Overbidding and Beliefs in Common-Value Auctions

Last registered on March 15, 2024
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Pre-Trial

Trial Information

General Information

Title
Overbidding and Beliefs in Common-Value Auctions
RCT ID
AEARCTR-0013159
Initial registration date
March 07, 2024

Initial registration date is when the trial was registered.

It corresponds to when the registration was submitted to the Registry to be reviewed for publication.

First published
March 15, 2024, 5:41 PM EDT

First published corresponds to when the trial was first made public on the Registry after being reviewed.

Locations

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Primary Investigator

Name
Zachary Breig
Affiliation
The University of Queensland
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Other Primary Investigator(s)

PI Name
Antonio Rosato
PI Affiliation
University of Queensland and Università di Napoli Federico II
Contact Investigator

Additional Trial Information

Status
In development
Start date
2024-03-11
End date
2024-05-31
Keywords
Behavior, Lab
Additional Keywords
JEL code(s)
Secondary IDs
Prior work
This trial does not extend or rely on any prior RCTs.
Abstract
We will study how beliefs affect behavior in common-value auctions. These are auctions in which all buyers have the same value for an object or set of objects (e.g. an oil field), but this value is unknown ex-ante and each buyer receives a different signal about the value. We will study how different incentive structures interact with the information subjects receive using an incentivized laboratory experiment.
External Link(s)

Registration Citation

Citation
Breig, Zachary and Antonio Rosato. 2024. "Overbidding and Beliefs in Common-Value Auctions." AEA RCT Registry. March 15. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.13159-1.0
Sponsors & Partners
Experimental Details

Interventions

Intervention(s)
Intervention Start Date
2024-03-11
Intervention End Date
2024-05-31

Primary Outcomes

Primary Outcomes (end points)
The key outcome variables are the bids in two different types of auctions and reservation values.
Primary Outcomes (explanation)

Secondary Outcomes

Secondary Outcomes (end points)
Secondary Outcomes (explanation)

Experimental Design

Experimental Design
We use a within-subject design to observe 1) how subjects bid when there is one prize and the price is the second highest bid, 2) how subjects bid when there are four prizes and the price is the fifth highest bid, and 3) how subjects' reservation values vary with their signal and with information about how their signal ranks against other buyers' signals.
Experimental Design Details
Not available
Randomization Method
Randomization will be completed using the experimental software.
Randomization Unit
Groups and signals will be randomized within each round.
Was the treatment clustered?
No

Experiment Characteristics

Sample size: planned number of clusters
100-120 subjects
Sample size: planned number of observations
20 rounds for each subject
Sample size (or number of clusters) by treatment arms
We use a within-subject design
Minimum detectable effect size for main outcomes (accounting for sample design and clustering)
Supporting Documents and Materials
IRB

Institutional Review Boards (IRBs)

IRB Name
UQ BEL LNR Ethics Committee
IRB Approval Date
2023-09-19
IRB Approval Number
2023/HE001894
Analysis Plan

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