Do markets blunt identity?

Participants are recruited to participate in an online experiment in sets of prefectures in Fujian Province (SE China). These regions differ in their history of market integration. Participants play two standard games (Trust Game and Money Burning Game) after being randomly allocated to one of three conditions: primed to think about their membership in a natural group (language), primed to think about their membership in a minimal group (symbols) and not primed to think about their identity. Participants are then randomly matched with others who share the same or different group membership.

As in other studies of the importance of culture, we do not randomly assign participants to treatment (ie, well-integrated rice markets at the time of the Qing dynasty). In order to approximate the conditions of a natural experiment, we select study areas that ensure i) that the areas would exhibit large differences in terms of historical grain market integration, while ii) being similar in many ways, including but not limited to having a shared history, national government, ethnicity, and religion. Based on these criteria, we selected five prefectures in Fujian Province, in the south-eastern coast of China, which are classified into two groups, based on differences in historical levels of grain market integration:
• Prefectural Group 1 (Putian, Quanzhou, Xiamen) – prefectures that were historically exposed to a HIGH level of market integration;
• Prefectural Group 2 (Longyan, Zhangzhou) – prefectures that were historically exposed to a LOW level of market integration.
All recruited participants in this study are born and raised in the prefecture where they currently live and we collect information on whether parents were born in the same prefecture. The absence of population movement by respondents, and data on the same variable from their parents, allow us to establish a stronger link between the effect of historical experience and contemporaneous attitudes.
Exposure to market integration: We measure the effect of exposure to a history of well functioning markets on the strength of identity on decisions in two behavioural games among a sample of 900 respondents, equally split between the two prefecture groups described above. Participants have previously signed up to participate in market research panels managed by Pure Profile. After being provided with information about the survey, including the explanatory statement and consent form, participants eligibility is determined through their answer to a set of questions designed to meet the following criteria: being an adult (18+ years old), living in one of the selected prefectures, being born in the prefecture where they currently live, and speaking a local dialect.
Priming identity: Once eligibility is determined, participants in each of the two levels of market integration (high and low) are randomly assigned to three equal sized groups that differ in the type of primed group identities: (1) the Minimal-group Paradigm (meaningless symbol – triangle/circle), (2) Natural Group Identity (dialect) or (3) No Group Identity. They are then asked to make decisions in the context of the Trust Game (Berg, Dickhaut and McCabe, 1995) and Money Burning Game (Abbink and Sadrieh, 2009). Participants with No Group Identity are only told their partners are anonymous participants. Participants allocated to either the minimal group or the natural group identities play these games twice, once with a match with a shared identity and once with a match with a different identity, with the order in which each scenario is presented being randomly chosen.

2024-05-10

2024-06-07

Decisions in the Trust Game (amount sent as initiator and as recipient) and the Money Burning Game (money burned), in two situations: when partner's identity is the same as the participant and when it is different.

Taking advantage of random allocation of the identity of the match, the comparison between participants who are randomly primed to think about their identity (language group or artificial group) and those who are not (no identity) allows us to decompose average differences in decisions in both games into estimates of the importance of in-group bias or out-group bias. As a secondary outcome, we also include survey questions about characteristics of (un)desired neighbors, identical to questions used in the World Values Survey. We sum the number of identity groups that are not desired as neighbors (other race, other religion, migrants, speak other language, homosexuals) as an overall measure of prejudice.

The total number of participants is equally split between the two groups of prefectures, that also share the structure of experimental session (N=2 x 450 participants). Within each prefecture group, participants are randomly allocated to one of three situations: priming of minimal identity, priming of natural identity and no priming of identity.

Randomization done at time of participation in online experiment by a computer

Individual level

No

N/A

900 participants, over 18 years old, born and living in one of 5 prefectures in Fujian, who also speak a local dialect.

N/A

Outcomes are measured in Yuan. Trust Game – Amount sent (sender): MDES = 0.239 Trust Game – Amount sent (receiver): MDES = 0.546 Money Burning Game – Amount burned: MDES = 0.286 Prejudice (survey measure): MDES = 0.107