Does Competition Affect an Individual’s Willingness to Sabotage?

Last registered on April 26, 2024

Pre-Trial

Trial Information

General Information

Title
Does Competition Affect an Individual’s Willingness to Sabotage?
RCT ID
AEARCTR-0013316
Initial registration date
April 07, 2024

Initial registration date is when the trial was registered.

It corresponds to when the registration was submitted to the Registry to be reviewed for publication.

First published
April 16, 2024, 1:03 PM EDT

First published corresponds to when the trial was first made public on the Registry after being reviewed.

Last updated
April 26, 2024, 3:00 PM EDT

Last updated is the most recent time when changes to the trial's registration were published.

Locations

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Primary Investigator

Affiliation
Cornell University

Other Primary Investigator(s)

Additional Trial Information

Status
In development
Start date
2024-04-08
End date
2024-05-07
Secondary IDs
Prior work
This trial does not extend or rely on any prior RCTs.
Abstract
Competitions, or competitive incentives, have been shown, and are used in various real-world settings, to induce higher productivity and output. At the same time, in settings where individuals are able to affect the productivity or output of others, competition can also lead to individuals sabotaging one another. There are two main reasons as to why individuals sabotage when engaged in a competition. First, competition ties one’s payoff (e.g., earnings) to relative performance. This introduces a monetary incentive to sabotage others as it allows one to increase their likelihood of achieving a better relative performance and hence, a higher payoff. Second, being engaged in a competition alters an individual’s psyche and puts them in a competitive state of mind. This might in turn increase their willingness to hurt others in order to benefit themselves (i.e., their willingness to sabotage others to increase their potential payoff). The purpose of this project is to parse these two mechanisms and establish the latter which, to the best of my knowledge, has not been focused on in the literature on competition and sabotage. By utilising a lab experiment and randomising participants to see different compensation schemes which are designed to have the same monetary incentive to sabotage others but differ in the degree to which they trigger a sense of competition, this project aims to investigate whether individuals engage in sabotage differently across these different compensation schemes despite having the same underlying monetary incentive to do so.
External Link(s)

Registration Citation

Citation
Teh, Adelson. 2024. "Does Competition Affect an Individual’s Willingness to Sabotage?." AEA RCT Registry. April 26. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.13316-1.1
Experimental Details

Interventions

Intervention(s)
Participants will be asked to consider 4 different workplace payment schemes. They will need to think about and decide how they might behave (which includes potentially making decisions) as a worker under each of these payment schemes.

One of these 4 payment schemes will then be randomly selected and implemented. They will be asked to do a job under the selected payment scheme. Their final payment will depend on the selected payment scheme, and their performance on the job.

Intervention: Different participants will potentially see a different set of workplace payment schemes.
Intervention Start Date
2024-04-08
Intervention End Date
2024-05-07

Primary Outcomes

Primary Outcomes (end points)
- Whether participants sabotage. [Binary variable (0/1)]

- Extent to which participants sabotage. [Discrete variable (0 - 5)]

Note: This study considers 2 types of sabotage and so there are 4 primary outcome variables (2 of each of the above). Please refer to/request for the Pre-Analysis Plan for more details.
Primary Outcomes (explanation)

Secondary Outcomes

Secondary Outcomes (end points)
- Perceived benefit of sabotaging [Discrete variable (0 - 10)]

- Perceived cost of sabotaging [Discrete variable (0 - 10)]

Note: This study considers 2 types of sabotage and so there are 2 measures for each of the above. Please refer to/request for the Pre-Analysis Plan for more details.

- Happiness/Well-being [Discrete variable (0 - 10)]
Secondary Outcomes (explanation)
- Concern for others & Desire to win -- open-ended responses will be put through a simple word-counter/word-cloud, as well as a large language model (e.g., ChatGPT) to extract key themes participants were thinking about.

Experimental Design

Experimental Design
Participants will be asked to consider 4 different workplace payment schemes. They will need to think about and decide how they might behave (which includes potentially making decisions) as a worker under each of these payment schemes.

One of these 4 payment schemes will then be randomly selected and implemented. They will be asked to do a job under the selected payment scheme. Their final payment will depend on the selected payment scheme, and their performance on the job.
Experimental Design Details
Not available
Randomization Method
Intervention/treatment pre-assigned to each study session. Participants will have no knowledge of which intervention/treatment they will be part of when signing up for a study session.
Randomization Unit
Intervention/treatment is randomised across study sessions.
Was the treatment clustered?
Yes

Experiment Characteristics

Sample size: planned number of clusters
(At least) 30 study sessions. (Depends on how many participants sign up for each session (max 20) and whether the planned sample size by treatment arms is achieved)
Sample size: planned number of observations
(At least) 300 participants. Note: 300 is the lab's estimate of the average number of participants a study gets. That said, the plan is to attempt to get as many participants as possible.
Sample size (or number of clusters) by treatment arms
(At least) 150 participants in each of the two treatments, with (at least) 75 female-identifying and 75 male-identifying participants in each treatment.
Minimum detectable effect size for main outcomes (accounting for sample design and clustering)
- 0.169 difference in likelihood of sabotaging (sd = 0.52) - 0.701 difference in level of sabotage (sd = 2.16) - 0.415 difference in effect on likelihood of sabotaging between males and females (sd = 0.9) - 1.557 difference in effect of Competitive on level of sabotage between males and females (sd = 3.38) Please refer to/request for the Pre-Analysis Plan for more details.
IRB

Institutional Review Boards (IRBs)

IRB Name
Cornell Office of Research Integrity and Assurance
IRB Approval Date
2024-01-12
IRB Approval Number
IRB0148210
Analysis Plan

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