Signals of Consent

The study involves an incentivized consent game where individuals express written consent to participate in a pleasant or unpleasant task. Expressing written consent incurs a cost, while remaining silent is cost-free. These tasks, involving viewing images from a validated psychological survey, are designed to evoke emotions similar to those felt when one's consent is regarded or disregarded. Two treatment variations will evaluate consent violations under “yes means yes” (YmY) and “no means no” (NmN) legal models, with outcomes reflected in monetary losses or gains. There are two players, an Underperson and an Overperson, are randomly matched and given the same initial endowment. The game is one-shot, sequential, and the full set of payoffs is common knowledge. There are two possible states of the world: a pleasant or an unpleasant process for the Underperson. Only the Underperson knows the state, making this an asymmetric information game.

2024-08-12

2024-11-30

Whether people convey consent through explicit signal sending under YmY or NmN, (ii) whether silence is more often used to convey positive consent or negative consent, (iii) the interpretation of silence under each legal framework, (iv) the frequency of mismatches (i.e., cases where an Underperson and an Overperson end up in situations where their individual utilities are not maximized), and (v) how these first three points compare to the Baseline. We also compare the two court legislations by examining (i) the frequency with which the Underperson triggers a court case, (ii) the frequency of mismatches, (iii) the extent of signal violations by the Overperson and the Underperson's truthfulness in signal sending, and (iv) the welfare consequences in terms of monetary gains and losses.

In the survey, we elicit (i) demographics (such as gender, age, race, sexual orientation, and education), and (ii) individuals' perceptions of risk, trust, competitiveness, and social preferences. We will engage in a heterogeneity analysis based on these characteristics.

We will also analyze whether behavior in the consent game correlates with individuals' views on dating, sexual, and consenting behaviors. Additionally, we will examine the social appropriateness of real-life sexual consenting situations and explore how these views relate to behavior in the consent game.

The study involves an incentivized consent game where individuals express written consent to participate in a pleasant or unpleasant task. Expressing written consent incurs a cost, while remaining silent is cost-free. These tasks, involving viewing images from a validated psychological survey, are designed to evoke emotions similar to those felt when one's consent is regarded or disregarded. Two treatment variations will evaluate consent violations under “yes means yes” (YmY) and “no means no” (NmN) legal models, with outcomes reflected in monetary losses or gains. There are two players, an Underperson and an Overperson, who are randomly matched and given the same initial endowment. The game is one-shot, sequential, and the full set of payoffs is common knowledge. There are two possible states of the world: a pleasant or an unpleasant process for the Underperson. Only the Underperson knows the state, making this an asymmetric information game.

There are three stages in the consent game:

Stage one - Nature determines the state of the world. The Underperson then decides whether to send a signal (at a cost) or remain silent (cost-free) for the process to be enforced or not by the Overperson. In the pleasant world, the Underperson can send consent. In the unpleasant world, she can send no-consent.

Stage two – The Overperson observes the signal (or lack thereof) and decides whether to enforce or stop the process. At this stage, both players know that the Underperson benefits from the process being enforced if it is pleasant and suffers if it is not enforced. Conversely, the Underperson suffers if the process is enforced and benefits if it is not enforced when the process is unpleasant. The Overperson always benefits from enforcing the process, regardless of whether it is pleasant or unpleasant.

Stage three – If enforced, the Underperson undergoes the process.
In the pleasant process, the Underperson spends three minutes viewing tables overlaid on pleasant and joyful images, counting the number of 1’s, with any entry accepted as correct. She also receives an extra monetary bonus.

In the unpleasant process, the Underperson views tables overlaid on distressing images for three minutes, counting the number of 1’s. To receive payment, she must solve at least 10 tables. The Underperson can exit the task anytime by clicking an "Exit Study" button but keeps the participation fee. The Underperson also loses a percentage of her endowment.

If the Overperson does not enforce any process, the Underperson undergoes a neutral process, viewing tables without any overlaying pictures for three minutes and counting the number of 1’s, with a goal of solving at least 10 tables.

Consent Game - Yes means Yes
In this treatment, both players go through the three stages described earlier, followed by an additional fourth stage where the Underperson can trigger a court round against the Overperson under legislation resembling a "yes means yes" consent model (YmY). The Underperson has a high chance of success if the process was enforced and the Underperson stayed silent or sent a no-consent signal. If the Underperson wins the court round the Overperson loses part of the initial endowment.

Consent Game - No means No
In this treatment, both players go through the three stages described earlier, followed by an additional fourth stage where the Underperson can trigger a court round against the Overperson under legislation resembling a "no means no" consent model (NmN). The Underperson has a high chance of success only if the process was enforced and the Underperson sent a no-consent signal. If the Underperson wins the court round the Overperson loses part of the initial endowment.

Additional questionnaire
At the end of the experiment, we will elicit demographics, including gender identity, race, and sexual orientation. We will also gather information on individuals' attitudes towards risk and competition, as well as their social preferences and trust levels. Additionally, at the beginning of the consent game, participants report their age, education, income, employment status, and educational institution and location in the US.

Validation questionnaire
To correlate observed consent behavior in the game with sexual consent behavior, we will use a validation questionnaire. The questionnaire will include: (i) Views or experiences on dating, sexual, and consenting behaviors (England and Bearak, 2014). (ii) Vignettes to assess first and second-order beliefs on the social appropriateness of various behaviors on a date (Krupka and Weber, 2013).

Players are randomly assigned by a computer to the role of either Underperson or Overperson. Within each role, they are further randomly assigned to one of three treatments: Baseline, Yes means Yes (YmY), or No means No (NmN).

Individual

No

6000 individuals (3000 Underperson and 3000 Overperson)

6000 individuals (3000 Underperson and 3000 Overperson)

3000 Underperson and 3000 Overperson, where 1000 of each role are assigned to one of three treatments: Baseline, Yes means Yes (YmY), or No means No (NmN).

Our objective is to enlist around 3000 Underpersons and 3000 Overpersons equally divided into the three treatments, aiming for an effect size of approximately 0.2. We are striving for a targeted estimated power of 95\% at a significance level of 0.05 to test our primary hypotheses related to the frequency of staying in silence and enforcement of the processes conditional on the signal.