The Elasticity of Policy Preferences to Information

Last registered on December 08, 2016

View Trial History

Pre-Trial

Trial Information

General Information

Title

The Elasticity of Policy Preferences to Information

RCT ID

AEARCTR-0001326

Initial registration date

June 05, 2016

Initial registration date is when the trial was registered.

It corresponds to when the registration was submitted to the Registry to be reviewed for publication.

First published

June 05, 2016, 6:27 AM EDT

First published corresponds to when the trial was first made public on the Registry after being reviewed.

Last updated

December 08, 2016, 4:15 AM EST

Last updated is the most recent time when changes to the trial's registration were published.

Locations

Country

Switzerland

Region

Primary Investigator

Name

Christopher Roth

Affiliation

University of Cologne

Contact Primary Investigator

Other Primary Investigator(s)

PI Name

Julien Senn

PI Affiliation

University of Zurich

Contact Investigator

PI Name

Ernst Fehr

PI Affiliation

University of Zurich

Contact Investigator

Additional Trial Information

Status

Completed

Start date

2016-05-27

End date

2016-06-02

Keywords

Welfare

Additional Keywords

JEL code(s)

Secondary IDs

Abstract

This document describes the analysis plan for a field experiment evaluating the effects of direct
mailing on preferences for redistribution. We consider the case of the vote on the unconditional
basic income (henceforth UBI) which takes place in Switzerland in June 2016. Approximately
one week before the vote, different types of letters are sent to almost 2/3 of the swiss municipalities
with less than 750 households. These municipalities receive either a placebo letter which
reminds them to go voting, or a letter containing the same content as the placebo letter, but
also information about inequality, poverty and likely labor supply responses to the UBI. This
document outlines the econometric methods that will be used to assess the effect of the letters
on our main outcome variables.

External Link(s)

Registration Citation

Citation

Fehr, Ernst, Christopher Roth and Julien Senn. 2016. "The Elasticity of Policy Preferences to Information." AEA RCT Registry. December 08. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.1326-2.0

Former Citation

Fehr, Ernst, Christopher Roth and Julien Senn. 2016. "The Elasticity of Policy Preferences to Information." AEA RCT Registry. December 08. https://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/1326/history/12319

Sponsors & Partners

Experimental Details

Interventions

Intervention(s)

Each household in each municipalities in the placebo condition receives a letter which says, in
substance, that:
• the vote on the UBI takes place on the 5th on June.
• this vote is “an important opportunity to expand the economic opportunities of many
people, to effectively diminish poverty and to achieve a higher life quality for everyone.”
• the UBI is supposed to enable the whole population to live a life in decent conditions and
to enable them to take part in public life.
• each citizen’s vote can make a difference.
Each household from the municipalities in the information condition receives a similar letter
containing additional (truthful) information about:
• income inequality in Switzerland. In particular people are told the share of the total labor
income earned by the top 10% in the income distribution and by the bottom 10% in the
income distribution.
• expected labor supply response to the UBI in Switzerland. Specifically, people are told
that according to a recent survey almost all Swiss citizens plan to continue working after
the introduction of the basic income.
• the absolute number of swish citizens living below the poverty line. People are told that
more than 500,000 households in Switzerland have an income below the poverty line.3

Intervention (Hidden)

Intervention Start Date

2016-06-01

Intervention End Date

2016-06-02

Primary Outcomes

Primary Outcomes (end points)

--- Percentage of people voting in favor of the basic income popular initiative.
--- voter turnout for the basic income popular initiative.
--- Percentage of people voting in favor of the pro-public service initiative.

Primary Outcomes (explanation)

Secondary Outcomes

Secondary Outcomes (end points)

Secondary Outcomes (explanation)

Experimental Design

We randomly assign approximately 31% of these municipalities to an information treatment, approximately 31% to a placebo treatment, and the remaining municipalities to a control group.

Each household in each municipalities in the placebo condition receives a letter which says, in
substance, that:
• the vote on the UBI takes place on the 5th on June.
• this vote is “an important opportunity to expand the economic opportunities of many
people, to effectively diminish poverty and to achieve a higher life quality for everyone.”
• the UBI is supposed to enable the whole population to live a life in decent conditions and
to enable them to take part in public life.
• each citizen’s vote can make a difference.
Each household from the municipalities in the information condition receives a similar letter
containing additional (truthful) information about:
• income inequality in Switzerland. In particular people are told the share of the total labor
income earned by the top 10% in the income distribution and by the bottom 10% in the
income distribution.
• expected labor supply response to the UBI in Switzerland. Specifically, people are told
that according to a recent survey almost all Swiss citizens plan to continue working after
the introduction of the basic income.
• the absolute number of swish citizens living below the poverty line. People are told that
more than 500,000 households in Switzerland have an income below the poverty line.3

Experimental Design Details

Randomization Method

Randomization done in office by a computer

Randomization Unit

Municipality level

Was the treatment clustered?

Yes

Experiment Characteristics

Sample size: planned number of clusters

1033 municipalities

Sample size: planned number of observations

1033 municipalities

Sample size (or number of clusters) by treatment arms

321 treatment clusters
316 placebo clusters
396 control clusters

Minimum detectable effect size for main outcomes (accounting for sample design and clustering)

When we compare the mean support in municipalities in receipt of the information treatment relative to municipalities not receiving any letters we have power of .8 to detect effect sizes of .21 of a standard deviation at =0.05. In our preferred specification including strata fixed effects, Canton fixed effects, as well as additional controls, we will have a power of .8 to detect effect sizes of about .18 of a standard deviation at =0.05. When we compare the mean support in municipalities in receipt of the information treatment relative to municipalities which receive the placebo letters, we have power of .8 to detect effect sizes of .22 of a standard deviation at =0.05. In our preferred specification including strata fixed effects, Canton fixed effects, as well as additional controls, we will have a power of .8 to detect effect sizes of .19 of a standard deviation at =0.05.

Supporting Documents and Materials

IRB