Leadership in Dishonesty - Theory and Experiment

Last registered on June 24, 2024

Pre-Trial

Trial Information

General Information

Title
Leadership in Dishonesty - Theory and Experiment
RCT ID
AEARCTR-0013739
Initial registration date
June 04, 2024

Initial registration date is when the trial was registered.

It corresponds to when the registration was submitted to the Registry to be reviewed for publication.

First published
June 24, 2024, 12:08 PM EDT

First published corresponds to when the trial was first made public on the Registry after being reviewed.

Locations

There is information in this trial unavailable to the public. Use the button below to request access.

Request Information

Primary Investigator

Affiliation
Trier University

Other Primary Investigator(s)

PI Affiliation
Victoria University of Wellington
PI Affiliation
University of Innsbruck

Additional Trial Information

Status
In development
Start date
2024-06-10
End date
2024-12-31
Secondary IDs
Prior work
This trial does not extend or rely on any prior RCTs.
Abstract
We develop a behavioral game theoretical model to analyze the impact of self-selection in a sequential game where the participants can lie about the outcome of a binary lottery. The participants are paired in groups of two, and both members of the group observe the same outcome of the lottery. The outcome of the lottery is either low or high. Regardless of the outcome of the lottery, both group members receive the high outcome if and only if both of them report HIGH. The two members report sequentially, and the second mover (SM) observers the report of the first mover (FM) before making their report. In our model, we assume that participants care about their own monetary payoff and face type-specific lying costs which are private information.
In our model, we consider two settings that we refer to as EXOGENOUS and ENDOGENOUS. In EXOGENOUS, each group member is assigned to the role of the FM with 50% probability. Our model predicts that (i) the members of the group report HIGH in case of a low outcome if and only if their lying costs are below a certain threshold, and (ii) that the threshold is higher for SMs, i.e. that, for any given distribution of lying costs, the lying probability of SMs after HIGH by FMs is higher than the lying probability of FMs.
In ENDOGENOUS, one of the two group members is assigned, with 50% probability, to the role of the principal and the other group member to the role of the agent. The principal can decide between the role of FM and SM. The agent is informed that the principal decides on the order of moves. Our theoretical model provides three insights on the self-selection of principals: Principals with low lying costs self-select to the role of FM and report HIGH. Principals with intermediate lying costs self-select to the role of SM and report HIGH after HIGH by the FM. Principals with high lying costs are indifferent between the roles of FM and SM and report LOW in any case.
Our main research question is how the endogeneity of the order of moves influences the overall frequency of two HIGH reports in case the outcome of the lottery is LOW (that is, the frequency of unjustified high prizes). The model shows that this depends on how those principals with high lying costs who are indifferent between the roles of FM and SM.
Our experimental design follows closely the model (see the “Intervention” below for details).
External Link(s)

Registration Citation

Citation
Feess, Eberhard, Florian Kerzenmacher and Thomas Schilling. 2024. "Leadership in Dishonesty - Theory and Experiment." AEA RCT Registry. June 24. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.13739-1.0
Experimental Details

Interventions

Intervention(s)
Online experiment. Between-participant design. The experiment consists of two parts. Each of the two parts is paid out with a probability of 50%.
Part I:
Participants are randomly assigned to groups of two. Both group members observe the same outcome of a lottery, which can be high or low. The group members report sequentially and receive the high prize if and only if both of them report HIGH. The second mover (SM) is informed about the report of the first mover (FM) before their own report. The outcome of the lottery is high with a probability of 25%. The high prize is £1.50 and the low prize is £0.05. The outcome of the lottery is observable to the experimenter. There are two treatments:
In treatment EXOGENOUS, participants are randomly assigned to the roles of FM or SM. For the participants’ reports, we apply the strategy method by asking participants for their report in case they are assigned to the role of FM and SM.
In treatment ENDOGENOUS, one randomly chosen participant (the “principal”) decides on the order of the reports. The other group member (the “agent”) is informed that the principal decided on the order of the two reports. Principals are first asked to choose between FM and SM, and then for their report. We apply a softer form of the strategy method for principals, as their answers for the role they know that they do not choose anyway are meaningless. However, if they decide to be SM, we ask them for their decision in case the agent as FM reported HIGH. For agents, however, we apply the strategy method by asking participants for their report in case they are assigned to the role of FM and SM.

Part II.
Participants are not paired. They take part in the same lottery where the outcome is high with a probability of 25%. Again, the high prize is £1.50 and the low prize is £0.05. The outcome of the lottery is observable to the experimenter. Each participant receives the high prize if and only if they report HIGH.

The study will be conducted on Prolific. We restrict the sample to participants whose country of residence is either the USA or UK, who have at least 500 approved assignments, and whose submissions have been approved in at least 95% of the cases. We impose these restrictions to ensure a high data quality.

After the actual experiment we ask participants for their willingness to take risks on a scale from 0-10, and for their beliefs about the behavior of other participants.
Intervention Start Date
2024-06-10
Intervention End Date
2024-06-30

Primary Outcomes

Primary Outcomes (end points)
All our outcomes relate to the case when the outcome of the lottery is low. We test the following predictions and hypotheses. “Predictions” refer to Propositions from our model, while “Hypotheses” are explorative.
Prediction 1a: In treatment EXOGENOUS, the likelihood that participants report HIGH is lower for participants who reported LOW in Part II of the experiment.
Prediction 1b: In treatment ENDOGENOUS, the likelihood that participants report HIGH is lower for participants who reported LOW in Part II of the experiment.
Prediction 1c: Considering both treatments together, the likelihood that participants report HIGH is lower for participants who reported LOW in Part II of the experiment.
Prediction 2: In treatment EXOGENOUS, the likelihood that participants report HIGH as FM is lower than the likelihood that they report HIGH as SM after HIGH by FM.
Prediction 3a: In treatment ENDOGENOUS, the likelihood that a principal self-selects to FM is lower for participants who reported LOW in Part II of the experiment when we neglect principals who self-select to FM and report LOW.
Hypothesis 3b: In treatment ENDOGENOUS, the likelihood that a principal self-selects to FM is lower for participants who reported LOW in Part II of the experiment.
Prediction 4a: The likelihood of two HIGH reports is higher in treatment ENDOGENOUS than in EXOGENOUS when we neglect principals who self-select to FM and report LOW.
Hypothesis 4b: The likelihood of two HIGH reports is higher in treatment ENDOGENOUS than in EXOGENOUS. (Note: If H4b is supported by the data, this implies that H4a is supported as well. We nevertheless need both hypotheses, as it may be that only H4a is supported by the data).

We test our predictions and hypotheses both non-parametrically and with regression analyses. In regressions, we control for age, gender, self-reported willingness to take risks, and the answers to the relevant belief questions.
Primary Outcomes (explanation)

Secondary Outcomes

Secondary Outcomes (end points)
Impact of the aforementioned control variables.
Secondary Outcomes (explanation)

Experimental Design

Experimental Design
See description of the intervention.
Experimental Design Details
Not available
Randomization Method
Computer (online experiment)
Randomization Unit
Experimental session for the treatment and individual for the specific role
Was the treatment clustered?
No

Experiment Characteristics

Sample size: planned number of clusters
900
Sample size: planned number of observations
900
Sample size (or number of clusters) by treatment arms
100 paricipants in treatment EXOGENOUS, 400 participants in treatment ENDOGENOUS PRINCIPALS, 400 participants in treatment ENDOGENOUS AGENTS
Minimum detectable effect size for main outcomes (accounting for sample design and clustering)
For our minimum number of observations, we focus on Hypothesis 4b, that is, on the comparison of two HIGH reports in EXOGENOUS and ENDOGENOUS. In a pilot study with 409 participants, we found that, in 21.6% of cases both group members reported HIGH in EXOGENOUS compared to 38.9% in ENDOGENOUS. Assuming we can replicate this effect, we would need observations from at least 485 groups according to a two-tailed Fisher exact test with 5% error probability, 90% power and a 4/1 allocation ratio of ENDOGENOUS/EXOGENOUS (as some of our predictions exclude observations from ENDOGENOUS and we do not know the number of principals selecting into FM/SM, we aim to collect more observations in this treatment). Rounding up, this translates to 100 participants in EXOGENOUS (forming 100 groups) and 800 participants in ENDOGENOUS (400 principals and 400 agents forming 400 groups).
Supporting Documents and Materials

Documents

Document Name
Ethics approval
Document Type
irb_protocol
Document Description
File
Ethics approval

MD5: 3c977b48e90d9d17a9be184b8dfbb65f

SHA1: 6326cb9331fe198030f9f4afe3069f8c32f08dfd

Uploaded At: June 04, 2024

IRB

Institutional Review Boards (IRBs)

IRB Name
University of Innsbruck
IRB Approval Date
2023-09-21
IRB Approval Number
84/2023