Primary Outcomes (end points)
We will first document changes in beliefs about inequality and anti-sectarian views (first-stage) and to what extent incorrect beliefs vary based on four factors emphasized in the literature: (i) exposure to sectarian rhetoric proxied by self-reported exposure to sectarian media outlets3, (ii) income level and dependence on clientelism to meet basic needs, (iii) network diversity proxied by the quantity and quality of intergroup contact (Lebow et al. 2023; Breza et al. 2020). We will then test whether correcting misperceptions can: (1) increase social
cohesion and solidarity between low-income households belonging to different religious sects using self-reported attitudes towards outgroups including intergroup trust, comfort in living in mixed neighborhoods, willingness to interact and work with outgroup members; comfort with having a relative marrying outgroup members; (2) increase the salience of class identity and national identity and decrease the salience of religious identity; (3) increase support for redistribution and pro-poor policies (e.g., minimum wage, national poverty targeting program, income tax rates, and flat capital income rate) and tax morale; (4) decreases support for sectarian institutions and policies. Our outcomes will mostly be measured using survey data following the relevant literature (Okunogbe 2018; Blouin and Mukand 2019; Depetris-Chauvin et al. 2020; Mousa 2020; Alesina et al. 2021; Hoy 2023). However, we plan to measure (4) using survey-based measures of attitudes (e.g., attitudes toward sectarian politics and acceptability of voting for politicians from other religious groups) and direct behavioral measures, including participation to meetings to learn about alternative political candidates and concrete actions citizens can take to oppose sectarianism.