Economic Inequality and Social Capital

Last registered on April 16, 2024

Pre-Trial

Trial Information

General Information

Title
Economic Inequality and Social Capital
RCT ID
AEARCTR-0013301
Initial registration date
April 05, 2024

Initial registration date is when the trial was registered.

It corresponds to when the registration was submitted to the Registry to be reviewed for publication.

First published
April 16, 2024, 12:52 PM EDT

First published corresponds to when the trial was first made public on the Registry after being reviewed.

Locations

Region

Primary Investigator

Affiliation

Other Primary Investigator(s)

PI Affiliation
University of Michigan
PI Affiliation
University of Zürich
PI Affiliation
Maastricht University
PI Affiliation
Cornell University

Additional Trial Information

Status
In development
Start date
2024-04-08
End date
2025-06-15
Secondary IDs
Prior work
This trial does not extend or rely on any prior RCTs.
Abstract
This project will examine the causal effect of neighborhood inequality on social capital. To estimate this effect, we will leverage a lottery that generates exogenous variation in inequality at the neighborhood level. We will combine this natural experiment with an online survey to collect survey and behavioral measures of social capital.
External Link(s)

Registration Citation

Citation
Carvalho, Leandro et al. 2024. "Economic Inequality and Social Capital." AEA RCT Registry. April 16. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.13301-1.0
Experimental Details

Interventions

Intervention(s)
The Postcode Lottery runs a weekly lottery, the Street Prize, in which they randomly select a postcode in the Netherlands. All lottery subscribers in this winning postcode earn a substantial amount. This lottery generates an exogenous increase in income inequality in the neighborhood of the Street-Prize winning postcode. The Postcode Lottery also randomly selects postcodes that are awarded consolation prizes. Because these consolation prizes are small, they have a negligible effect on income inequality in neighborhoods that contain the consolation-prize winning postcode. The treatment group will comprise households living adjacent to (but outside) a postcode that won the Street Prize. The control group will comprise households living adjacent to (but outside) a postcode that won a consolation prize.
Intervention (Hidden)
The Postcode Lottery is a popular subscription lottery in the Netherlands (www.postcodeloterij.nl). Players pay a monthly fee for a lottery subscription and are entered in all draws. A unique feature of this lottery is that, rather than drawing winning numbers, it randomly selects winning postcodes. If a postcode is selected, all lottery subscribers living in this winning postcode earn prizes.
The Postcode Lottery runs several different draws in the Netherlands. One of the most popular is the “Street Prize,” which randomly selects a postcode in the Netherlands every week. Lottery subscribers in this winning postcode earn up to €75,000, depending on the type of subscription they have. Consequently, there may be multiple households – all geographically concentrated – earning up to €75,000 each.
The Street Prize generates an exogenous increase in income inequality in the neighborhood. While the incomes of the lottery subscribers living in the winning postcode increase substantially, the incomes of households living in a different postcode, just outside the winning postcode remain the same. The latter experience some of their neighbors getting richer, but their own financial circumstances did not change.
The Postcode Lottery also randomly selects postcodes that are awarded consolation prizes. Because these consolation prizes are small, they have a negligible effect on income inequality in the neighborhoods containing the consolation-prize winning postcode.
The treatment group will comprise households living adjacent to (but outside) a postcode that won the Street Prize. The control group will comprise households living adjacent to (but outside) a postcode that won a consolation prize.
Intervention Start Date
2024-04-08
Intervention End Date
2025-04-20

Primary Outcomes

Primary Outcomes (end points)
Our primary outcome will be an index constructed from two outcomes: (1) a question on trust and (2) behavior in an incentivized task designed to measure honesty.
Primary Outcomes (explanation)
Participants will be asked the following question to measure trust: “How strongly do you agree with the following statement? Most people living in my neighborhood can be trusted.” Participants will answer using a scale from 0 (“Don’t agree at all”) to 10 (“Fully agree”).
Honest behavior will be measured using the so-called “mind game.” The screen will show a card face down. Participants will be told that there is a 50-50 chance that the card is either red or black. Then, they will be asked to guess the color of the card and make a mental note of their guesses. At this point, the screen will reveal the color of the card and participants will be asked to report which color they had guessed originally. There will be 16 trials in total. At the end of the survey, one of the 16 trials will be randomly selected for payment. A participant will earn €10 if she guessed correctly in the selected trial. As a result, the participant can increase her chances of earning €10 if she misreports her guess in a trial in which she had guessed the wrong color. Although it will not be possible to identify whether a specific participant cheated, we will be able to infer cheating at the group level by comparing the reported number of correct guesses to the theoretical benchmark under truthful reporting (i.e., 50 percent).
We will construct an index (e.g., Anderson 2008) out of the trust question and the reported number of correct guesses (as a proxy for cheating). Although the index will be our main outcome, we will also separately estimate the effects on each of the two primary outcomes.
Anderson, M. L. (2008). Multiple inference and gender differences in the effects of early intervention: A reevaluation of the Abecedarian, Perry Preschool, and Early Training Projects. Journal of the American statistical Association, 103(484), 1481-1495.

Secondary Outcomes

Secondary Outcomes (end points)
We will collect data on secondary outcomes to explore the following potential mechanisms through which income inequality may affect social capital: (a) competitiveness; (b) neighborhood cohesiveness; (c) envy; and (d) perceived unfairness. We will also measure happiness to assess the potential side-effects of inequality on mood.
Secondary Outcomes (explanation)
To measure competitiveness, participants will be asked the following question:
“To what extent do you agree with the following statements?
Nowadays, it seems like…
a) ...winning is not the first thing; it is the only thing.
b) …life is governed by the “survival of the fittest”.
c) ...it is a dog-eat-dog world where you have to be ruthless at times.”
They will answer this question using a scale from 0 (“Don’t agree at all”) to 10 (“Fully agree”).
Neighborhood cohesiveness will be assessed using the following two questions:
a) Our social lives in the neighborhood wax and wane, changing from time to time. Over the last few months, how has the sense of community changed in your neighborhood? Participants will answer using a scale from -5 (“Much weaker sense of community”) to +5 (“Much stronger sense of community”).
b) As you think about your interactions with the people in your neighborhood over the last few months, have they become friendlier, less friendly, or have they stayed the same? Participants will answer using a scale from -5 (“Much less friendly”) to +5 (“Much more friendly”).
Envy will be measured by asking participants how strongly they agree with the following statements:
a) When I walk through my neighborhood, I sometimes feel envious of how much money some people in my neighborhood have. Participants will answer using a scale from 0 (“Don’t agree at all”) to 10 (“Fully agree”).
b) When I walk through my neighborhood, I often catch myself wishing I had as much money as some people in my neighborhood have. Participants will answer using a scale from 0 (“Don’t agree at all”) to 10 (“Fully agree”).
To measure perceived unfairness, participants will be asked how strongly they agree with the following statement:
Walking through the neighborhood, I sometimes think about how unfair it is that some people in my neighborhood have so much money while other people in my neighborhood have so little. Participants will answer using a scale from 0 (“Don’t agree at all”) to 10 (“Fully agree”).

Although the effect of the Postcode Lottery on inequality in the Netherlands as a whole is negligible, it is possible that an increase in neighborhood inequality may affect not only one’s trust in one’s neighbors but also one’s trust in people more generally. To investigate this possibility, participants will also be asked the following question: “How strongly do you agree with the following statement? Most people living in the Netherlands can be trusted.” Participants will answer this question using a scale from 0 (“Don’t agree at all”) to 10 (“Fully agree”).
Finally, the potential emotional effects of inequality will be assessed by asking participants the following question: “Overall, how happy would you say you are? Please give a number between 0 (extremely unhappy) and 10 (extremely happy)”

Experimental Design

Experimental Design
The Postcode Lottery also randomly selects postcodes that are awarded consolation prizes. These postcodes provide a valid counterfactual for the postcodes that win the Street Prize. Our empirical strategy will compare households living adjacent to (but outside) a postcode that won the Street Prize to households living adjacent to (but outside) a postcode that won a consolation prize.
Experimental Design Details
In addition to the Street Prize, the Postcode Lottery also randomly selects postcodes that are awarded consolation prizes. For example, all lottery subscribers in one of these postcodes may earn €20.
Importantly, postcodes that win the consolation prizes are drawn from the same pool of postcodes used to select the Street-Prize-winning postcode (this pool is formed by all postcodes in the Netherlands in which there is at least one lottery subscriber). For this reason, the postcodes that win consolation prizes provide a valid counterfactual for the postcodes selected to win the Street Prize.
Our research design focuses on households living in the postcodes near to postcodes selected for either the Street Prize or a consolation prize. In particular, let “treatment households” be the households living adjacent to (but outside) a postcode that won the Street Prize. These households experience some of their neighbors getting richer, but their own financial circumstances do not change. Let “control households” be the households living adjacent to (but outside) a postcode that won a consolation prize. Because these consolation prizes are small, they have a negligible effect on income inequality in the neighborhoods of control households.
Our empirical strategy will compare treatment households to control households. Note that both control and treatment households live in non-winning postcodes, such that—irrespective of whether they have a lottery subscription or not—they will not have won any lottery prizes.
Randomization Method
Public lottery.
Randomization Unit
The unit of randomization is a postcode.
Was the treatment clustered?
Yes

Experiment Characteristics

Sample size: planned number of clusters
1,134 postcodes (this is the number of targeted postcodes; in practice there will be fewer postcodes in the data because in some of them none of the invited participants will answer the survey).
Sample size: planned number of observations
We are planning to recruit subjects for about 54 weeks. Based on a response rate of 20% we expect a total sample size of roughly 1,300 participants.
Sample size (or number of clusters) by treatment arms
To increase the number of potential participants per week, we will over-sample the control group by a factor of 2:1.
Minimum detectable effect size for main outcomes (accounting for sample design and clustering)
Assuming an intra-cluster correlation of ρ = 0.15, the minimum detectable effect size is approximately 0.225 standard deviations (at the 5% significance level and with a power of 80%).
Supporting Documents and Materials

Documents

Document Name
Manipulation Check, Heterogenous Treatment Effects, and Participants Living in Winning Postcodes
Document Type
other
Document Description
This document describes:

- the manipulation check we'll use to investigate whether the Street Prize changes participants’ perceptions about inequality in their neighborhood
- analysis of heterogeneous treatment effects we plan to conduct, and
- an exploratory analysis we plan to conduct using data on individuals living in the postcodes that won a prize.
File
Manipulation Check, Heterogenous Treatment Effects, and Participants Living in Winning Postcodes

MD5: be1605466aeb353aa2d7be42d4c49e01

SHA1: efce87825001b03e637a1d9b70f85fc37f480232

Uploaded At: April 05, 2024

IRB

Institutional Review Boards (IRBs)

IRB Name
University of Michigan's Health Sciences and Behavioral Sciences Institutional Review Board (IRB-HBS)
IRB Approval Date
2018-06-12
IRB Approval Number
HUM00146579
IRB Name
Maastricht University's Ethical Review Committee Inner City Faculties (ERCIC)
IRB Approval Date
2022-05-30
IRB Approval Number
ERCIC_350_02_05_2022

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Intervention

Is the intervention completed?
No
Data Collection Complete
Data Publication

Data Publication

Is public data available?
No

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