Preferences and willingness to pay for climate policy mixes

Last registered on July 08, 2024
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Pre-Trial

Trial Information

General Information

Title
Preferences and willingness to pay for climate policy mixes
RCT ID
AEARCTR-0013909
Initial registration date
July 03, 2024

Initial registration date is when the trial was registered.

It corresponds to when the registration was submitted to the Registry to be reviewed for publication.

First published
July 08, 2024, 1:15 PM EDT

First published corresponds to when the trial was first made public on the Registry after being reviewed.

Locations

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Primary Investigator

Name
Karolina Rütten
Affiliation
Mercator Research Institute on Global Commons and Climate Change (MCC Berlin) and University of Potsdam
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Other Primary Investigator(s)

PI Name
Matthias Kalkuhl
PI Affiliation
Mercator Research Institute on Global Commons and Climate Change (MCC Berlin) and University of Potsdam
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PI Name
Maximilian Kellner
PI Affiliation
Mercator Research Institute on Global Commons and Climate Change (MCC Berlin)
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PI Name
Andreas Peichl
PI Affiliation
ifo Institute and LMU Munich
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PI Name
Lisa Windsteiger
PI Affiliation
University of Salzburg and ifo Institute
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Additional Trial Information

Status
In development
Start date
2024-07-04
End date
2025-07-04
Keywords
Behavior, Electoral, Environment & Energy, Welfare
Additional Keywords
Survey Experiment, Climate Policy, Public acceptance, Willingness to Pay, Pigouvian Pricing
JEL code(s)
H21, H23, H53, Q54, Q58
Secondary IDs
Prior work
This trial does not extend or rely on any prior RCTs.
Abstract
The experiment is designed to analyze the gap between public preferences and economically optimal environmental policy making. We confront respondents with the monetary cost induced by carbon pricing and and an alternative subsidy scheme. Given the low public acceptance of carbon pricing, we investigate whether preferences shift when the cost of subsidizing is made salient. A VAT increase is used to finance subsidy programs of varying efficiencies. If the preference for either instrument changes as costs are made salient, the experiment can provide an estimate of the public's additional willingness to pay for subsidies compared to Pigouvian pricing. The survey is conducted online in Germany and refers to examples from the housing sector to explain the carbon pricing mechanisms and the effect of subsidies.
External Link(s)

Registration Citation

Citation
Kalkuhl, Matthias et al. 2024. "Preferences and willingness to pay for climate policy mixes." AEA RCT Registry. July 08. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.13909-1.0
Sponsors & Partners

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Experimental Details

Interventions

Intervention(s)
We confront respondents with the monetary cost induced by carbon pricing and an alternative subsidy scheme. Respondents receive information about the inherent cost of subsidies in form of a VAT increase, which are usually not salient in public discussions about subsidy programs. To elicit the willingness to pay for subsidies, respondents are randomly assigned to a subsidy program with a high or low efficiency levels. The low efficiency group faces considerably higher VAT increases.
Intervention Start Date
2024-07-04
Intervention End Date
2024-08-04

Primary Outcomes

Primary Outcomes (end points)
Share of carbon pricing in Germany's climate policy mix, willingness to support the chosen policy mix in a referendum
Primary Outcomes (explanation)

Secondary Outcomes

Secondary Outcomes (end points)
Secondary Outcomes (explanation)

Experimental Design

Experimental Design
Information experiment which reveals non-salient policy costs to treated individuals; two levels of policy costs are randomly assigned to two treament groups to calculate Average Treatment Effects
Experimental Design Details
Not available
Randomization Method
Computer
Randomization Unit
Individual
Was the treatment clustered?
No

Experiment Characteristics

Sample size: planned number of clusters
Sample size of 3,000 individuals
Sample size: planned number of observations
Sample size of 3,000 individuals
Sample size (or number of clusters) by treatment arms
1,000 individuals per treatment
Minimum detectable effect size for main outcomes (accounting for sample design and clustering)
Supporting Documents and Materials
IRB

Institutional Review Boards (IRBs)

IRB Name
Ethics Commission, Department of Economics, University of Munich
IRB Approval Date
2024-02-27
IRB Approval Number
2024-03
Analysis Plan

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