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Field
Trial Title
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Before
Social norms and diversification: evidence from Central and Northern Kenya
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After
Understanding barriers to diversification in response to climate change: evidence from Central and Northern Kenya
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Abstract
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Before
I study how social norms influence diversification among pastoralists in Central and Northern Kenya.
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After
I study barriers to diversification in response to climate change among pastoralists in Central and Northern Kenya.
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Last Published
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August 29, 2024 05:33 AM
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After
August 29, 2024 05:51 AM
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Primary Outcomes (End Points)
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Before
(i) preferences in the incentivized lottery experiment (traditional asset vs. alternative, as a binary variable), and impact of public treatment on preference,
(ii) difference between own choice and beliefs, both alone and in visibility vs. private treatment,
(iii) choice and wtp to change to the alternative under two alternative visibility conditions (‘conformity’ and ‘public win’)
Survey section:
(iv) adaptation and portfolio diversification choices – heterogeneity based on intensity of exposure to climate shocks and elicited beliefs,
The specification to understand treatment effects for the visibility treatment may include controls, for instance for gender. Randomization balance will be checked.
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After
(i) preferences in the incentivized lottery experiment (as a binary variable, livestock vs. other option), and impact of public treatment on preference,
(ii) difference between own choice and beliefs, both alone and in visibility vs. private treatment,
(iii) choice and wtp to change to the alternative under two alternative visibility conditions (‘conformity’ and ‘public win’)
Survey section:
(iv) adaptation and portfolio diversification choices – heterogeneity based on intensity of exposure to climate shocks and elicited beliefs,
The specification to understand treatment effects for the visibility treatment may include controls, for instance for gender. Randomization balance will be checked.
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Experimental Design (Public)
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Before
The experiment assigns individuals to make an incentivized preference statement under alternative visibility conditions in order to elicit peer pressure in the choice between two alternative assets. Around half of the participants are randomly assigned to a public treatment condition where their choice is shown to others. After the choice, they are asked questions about alternative visibility conditions which exploit the timing of the choice (to understand conformity) and where further aspects of the choice would be revealed (lottery win).
The experiment is complemented by a detailed survey on adaptation measures and diversification margins, beliefs, and social norms.
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After
The experiment assigns individuals to make an incentivized preference statement where they choose one of two assets under alternative visibility conditions. Around half of the participants are randomly assigned to a public treatment condition where their choice is shown to others. After the choice, they are asked questions about alternative visibility conditions which exploit the timing of the choice and the features of the choice that are made visible to others. The experiment is complemented by a detailed survey on adaptation measures and diversification margins, market behavior and transaction data, beliefs, and social norms.
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Secondary Outcomes (End Points)
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Before
(v) difference between private responses and perceptions of others elicited in Krupka & Weber (2013) style coordination game questions,
(vi) timing of livestock sales from transaction data (wet vs. dry season),
(vii) redistribution norms and in-group bias
(viii) beliefs – impact of recent season quality vs. intensity of drought exposure.
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After
(i) difference between private responses and perceptions of others elicited in Krupka & Weber (2013) style coordination game questions,
(ii) timing of livestock sales from transaction data (wet vs. dry season), coincidence with household expenditure times (e.g. school fees),
(iii) perception of prices in wet vs. dry seasons (difference with actual prices collected from market data),
(iv) beliefs about returns to alternative saving instruments and occupations,
(v) redistribution norms (types of assets) and in-group bias,
(vi) beliefs – impact of recent season quality vs. intensity of drought exposure.
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