Minimum Wage Preferences

Last registered on April 30, 2024

Pre-Trial

Trial Information

General Information

Title
Minimum Wage Preferences
RCT ID
AEARCTR-0013226
Initial registration date
March 30, 2024

Initial registration date is when the trial was registered.

It corresponds to when the registration was submitted to the Registry to be reviewed for publication.

First published
April 02, 2024, 12:47 PM EDT

First published corresponds to when the trial was first made public on the Registry after being reviewed.

Last updated
April 30, 2024, 8:44 PM EDT

Last updated is the most recent time when changes to the trial's registration were published.

Locations

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Primary Investigator

Affiliation
UCLA Anderson

Other Primary Investigator(s)

Additional Trial Information

Status
In development
Start date
2024-05-02
End date
2024-05-20
Secondary IDs
Prior work
This trial does not extend or rely on any prior RCTs.
Abstract
How do people reason and decide when it comes to voting for minimum wage increases? Do low-wage workers think that the higher rate, the better, or do they take into account disemployment effects of minimum wages while making their policy choices? For high-wage workers who would not be affected by the increases, do they care more about workers, small businesses, or the overall economy? In addition, are those factors different between liberal and conservative individuals? My study will shed some light on the mental maps that determine individuals' support for minimum wages. To further investigate those channels, I implement information provision treatments: providing people information on the bindingness of the minimum wage in their state and the unemployment rate in their state. Finally, to shed some light on the link between perceptions on the labor markets and policy choices, I implement a hypothetical experiment to study whether people would demand a higher minimum wage rate or a lower minimum wage rate when the economy is not doing well or under crisis.
External Link(s)

Registration Citation

Citation
Nguyen, Anh. 2024. "Minimum Wage Preferences." AEA RCT Registry. April 30. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.13226-1.1
Experimental Details

Interventions

Intervention(s)
Information provision treatment and hypothetical treatment.
Intervention Start Date
2024-05-02
Intervention End Date
2024-05-20

Primary Outcomes

Primary Outcomes (end points)
Preferred minimum wage: people are asked what would be a good minimum wage in their state
Voting decision for a small minimum wage increase: dummy = 1 if they prefer a $2 increase over the status quo
Voting decision for a medium minimum wage increase: dummy = 1 if they prefer a $5 increase over the status quo
Voting decision for a large minimum wage increase: dummy = 1 if they prefer a $8 increase over the status quo
Primary Outcomes (explanation)

Secondary Outcomes

Secondary Outcomes (end points)
Secondary Outcomes (explanation)

Experimental Design

Experimental Design
My survey experiment is created using Qualtrics and distributed to their representative panel of respondents. Individuals who agree to participate in the survey will be asked a series of background socio-economic questions and political affiliation questions. In addition, I ask questions to measure their optimism about their career prospect depending on whether they are actively working, unemployed, or not in the labor force. Next, all respondents will be asked an open-ended question about minimum wage to elicit first ordered concerns. They can write whatever comes to their mind regarding the policy. I then elicit everyone's beliefs on minimum wage workers by asking what percentage of hourly workers making less than or equal to the state minimum wage.

An equal number of respondents are randomly put into a control group and three different treatment groups. In the control group, respondents go straight to questions about policy choices and assessment.
In the first information treatment group, people are given an information about the number of hourly workers whose wage is equal to or less than the state minimum wage out of every 100 hourly workers in their state based on the most recent survey data from the Current Population Survey. They are then given another opportunity to reassess their answer to this question. I do this to elicit their posterior beliefs to take this into account when analyzing the information effects. Next, they are asked the same set of questions regarding policy choices as in the control group.

In the second information treatment group, I provide them with information on the unemployment rate in their state and elicit prior and posterior beliefs. I then ask them again the questions about their career prospects. Lastly, they are asked policy questions.

In the hypothetical treatment group, I ask for their perceptions on the unemployment rate in their state, then ask them to think about a hypothetical scenario where the unemployment rate is higher. Then they are asked to answer questions about career prospects and policy choices taking into account the hypothetical scenario.
Experimental Design Details
Not available
Randomization Method
Randomization done by Qualtrics
Randomization Unit
Individual level
Was the treatment clustered?
No

Experiment Characteristics

Sample size: planned number of clusters
2000 individuals
Sample size: planned number of observations
2000
Sample size (or number of clusters) by treatment arms
500 control, 500 information treatment 1, 500 information treatment 2, 500 hypothetical treatment.
Minimum detectable effect size for main outcomes (accounting for sample design and clustering)
Supporting Documents and Materials

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IRB

Institutional Review Boards (IRBs)

IRB Name
IRB Approval Date
IRB Approval Number