Abstract
Reforms that rely on private providers to deliver care are premised on the notions that the effect of market competition will increase efficiency, quality and responsiveness to consumers. However, insights from economic theory provide a more nuanced vision and in particular highlight the importance of considering the responsiveness of the demand side to quality. In settings where quality of services may be difficult to judge by consumers, such as healthcare markets, it is a widely held belief that giving information about provider quality may support and improve the responsiveness of the demand, and therefore the allocative efficiency of the market. Yet there is hardly any evidence of responsiveness of the demand to information and quality in healthcare markets in low- and middle-income settings.
This project will provide experimental evidence on whether the demand for healthcare services is responsive to quality. To test this, we will provide information on quality of providers to parents who have free access to a small network of private providers for their children's care, and observe their choice of providers over a two-month period. Other outcomes will include beliefs about provider quality and willingness-to-pay for a consultation at a top-quality provider.