Market Luck and Redistributive Preferences - France

Last registered on July 29, 2024
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Pre-Trial

Trial Information

General Information

Title
Market Luck and Redistributive Preferences - France
RCT ID
AEARCTR-0014009
Initial registration date
July 19, 2024

Initial registration date is when the trial was registered.

It corresponds to when the registration was submitted to the Registry to be reviewed for publication.

First published
July 29, 2024, 4:27 PM EDT

First published corresponds to when the trial was first made public on the Registry after being reviewed.

Locations

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Primary Investigator

Name
Jeffrey Yusof
Affiliation
Department of Economics, University of Zurich
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Other Primary Investigator(s)

PI Name
Simona Sartor
PI Affiliation
Department of Economics, University of Zurich
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Additional Trial Information

Status
In development
Start date
2024-07-19
End date
2024-12-31
Keywords
Behavior
Additional Keywords
inequality, redistribution, fairness
JEL code(s)
Secondary IDs
Prior work
This trial does not extend or rely on any prior RCTs.
Abstract
Structural transformations caused by globalization and technological change substantially alter the rewards for different skills in the labor market. The shift in the valuation of skills and the resulting skill-biased inequality are, therefore, often determined by external market forces, a phenomenon we refer to as market luck. In meritocratic societies, inequalities are typically considered justifiable only when they stem from individual effort and not from factors beyond an individual's control. This raises the question of whether individuals perceive inequalities arising from market luck as fair. To answer this question, we design an experiment where inequality between workers with different skills emerges because they are matched with a buyer who requires a specific skill. We collected data on redistributive choices from nearly 2,000 Americans. This study replicates the main experimental treatment with participants from an online sample in France.
External Link(s)

Registration Citation

Citation
Sartor, Simona and Jeffrey Yusof. 2024. "Market Luck and Redistributive Preferences - France." AEA RCT Registry. July 29. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.14009-1.0
Sponsors & Partners
Experimental Details

Interventions

Intervention(s)
We replicate the three main treatments (Brute Luck, Market Luck, and Effort) from the study previously conducted in the US (AEARCTR-0011869). For this replication, we recruit participants from an online sample in France.
Intervention Start Date
2024-07-19
Intervention End Date
2024-12-31

Primary Outcomes

Primary Outcomes (end points)
The redistributive behavior of third-party spectators.
Primary Outcomes (explanation)
The main outcome is the inequality implemented by a spectator.

The hypotheses we test are identical to those in the original study (for more details, refer to the corresponding pre-analysis plan). In other words, we will test whether spectators implement different levels of inequality across the different treatments.

Additionally, we will compare the levels of implemented inequality and treatment effects between the different countries.

Secondary Outcomes

Secondary Outcomes (end points)
Beliefs about free-markets, inequality, and fairness.
Secondary Outcomes (explanation)
We include a set of survey questions to measure participants' beliefs about free markets. This allows us to construct an index of individuals' free-market attitudes. In addition to collecting basic sociodemographic information about participants (such as gender, income, and education), this also enables us to explore the heterogeneity of treatment effects.
We also elicit people's attitudes toward redistribution in general and their trust in the government.

Experimental Design

Experimental Design
The experiment replicates the design of a study previously conducted with a participant sample in the US (AEARCTR-0011869). For a detailed pre-analysis plan, please refer to the pre-registration of the original study.

Experimental Design Details
Not available
Randomization Method
Individuals will be randomized by a computer.
Randomization Unit
Individual randomization
Was the treatment clustered?
No

Experiment Characteristics

Sample size: planned number of clusters
About 1500 spectators, 300 workers, and 50 producers.

Data for the French spectators will be collected through the panel provider Cint.
Sample size: planned number of observations
About 1500 spectators, 300 workers, and 50 producers. We include an attention check in our survey. Any participant who does not pass the attention check will be excluded from the analysis and will not count towards the number of completes.
Sample size (or number of clusters) by treatment arms
Spectators are assigned to one of the three treatments (brute luck, market luck, and effort) with equal probability (N=500).

One out of every ten spectators is assigned to a pair of workers, resulting in 100 workers per treatment.

Producers are only included in the market luck treatment.
Minimum detectable effect size for main outcomes (accounting for sample design and clustering)
A sample size of 500 per treatment will allow us to detect an effect size of nearly half the magnitude of our treatment effect from the US sample (0.068) at a conventional significance level (5%) and power (80%). This will provide sufficient power to determine whether inequality acceptance differs not only in levels but also across treatments in the different countries.
Supporting Documents and Materials
IRB

Institutional Review Boards (IRBs)

IRB Name
Human Subjects Committee of the Faculty of Economics, Business Administration, and Information Technology
IRB Approval Date
2024-07-12
IRB Approval Number
2024-065
Analysis Plan