Political Polarization and Labor Market Discrimination

Last registered on June 24, 2024
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Pre-Trial

Trial Information

General Information

Title
Political Polarization and Labor Market Discrimination
RCT ID
AEARCTR-0013763
Initial registration date
June 13, 2024

Initial registration date is when the trial was registered.

It corresponds to when the registration was submitted to the Registry to be reviewed for publication.

First published
June 24, 2024, 1:46 PM EDT

First published corresponds to when the trial was first made public on the Registry after being reviewed.

Locations

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Primary Investigator

Name
Martin Abel
Affiliation
Middlebury College
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Other Primary Investigator(s)

PI Name
Andrea Robbett
PI Affiliation
Middlebury College
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PI Name
Daniel Stone
PI Affiliation
Bowdoin College
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Additional Trial Information

Status
In development
Start date
2024-06-13
End date
2025-06-04
Keywords
Labor
Additional Keywords
JEL code(s)
Secondary IDs
Prior work
This trial does not extend or rely on any prior RCTs.
Abstract
We conduct an online experiment to test whether people discriminate based on workers' political affiliation. We will randomly vary worker characteristics and whether workers are receive a wage for being hired and measure how this affects employers' willingness to pay wages.
External Link(s)

Registration Citation

Citation
Abel, Martin, Andrea Robbett and Daniel Stone. 2024. "Political Polarization and Labor Market Discrimination." AEA RCT Registry. June 24. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.13763-1.0
Sponsors & Partners
Experimental Details

Interventions

Intervention(s)
Intervention Start Date
2024-06-14
Intervention End Date
2024-09-06

Primary Outcomes

Primary Outcomes (end points)
Employers' wage offer and productivity beliefs
Primary Outcomes (explanation)

Secondary Outcomes

Secondary Outcomes (end points)
Secondary Outcomes (explanation)

Experimental Design

Experimental Design
Participants act as employers and are presented with a total of 30 worker profiles. For varying tasks they are asked to state the maximum wage offer they would be willing to pay for each profile. Their compensation is linked to the actual productivity of workers.
We furthermore randomize whether worker are paid when being hired.
Experimental Design Details
Not available
Randomization Method
As part of Qualtrics.
Randomization Unit
Individual participant.
Was the treatment clustered?
No

Experiment Characteristics

Sample size: planned number of clusters
There are no clusters to be randomized.
Sample size: planned number of observations
Our target sample size is 1100 participants. Each participants will make 30 wage offer decisions.
Sample size (or number of clusters) by treatment arms
Participants are randomized in equal share to the worker bonus and control group.

In addition, we randomly assign participants to make wage offer decisions for two of the tasks (after everyone initially completes the main hiring task).
Minimum detectable effect size for main outcomes (accounting for sample design and clustering)
Supporting Documents and Materials
IRB

Institutional Review Boards (IRBs)

IRB Name
Middlebury College
IRB Approval Date
2024-05-14
IRB Approval Number
#340
Analysis Plan

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