Repeated vs Dynamic Contests

Last registered on April 26, 2024

Pre-Trial

Trial Information

General Information

Title
Repeated vs Dynamic Contests
RCT ID
AEARCTR-0013351
Initial registration date
April 22, 2024

Initial registration date is when the trial was registered.

It corresponds to when the registration was submitted to the Registry to be reviewed for publication.

First published
April 26, 2024, 12:03 PM EDT

First published corresponds to when the trial was first made public on the Registry after being reviewed.

Locations

There is information in this trial unavailable to the public. Use the button below to request access.

Request Information

Primary Investigator

Affiliation
National University of Singapore

Other Primary Investigator(s)

PI Affiliation

Additional Trial Information

Status
In development
Start date
2024-04-25
End date
2024-12-01
Secondary IDs
Prior work
This trial does not extend or rely on any prior RCTs.
Abstract
This study focuses on a managerial question: when agents are competing across multiple periods, should managers reward the winners based on accumulative performance across periods with a larger prize (i.e., dynamic contest) or reward winners of each period with a smaller prize (i.e., repeated contest), to elicit higher effort? The standard economic theory would predict that the dynamic contest is optimal if agents only care about the prize they receive. However, based on evidence from the behavioral economics literature, we suggest that if managers can successfully create a social environment where the effects of certain psychological drivers of behavior become more salient, they could expect higher effort from agents in the repeated contest.
External Link(s)

Registration Citation

Citation
Hua, Chen and Wencong LI. 2024. "Repeated vs Dynamic Contests." AEA RCT Registry. April 26. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.13351-1.0
Experimental Details

Interventions

Intervention(s)
Intervention Start Date
2024-04-25
Intervention End Date
2024-12-01

Primary Outcomes

Primary Outcomes (end points)
The choices of contest number: In a contest where subjects compete to choose a number between 0 and 100, each choice incurs a decision cost. Subjects aim to select a number that will be higher than their opponent's choice to win.
Primary Outcomes (explanation)

Secondary Outcomes

Secondary Outcomes (end points)
Secondary Outcomes (explanation)

Experimental Design

Experimental Design
In this decision-making experiment, the subjects will participate in 2-player economic games. The payments will be calculated in the Experimental Currency Unit (ECU). We will implement two treatment conditions, that is, Dynamic Contest and Repeated Contest. Each subject will be only allocated to one of these two treatments.

In each session, there will be 5 contests in total and the subjects will be randomly, independently, and anonymously rematched with another subject in their session. Each contest consists of 2 rounds. The task in each round is to select a number ranging from 0 to 100, with a decision cost ranging from ECU 0 to ECU 2.85 (cost table attached). In each round, the computer will generate a random number ranging from –50 to 50, This number is added to the subject’s decision number to determine their final number. The final number is calculated as follows:

Final Number = Decision Number + Random Number

In Dynamic Contest, we will rank the two subjects according to the sum of their final numbers from two rounds (from highest to lowest). The member who is ranked 1st will win the contest, while the member ranked 2nd will lose the contest. After subjects complete each contest, they will announce aloud publicly whether they win or lose (“Win” or “Lose”). The winner will get a prize of ECU 6, while the loser will get a prize of ECU 2. Thus, the subject will get a cash earning of the prize minus the decision costs in each contest. Subjects’ total cash earnings will be the sum of the cash earnings across the 5 contests.

In Repeated Contest, we will rank the two subjects according to their final numbers in each round (from highest to lowest). The member who is ranked 1st will win the round in this contest, while the member ranked 2nd will lose the round in this contest. After subjects complete each contest, they will announce aloud publicly whether they win or lose and for how many times (“Win twice”, “Win once”, or “Lose once”). The winner will get a prize of ECU 3 while the loser will get a prize of ECU 1. Thus, the subject will get a cash earning of the prize minus the decision costs in each round of the contest. Subjects’ total cash earnings will be the sum of the cash earnings across 10 rounds from the 5 contests.

At the end of the session, each subject's earned ECU will be redeemed and converted to SGD with the exchange rate of 1 ECU =1.5 SGD. Additionally, all participants receive an SGD 5 show-up fee. If the earnings from the experiment are negative, their payment will be 0. This does not affect the show-up fee. Hence, the overall payment from the experiment is never less than the show-up fee of SGD 5.

After subjects complete the contests, they fill in a simple questionnaire with a few questions asking them to reflect their decisions during the experiment. No personal or identification information will be collected.
Experimental Design Details
Not available
Randomization Method
Randomization of contest format and subject pair order is implemented by z-Tree.
Randomization Unit
Individual
Was the treatment clustered?
No

Experiment Characteristics

Sample size: planned number of clusters
120 subjects
Sample size: planned number of observations
600 (60 subjects × 5 games × 2 rounds) decisions in Dynamic Contest; 600 (60 subjects × 5 games × 2 rounds) decisions in Repeated Contest.
Sample size (or number of clusters) by treatment arms
60 subjects in Dynamic Contest;
60 subjects in Repeated Contest.
Minimum detectable effect size for main outcomes (accounting for sample design and clustering)
IRB

Institutional Review Boards (IRBs)

IRB Name
Department of Economics Departmental Ethics Review Committee, National University of Singapore
IRB Approval Date
2024-04-01
IRB Approval Number
N/A