Group 2 in each session
=> 29 Player 1 of Group 1 in each treatment + baseline
Minimum detectable effect size for main outcomes (accounting for sample design and clustering)
sampsi 0.5 0.7, sd(0.5) onesam oneside p(0.8) => n = 39 After running the pilot, I find that the mean choice of redistribution is 0.5 in the baseline and 0.7 in the treatment. The mean sd is 0.5.
IRB

Institutional Review Boards (IRBs)

IRB Name
Jaume I University
IRB Approval Date
2024-03-20
IRB Approval Number
N/A
Analysis Plan

There is information in this trial unavailable to the public. Use the button below to request access.

Request Information

Post-Trial

Post Trial Information

Study Withdrawal

There is information in this trial unavailable to the public. Use the button below to request access.

Request Information

Intervention

Is the intervention completed?
No
Data Collection Complete
Data Publication

Data Publication

Is public data available?
No

Program Files

Program Files
Reports, Papers & Other Materials

Relevant Paper(s)

Reports & Other Materials