Entitlement and Corruption: An Experiment

Last registered on May 01, 2024
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Pre-Trial

Trial Information

General Information

Title
Entitlement and Corruption: An Experiment
RCT ID
AEARCTR-0013403
Initial registration date
April 20, 2024

Initial registration date is when the trial was registered.

It corresponds to when the registration was submitted to the Registry to be reviewed for publication.

First published
May 01, 2024, 1:31 PM EDT

First published corresponds to when the trial was first made public on the Registry after being reviewed.

Locations

Country
China
Region

Primary Investigator

Name
Dexuan Zhang
Affiliation
Hong Kong University of Science and Technology（GuangZhou）
Contact Primary Investigator

Other Primary Investigator(s)

Additional Trial Information

Status
On going
Start date
2024-04-20
End date
2024-05-12
Keywords
Behavior
Additional Keywords
JEL code(s)
Secondary IDs
Prior work
This trial does not extend or rely on any prior RCTs.
Abstract
We experimentally examine how the selection process of public officials (POs) impacts their corrupt activities via a fostered sense of entitlement. We propose that entitlement effects vary with the selection method, with ability-based selections possibly height- ening corruption, while prosociality-based ones might mitigate it. Our experimental design entails a two-stage process where the first stage involves an ability contest and a prosociality contest. The second stage is a bribery game where citizens in each group compete for a prize and can bribe the PO in charge. We control the sense of enti- tlement and its source by whether or not announcing which contest determines the appointment of POs. We analyze how various selection methods shape bribery and corruption through the lens of social norms, moral costs, and greed. Our findings offer insights into the relationship between public sector recruitment policies and integrity in governance.
External Link(s)

Registration Citation

Citation
Zhang, Dexuan. 2024. "Entitlement and Corruption: An Experiment." AEA RCT Registry. May 01. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.13403-1.0
Sponsors & Partners
Experimental Details

Interventions

Intervention(s)
Intervention Start Date
2024-04-21
Intervention End Date
2024-05-12

Primary Outcomes

Primary Outcomes (end points)
Subjects' decisions in a bribery game.
Primary Outcomes (explanation)
We adopt the bribery game proposed by Gneezy et al. (2019) to study decisions about bribery and corruption.

Secondary Outcomes

Secondary Outcomes (end points)
Secondary Outcomes (explanation)

Experimental Design

Experimental Design
We experimentally examine how the selection process of public officials (POs) impacts their corrupt activities via a fostered sense of entitlement. We propose that entitlement effects vary with the selection method, with ability-based selections possibly heightening corruption, while prosociality-based ones might mitigate it. Our experimental design entails a two-stage process where the first stage involves an ability contest of general knowledge and a prosociality contest of public goods game contribution. The second stage is a three-person bribery game where two citizens in each group compete for a prize and can bribe the PO in charge. We control the sense of entitlement and its source by whether or not announcing which contest determines the appointment of POs. Based on the information condition and the PO selection rule, we have a 2x2 between-subject design: unknown-ability contest (UAC), unknown moral contest (UMC), known ability contest (KAC), and known moral contest (KMC).
Experimental Design Details
Randomization Method
We have four treatment groups, a 2x2 between-subject design: unknown-ability contest (UAC), unknown moral contest (UMC), known ability contest (KAC), and known moral contest (KMC). All four groups of subjects were recruited from the sample pool of undergraduate students in a Chinese university and entered into different sessions. The treatment for each session was randomly determined by a computer. More specifically, we published the experimental recruitment of our different sessions in the test library, and the subjects freely chose to participate in a certain session, and the recruitment information of these sessions did not contain any other information except the experiment time.
Randomization Unit
Experimental sessions.
Was the treatment clustered?
Yes

Experiment Characteristics

Sample size: planned number of clusters
12 sessions
Sample size: planned number of observations
576 subjects
Sample size (or number of clusters) by treatment arms
48 subjects per session, 3 sessions per treatment
Minimum detectable effect size for main outcomes (accounting for sample design and clustering)
Supporting Documents and Materials
IRB

Institutional Review Boards (IRBs)

IRB Name
The Hong Kong University of Science and Technology (Guangzhou)
IRB Approval Date
2024-04-03
IRB Approval Number
HKUST(GZ)-HSP-2024-0022
Analysis Plan

Post-Trial

Post Trial Information

Study Withdrawal

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Intervention

Is the intervention completed?
No
Data Collection Complete
Data Publication

Data Publication

Is public data available?
No

Program Files

Program Files
Reports, Papers & Other Materials

Relevant Paper(s)

Reports & Other Materials