The timing of payment

Last registered on April 25, 2024

Pre-Trial

Trial Information

General Information

Title
The timing of payment
RCT ID
AEARCTR-0013339
Initial registration date
April 18, 2024

Initial registration date is when the trial was registered.

It corresponds to when the registration was submitted to the Registry to be reviewed for publication.

First published
April 25, 2024, 11:52 AM EDT

First published corresponds to when the trial was first made public on the Registry after being reviewed.

Locations

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Primary Investigator

Affiliation
Nankai University

Other Primary Investigator(s)

PI Affiliation
Nankai University

Additional Trial Information

Status
On going
Start date
2023-09-01
End date
2025-12-31
Secondary IDs
Prior work
This trial does not extend or rely on any prior RCTs.
Abstract
We aim at exploring the effects of the timing of payment on employees’ behaviour in an employer-employee relationship and its mechanisms.
External Link(s)

Registration Citation

Citation
Meng, Jingyi and Feng Zhu. 2024. "The timing of payment." AEA RCT Registry. April 25. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.13339-1.0
Experimental Details

Interventions

Intervention(s)
Intervention Start Date
2024-04-02
Intervention End Date
2024-04-19

Primary Outcomes

Primary Outcomes (end points)
Research questions
• Research question #1: Does the timing of payment affect agents’ task performance?
o Hypotheses 1: Middle payment generates the highest performance as it invoke reciprocity from trust behaviour and prevent the decay of effort at the decaying time.
o Hypotheses 2: Begin payment generate higher payment than the end payment as it invoke the reciprocity from the trust behaviour.
o Hypotheses 3: Middle payment perform better than begin payment as it invoke the reciprocity from the trust behaviour and prevent the effort decay.

• Research question #2: What are the emotional mechanisms during this process?
o Hypotheses 1: The early payment (begin ore middle) invokes positive emotions of reciprocity.
 We look at these positive emotions: happiness, satisfaction, gratitude.
o Hypotheses 2: The middle payment invokes decreasing negative emotions that generated from the tiredness and boredom that causes the effort decay.
 We look at these positive emotions: boredom, tiredness.
o Hypotheses 3: The emotional mechanism for reciprocity are positive emotions rather than negative emotions like guilty or stressful
 We look at these negative emotions: guilty, stressful.
o Hypotheses 4: The pure emotional treatment will not perform as good as the emotion generated from the payment.
 This will be done by the between-subject analyses of the emotion treatments and the payment treatments.

• Research question #3: Reciprocity decays over time.
o Hypotheses 1: Participation of the end group for the voluntary work is higher than both begin and middle payment groups.
 This is measured by a 3 minutes voluntary work of the agent.

• Research question #4: Heterogeneous treatment effects.
o Hypotheses 1: Time preference doesn’t affect the results.
o Hypotheses 2: Social preference may exhibit heterogeneous treatment effects.
Estimation methodology
• Unit(s) of analysis
- We perform between-subjects analysis. Analysis will be at the individual level.
• Major outcome variable: agents task performance
- Overall
- Two Parts of the Formal Task Phase
- Minute-level performance overtime
• Major independent variables: treatment group
• Secondary independent variables: emotion variables
• Control variables: demographic variables, familiarity with the principal, mood and tiredness before coming to the experiment, Big 5 personality
• Heterogeneous treatment effect variables: time preference and social preference.
Primary Outcomes (explanation)

Secondary Outcomes

Secondary Outcomes (end points)
• Major independent variables: treatment effect
• Secondary independent variables: emotion variables
• Control variables: demographic variables, familiarity with the principal, mood and tiredness before coming to the experiment, Big 5 personality
• Heterogeneous treatment effect variables: time preference and social preference
Secondary Outcomes (explanation)

Experimental Design

Experimental Design
Lab experiment. Real-effort slider task.
Experimental Design Details
Not available
Randomization Method
Randomization
1. Students who signed up for the experiment are randomly allocated to each experimental session by our research assistant.
2. Before each experimental session begins, students randomly pick a card from a deck of folded cards on which show their seat number. The participant with Seat Number 1 takes the role of the employer, while the rest of the participants take the role of employees.
3. By the end of each experimental session, the random selection of the participants to be paid and incentivized question in questionnaire part is done by the computer.
Randomization Unit
experimental sessions
Was the treatment clustered?
Yes

Experiment Characteristics

Sample size: planned number of clusters
11 sessions (1 pilot session and 10 experimental sessions)
Sample size: planned number of observations
26 for the pilot session, about 270 for formal experimental sessions
Sample size (or number of clusters) by treatment arms
5 treatments, 54 participants for each treatment
Minimum detectable effect size for main outcomes (accounting for sample design and clustering)
IRB

Institutional Review Boards (IRBs)

IRB Name
IRB Approval Date
IRB Approval Number
Analysis Plan

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